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nected with our moral nature, when it is considered, as it were, in the mass. The body of mankind undoubtedly look upon this subject, in its great outlines and as a whole, without attempting to penetrate and seize its elements. And, without unduly yielding to popular prejudices or abating from the dignity of philosophy, we may safely assert, that this is an inquiry on which an appeal may with propriety be made to the common experience, and the common convictions and expressions of the great body of men. And we no sooner make the appeal than we fiud that the testimony from that source is unanimous and unequivocal.

There are some truths which are so deeply based in the human constitution, that all men of all classes receive them and act upon them. They are planted deeply and immutably in the soul, and no reasoning, however plausible, can shake them. And, if we are not mistaken, the doctrine of the freedom of the will, as a condition of even the possibility of a moral nature, is one of these first truths. It seems to be regarded by all persons, without any exception, as a dictate of common sense and as a first principle of our nature, that men are morally accountable, and are the subjects of a moral responsibility in any respect whatever, only so far as they possess freedom, both of the outward action and of the will. They hold to this position as an elementary truth, and would no sooner think of letting it go, than of abandoning the conviction of their personal existence and identity. They do not profess to go into particulars, but they assert it in the mass, that man is a moral being only so far as he is free. And such a unanimous and decided testimony, bearing, as it obviously does, the seal and superscription of nature herself, is entitled to serious. consideration.

In view of the various suggestions of this chapter (and further illustrations to the same effect might be given if time would allow), we are abundantly authorized in the assertion, that the liberty of the will

is implied, and fully and clearly implied, in the fact of man's possessing a moral nature; and that, if he possesses such a nature, he possesses freedom.

CHAPTER V.

OTHER PROOFS OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

§ 121. Evidence of the freedom of the will from languages. IN bringing forward the various considerations which, however disconnected with each other in themselves, have yet a bearing on the subject before us, we proceed to remark further, that the existence of the freedom of the will may be argued with some degree of force from the structure of all languages.— We have already had occasion to make the remark, that every language is, in some important sense of the terms, a mirror of the mind; and that something may be learned of the tendencies of the mind, not only from the form or structure of languages in general, but even from the import of particular terms. Now it is undeniable, that the terms LIBERTY and FREEDOM, and other terms of equivalent import, are found in all languages; and that they are not only found in application to nations, but to individuals; and not only in application to outward actions, but to the acts of the Will. But if men are in fact and by their very constitution destitute of liberty of the will, it seems impossible to give any explanation of this state of things. So that it is a natural and irresistible inference, if we can infer the convictions and belief of men at all from the forms of speech, that they universally have a conviction and belief of their liberty in that respect. And we can give no explanation of the existence of such conviction or belief, except on the ground of the actual existence of that freedom to which the belief relates.

§ 122. Evidence from the occasional suspension of the will's acts. Another circumstance which may be adduced as an

indication and evidence of the FREEDOM of thẻ Will, is the fact of the occasional suspension or delay of its operations, when its action is solicited by the pressure of motives which happen to be various and conflicting in their kind, though all of them are alike powerful and urgent. Without attempting to explain how this suspension takes place, it is enough for our present purpose simply to state the fact, as it constantly presents itself to observation and notice, viz., that at times, when motives are thronging around the will in various directions, and are each and all of them clamorous for an action of the will favourable to themselves, the will nevertheless does not act. It is true, some persons will say, and probably with correctness, that this negation or suspension of action is itself to be regarded as a species of resolve or volitional determination; that while the will reserves itself, so to speak, for a movement based upon more mature inquiry, this very reservation of its action is itself an action. Without stopping to comment on this suggestion, it will be perceived that the essential idea still holds good and indisputable, viz., that the will not unfrequently, for some reason or other, whatever it may be, withholds its decision. in respect to claims that are urged by motives of no small efficacy. And this suspension of the will's action in respect to such claims (on whatever grounds it may happen, and whatever other course may be subsequently taken by the will) is undoubtedly to be regarded, in a candid view of the subject, as a characteristic and a proof of its freedom.

§ 123. Evidence of the freedom of the will from the control which every man has over his own motives of action.

There are various other considerations, which are entitled to more or less weight.-We have already seen that the will has its laws; and one of these laws is that it never acts, and is not capable of acting, except in connexion with antecedent motives. But it is a striking fact, and one worthy of special notice

in connexion with the will's freedom, that we ourselves have no inconsiderable degree of control over these motives. If the reader has in memory the remarks already made in the chapters in the First Part on the connexion among all the great departments of the mind, particularly on the relation of the Intellect to the Will and of the Sensibilities to the Will, he will be prepared to understand and receive the truth of this remark. Those motives which come in immediate contact with the will, and are most closely connected with its action, are deposited, not in the Understanding, but in the Sensibilities, are not mere perceptions of the intellect, but are impregnated with an infusion of desire and obligative feeling. Still they undoubtedly have a close connexion with the antecedent acts of the intellect. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that we should have the feeling of desire or the feeling of obligation, without an antecedent act of the intellect or understanding making known and identifying to us the particular object of desire, and the particular object to which the feeling of moral obligation relates. Hence, as the sensibilities act upon the will, and the understanding or intellect acts upon the sensibilities, we may in some degree control the will by enlightening the understanding. But it is the will which, more than anything else, is the counterpart, or the synonym perhaps, of the personal pronoun, of the I and We, which are so conspicuously introduced as agents; and it is the will, therefore, which, by adopting this process, controls itself. The volitional power, operating through the intellect, and requiring and compelling the intellect to investigate the subject before it, may contract or expand the horizon of motives by which it is surrounded, and in this way regulate by anticipation the possibilities and probabilities, if not the absolute certainty of its own ulterior action. We are presented, therefore, in this view of the subject, with an instance of self-regulation, obviously carried on under the control and within the limits of law, which is not only liber

ty in essence, but liberty in its most interesting and perfect form.

§ 124. The freedom of the will further shown from the attempts of men to influence the conduct of their fellow-men.

The freedom of the will seems to be evinced and proved, furthermore, from the manner in which we address our fellow-men when we wish them to pursue a certain course of conduct. When we request or require them to do a certain thing, we certainly act on the supposition that they have both the power and the liberty to do it. It would evidently be a very fruitless thing to attempt, by means of persuasion and argument, to move them in a certain direction, if they were the subjects of an inflexible destiny, and destitute of the power and liberty of acting in accordance with what is proposed. The view which men obviously take of their fellow-men is, that they are rational beings; that the considerations addressed to them will have their due weight; and that their acting or not acting in conformity with those considerations is a matter wholly within their own power, and in respect to which they are entirely and completely free.

§ 125. Further evidence from the observation of men's conduct. Among other sources of evidence in support of the proposition of the Will's freedom, we may confidently appeal to the observation of what is constantly taking place among men, as we behold them engaged in the pursuits and duties of life. Even a slight notice of their conduct fully justifies the assertion that men act universally as if they felt and knew themselves to be free. In making this statement, however, we may properly claim to be understood in the natural import of the terms. We speak of men in general, as we see them in the discharge of the common duties of life. and under the influence of ordinary motives, and not of those whose liberty of outward action is restrained by chains and dungeons; nor of those whose inward liberty has been perplexed and compromised by inor

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