ceeding to explain the import and to show the truth of this proposition, we have one remark to make here, viz., that the doctrine of the will's being subject to law is, as seems to us, confirmed by our Consciousness. Certain it is, we all of us have the testimony of our inward experience, that there is a relation, whatever may be its nature, and however difficult of explanation, between volition and motives. As a general statement (for we do not here speak of those actions which, in consequence of being frequently repeated, have become almost mechanical, nor of those which are entirely trifling and insignificant), no man is conscious of a volition who is not also conscious of a knowledge of some antecedent which constitutes the occasion, motive, or cause of the subsequent volition. And if so, then the testimony of consciousness may properly be adduced in support of the general position which we are endeavouring to maintain.

§ 79. The same confirmed by the fact of the will's not being a subject, but an attribute.

But returning to the specific subject of this chapter, viz., that laws of the will are involved in its own nature, we proceed to remark, that the faculty of the Will is not a distinct entity by itself, but rather an incident to, or an appurtenance of, something else; in other words, it is not the subject, which might more reasonably put forth claims of independence, but sustains the subordinate relation of an attribute. As the Will is evidently only one of the many attributes of that distinct and organized existence which we denominate the soul or mind, it is necessarily subjected. to all the conditions implied in that relation. If the Will, in its ordinary conditions, is not only free (a truth which is readily and fully conceded), but is capable also of a perfectly contingent action; if it be not only independent of compulsion, but independent also of all regulative oversight and control; if no principles whatever pervade its varieties of action, and secure to them something like symmetry and or

der; then, so far as we have an understanding in the matter, it is obviously not merely an attribute or part of that whole which we variously denominate the MIND or SOUL, but must be regarded as a distinct existence by itself. But if it be otherwise, and the Will is truly an attribute, as it undoubtedly is, then, like every other attribute, it is necessarily subordinate to the fundamental conditions of that existence or entity to which it belongs; and, from the nature of the case, cannot sustain the claims which have sometimes been set up for it, to a wholly irresponsible and independent action.

§ 80. The same confirmed by the fact that every exercise of the Will implies an object.

We may further argue the matter under consideration by a reference to the nature of the exercises of the will or volitions. If we rightly understand the subject, the very idea of volition implies some antecedent object. In other words, it is a condition or law of the Will's action, that it cannot put forth a volition except in reference to some object. It is perfectly obvious, in any given case, that there can be no determining upon it without something which is determined; no resolving without something resolved on; but as these are only other names for willing or volition, it is equally obvious that there can be no volition without an object towards which the act of the Will is directed. It is the same here as it is with the memory, desire, association, and the like. There can be no act of the memory without something which is remembered; no act of the desire without something which is desired; no act of association without some subject or object to which the principle of association attaches itself. But if, by universal admission, it would be altogether absurd to speak of remembrance, desire, and association without some object towards which they are directed or upon which they can operate, it would seem clearly to follow that volition without an object is no less an absurdity. It is

something impossible; something not admitted by the nature of the mind itself.

.

But if volition has in all cases an object, it cannot well be denied that its action is in all cases subjected to some law. This object, without which volition cannot exist, is, of course, a condition of its existence. And it is evident that everything which is a condition of action, is in some sense (and, we may add, in a true and very important sense) a law to that being or power which puts forth such action. The will, therefore, is, in its very nature, subject to law.

81. Confirmed also by the fact that every exercise of the will implies a motive.

Furthermore, such is the nature of the will, that it must in its exercise not only have an object, in reference to which it acts, but, what is not less important, it must have a motive to action. Sometimes the outward object is called a motive. But we speak now of the internal or subjective, in distinction from the external or objective motive. In this sense, we say, there must be a motive as well as an object. Both of these conditions of volitional action are indispensable. In the absence of either of them, it does not appear how any movement of the Will can possibly take place.

Place any object whatever before the mind; make it a distinct inquiry whether such object shall be obtained; reflect upon it for any length of time, and in view of any multitude of considerations; and, unless there exists in the mind that peculiar mental state which we denominate a motive, viz., some form of Desire or some sentiment of Obligation, the voluntary power will remain immutably and forever motionless. It is, therefore, another law of the Will, resulting from its own constitution or nature, THAT IT ACTS, AND ACTS ONLY, IN CONNEXION WITH MOTIVES.

The subject of Motives, in connexion with the doctrine of the Will, is a very interesting and important one. But we make scarcely more than a mere allu

sion to it here, because it will be necessary hereafter to resume it, and to examine it more particularly. We cannot forbear saying, however, that the outward or objective motive (more simply and precisely the OBJECT) is presented before the Will by the Intellect. The infernal or subjective motive, which, in philosophic strictness, is the true motive, is presented before the Will by the Sensibilities. The former indicates the direction in which the movement of the Will is to be made; the latter furnishes the proximate cause or ground of the movement. Both, as has been stated, are indispensable to the Will's action; but the circumstance, that the one is Intellective and the other Sentimentive in its origin, forever distinguishes them from each other.

§ 82. Confirmed also by the fact that every exercise of the will implies belief.

In introducing those considerations which are now presented to the reader's notice, we are aware that we are repeating, to some extent, what has already been said in a former chapter. We shall, therefore, state them much more concisely than we might otherwise feel at liberty to do.

Another law of the Will involved in its own nature, and which we have already had occasion to notice, is, that FAITH is a condition of volition. In other words, we cannot put forth an exercise of the Will or volition in respect to any given thing, without some degree of faith or belief in the practicability or attainableness of that thing.

We do not suppose that this law of the Will's action can be a matter of dispute. Whoever will make the experiment; whoever will endeavour to put forth a volition in reference to any object which he fully believes and knows to be beyond his power (for instance, in reference to flying in the air, or the creation of a tree or stone), will assuredly satisfy himself of the impracticability of the attempt. In every case of this kind, there is an utter destitution or negation

of belief. The person does not believe, even in the slightest degree, in the practicability of the thing. And, therefore, he not only does not, but he cannot will it. Such is his nature.

Furthermore, it seems to be a subordinate law of the Will, allied to, and growing out of, that which has just been mentioned, although there is perhaps a little more uncertainty attending it, that the degree of the volitional energy, in cases where belief actually exists, will be in proportion, or nearly so, to the intensity or measure of belief. In other words, if our belief in the practicability of a thing is full and strong, the voluntary effort which we shall make will be likely, if other things do not concur to prevent this result, to partake of the energy of our faith. And, on the other hand, if our belief be vacillating and weak, the natural result will be, that the volition, the effort of the voluntary faculty, will be proportionately vacillating and powerless. (See, on this subject, part i., chap. iii.)

§ 83. Statement of other laws that are involved in the constitution or nature of the will itself.

Another law of the Will, involved in its own nature as that nature is ascertained by consciousness and general observation, is, that in its exercise it has exclusive relation to our own actions, and to whatever may be truly dependent upon us, but not to anything beyond this limit. This law of the Will's action has been already (part i., chap. iii.) so fully explained and illustrated by examples, that it is unnecessary to delay upon it here.

We may refer here also to the law of the Will, that its action is always prospective; always looks forward to the future. It is not like the feelings of regret and remorse, for instance, that are always looking backward; it is not like the memory, which is continually diving after and bringing up images from the abyss of things that are gone by; but, although present in itself, it continually contemplates results