the position which we are now examining in regard to the Will.

§ 71. Prescience or foresight of men in respect to their own situation. and conduct.

In the first place, man can foretell (we do not say with perfect certainty, nor is that at all essential to our argument) his own situation, actions, and success at some future time.

Take a very simple illustration. A man proposes to go to Boston or New York, or to some place of common resort, no matter where it is, for the purpose of transacting business there. The execution of a design of this nature, although it is difficult to mention one more common and simple, implies the putting forth of hundreds and thousands of volitions. And it is undoubtedly the fact, that the object in view cannot be effected without this great number of volitions. And yet we perceive that this person goes forward with confidence, and that he makes his calculations. without fear, and with a feeling of certainty that he will be able to execute them. He evidently proceeds upon the supposition (although he may not be fully conscious of it at the time, and may never have made it a matter of distinct reflection) that the operations of the Will exist in reference to some fixed principles, and particularly in connexion with motives in their various kinds and degrees. And looking at his proposed undertaking with care, and understanding well the claims, both of interest and duty, which are involved in it, he determines or wills in reference to the general plan before him, whatever it may be, without even doubting that all the future acts of the volitional power will be accordant with its requisite details, and that, in due season, it will be brought to a fulfilment in all its parts. But we may assert with confidence, that this could never be done if volitions were entirely contingent; in other words, if they were without laws. For if this last were the case, he would be just as likely to go to Providence as Boston, to Al

bany as New York, or to any other place whatever, as to that where he first determined to go, and would be just as likely to do the direct opposite as that particular business which he designed to accomplish at his first setting out.-And the views, applicable in this particular case, will apply to the multiplied occurrences and duties of every week and day. And they furnish of themselves, and independently of every other argument which may be brought up, but little short of a demonstration of what we are attempting to establish.

§ 72. Foresight of men in respect to the conduct of others.

In the second place, men are able to foretell, with a considerable degree of certainty, the situation, actions, and success of others at some future time. This is so notorious as not unfrequently to have elicited the remark, that there is a certain regular order in the conduct of men, in some degree analogous to the regular course of things, which we never fail to observe in the physical world. Men may everywhere be found who would no more hesitate to predict the precise conduct of their neighbours in certain assignable circumstances, than they would to predict that trees of a certain kind will grow in a given situation.

A

Some instances will illustrate what we mean. poor man goes to a rich man in the same neighbourhood, who is a confirmed and inexorable miser, for the purpose of borrowing a sum of money, but without being willing to give the large interest which he has been in the habit of receiving, and unable at the same time to furnish adequate security for the principal. Everybody knows that the miser will refuse his money at once. They expect and predict it with hardly less confidence than they predict that a stone thrown into the air will immediately fall to the earth's surface. A prisoner," says Mr. Hume, "who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of escape, as well when he considers the obstinacy of his guards as the walls and bars with which he is sur

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rounded; and in all his attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other." This remark of Mr. Hume is an important one, and, without question, is essentially correct. Undoubtedly it is sometimes the case that prisoners endeavour to effect their escape by working upon the passions and will of their guards, but in a vast majority of cases they consider their chance of escape much better by means of attempts made upon the stone and iron that enclose them. They understand so well the connexion between motive and volition, between interest and duty on the one hand and the resolves of the will on the other, that, with the knowledge they possess of the character and situation of those who are appointed to act as their guards, they consider their escape by means of any collusion with them, or any assistance from that source, as an utter impossibility.*

§ 73. Other familiar instances of this foresight.

But we will now proceed to give some instances which are less remote from common observation. The reader may perhaps recollect some remarks of Dr. Paley relative to our constant dependence on our fellow-men. "Every hour of our lives we trust and depend upon others; and it is impossible to stir a step, or, what is worse, to sit still a moment, without such trust and dependence. I am now writing at my ease, not doubting (or, rather, never distrusting, and, therefore, never thinking about it) but that the butcher will send in the joint of meat which I ordered; that his servant will bring it; that my cook will dress it; that my footman will serve it up; and that I shall

* Expressions very similar to those of Mr. Hume, and certainly not less strong in their import, are found in a Treatise of Lord Kames (Principles of Morality, pt. i., Essay iii.), and also in the work of Dr. Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings, part ii.-"We can foretell," says the last-mentioned writer, "the respective effects which a tale of distress will have upon a cold-hearted miser and a man of active benevolence with the same confidence with which we can predict the different actions of acid upon an alkali and upon a metal."

find it on the table at one o'clock."*-And this is a state of things which is constantly occurring, not only in the matter of the daily food necessary for the support of our lives, but in a thousand other instances. The merchant depends upon his clerks; the manufacturer upon his numerous operatives of all classes and conditions; the farmer, who works upon a large scale, depends upon the hands of others as much as he does upon the labour of his own hands; the commander of a vessel constantly reckons upon the efficient cooperation of his sailors; the leader of armies relies upon the movements of vast bodies of men made with the utmost precision in the most trying circumstances. And it is the same in all situations, and among all classes of men, as any one, who will in the least trouble himself to exercise his recollection, will be abundantly satisfied. But if all these persons operated by mere accident, and without regard to any fixed principles; if it were a matter of entire contingency whether they should perform their engagements or not, it is easy to see that all the sources of enjoyment and even of existence would be destroyed, and the foundations of society speedily broken up.

§ 74. The fact of laws of the will shown from the regularity of voluntary contributions and of deposites.

In connexion with the topic now before us, viz., that we are able to foretell, with a considerable degree of certainty, the situation and actions of others at some future time, we request the attention of the reader to a class of facts which are somewhat peculiar. It cannot have escaped the notice of any one as in some degree a characteristic of modern times, that there are a multitude of benevolent associations, whose receipts depend wholly upon voluntary contributions. But, notwithstanding the fact of their income being wholly voluntary, which, if experience had not shown to the contrary, would be exceedingly discouraging, they proceed in their affairs with near

* Moral Philosophy, book iii., chap. v.

ly or quite the same confidence as if they had a fixed capital to operate with. They send out missionaries, establish schools, translate the Scriptures, explore unknown and barbarous countries, plant colonies, erect. churches, and engage in other important and expensive undertakings, without a cent of money except what comes from voluntary gifts. They make their calculations beforehand as to what they can accomplish in a given time, and not unfrequently incur heavy expenses in anticipation of their receipts. Their true capital is a knowledge of the operations of the human mind under certain assignable circumstances. These circumstances they are in a good degree acquainted with, and hence are enabled to anticipate the amount of their receipts for a given time with almost as much accuracy as the merchant or farmer, who has an actual capital already in his possession to operate with. Does not this circumstance go, with others, to show that the Will has its laws?

Without enlarging further upon this topic, we merely observe, that it reminds us of another interesting fact somewhat analogous to this. It is, that banks issue bills and lend money upon their deposites, and often to a great amount. They take this course, as they believe, and as they have undoubted reason to believe, with almost entire safety. By observation, they ascertain that their customers (although the ability of their customers to do it evidently depends on a thousand apparent contingencies) deposite a certain amount, or nearly so, within a given time. They find, as a general thing, that the variation in the amount received in specified times is not greater than the variation of the receipts of an individual who is largely engaged in business; and they consider this state of things basis enough for very extended transactions. But could this, or anything else of the same kind, possibly be, if the Will were wholly exempt from everything having the nature of well defined and permanent principles of action?