CHAPTER I. NATURE OF MENTAL FREEDOM. § 91. Of bodily in distinction from mental freedom. HAVING thus, in the second Part of this discussion of the Will, assigned our reasons in support of the proposition THAT THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS, and having, in connexion with the main topic, indicated what some of these laws are, we next naturally proceed to consider the subject of its Freedom; a subject of perhaps equal importance and difficulty, and resting upon its own appropriate and specific grounds. It has sometimes been the method of writers on the Freedom of the will to introduce the subject with remarks in illustration of what may be termed bodily, in distinction from mental freedom. Although there is no such analogy between mental and bodily freedom as to enable us to diffuse much light from one to the other, it may not be lost time to offer a few remarks in explanation of what is meant by freedom of the latter kind.-Bodily freedom appears to consist in an exemption from any restraint on the corporeal action. So far as we are capable of putting forth any outward action at all, in accordance with some antecedent volition, so far are we in the actual possession and enjoyment of corporeal liberty.-And, on the other hand, inability of corporeal action, where the volition prompts us to make the attempt, may be regarded as a sort of slavery of the body. Accordingly, he who is shut up within the massy walls and doors of a prison, which he cannot possibly pass; he who is the subject of a weakening and paralyzing disease, which confines him to his chamber and his bed; he who is thrown from a precipice, and, in his descent, is obviously incapable of a contrary or upward motion; and all others in a like situation, whether it be from an abstraction of their personal power or the presence of some outward impediment, may with propriety be described, to the extent of their inability to conform their outward actions to the requisitions of the Will, as destitute of freedom; or, what is the same thing, as the subjects of necessity or enthralment, in the bodily or corporeal sense of enthralment or freedom. And this is all we have to say on the subject, because, according to the views we entertain in relation to it, bodily freedom or enthralment, which is a matter perfectly well understood and beyond all reach of controversy, throws no light at all, or, at least, but a feeble ray, upon the nature of the enthralment or liberty of the mind. § 92. Unsuccessful attempts to explain the nature of freedom. Accordingly, for the reason above intimated, it will be understood, that in what we have to say of Freedom, we mean freedom or liberty of the mind. Mental freedom has a nature appropriate to itself; it possesses an identity and a character of its own; it stands apart in the position and the fact of its own essentiality; and is not only an entirely distinct thing, but is as much more important than any mere corporeal liberty as the mind is more important than the body. In discussing the subject of the freedom of the mind (a phrase which we employ as interchangeable and synonymous with liberty of the mind), the inquiry first presenting itself is, what are we to understand by the term FREEDOM? This is a question which seems to have been asked, and to have elicited more or less attention in almost every age of the world. It is probably no exaggeration to say that many volumes have been written in illustration of the import of this single term. And if, to a considerable degree, these repeated efforts have proved unsuccessful, may we not suppose that it is owing, in part at least, to mistaken methods of inquiry? Or, perhaps, if right methods have been pursued, may not this ill success be attributable to the fact that the limits, which in the nature of things sometimes intercept and restrict their successful application, may not have been fully perceived? The history of philosophical opinions, which embraces the errors as well as the truths of human thought, sufficiently suggests the answer. § 93. Freedom, considered as an element of thought rather than as a thing in actual realization, is the name of a simple abstract idea. In attempting to throw some light upon the subject of freedom, we naturally call to mind the well-established doctrine of mental philosophy, that the mental states may properly be discriminated from each other, and arranged, in accordance with the facts in the case, under the heads of Simple and Complex. Accordingly, when we have fixed our attention upon any distinct subject of contemplation, which is complex in its character, and have resolved it into its parts, and have distinctly traced those parts to a position where there is no longer a possibility of a separation of them, we have then reached a boundary of analysis which it is not within the capacity of the human mind to go beyond. The elements of thought, which are disclosed in the issue of such a process, are entirely SIMPLE. Truly elementary and ultimate, they are deposited as deeply and strongly in the foundations of the intellectual edifice as it is possible for them to be. They are to be regarded, therefore, as constituting knowledge, and that, too, of the highest kind, although it is equally true that they are not susceptible of explanation, and that the person who does not know them of himself and by virtue of his own mental action can never know them from any other source. And, in accordance with these views, our first remark in illustration of the nature of FREEDOM or liberty is, that the term, when it is used abstractly, and as expressive of an intellectual perception rather than of a thing in actual realization, is the name of a simple thought or idea, the knowledge of which we can derive from the mind itself alone. This remark we consider of no small importance, since it has a direct bearing on all attempts at a verbal explanation of the |