et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus."* No person who examines the whole of this remarkable passage with care will fail to perceive that its author had in his conceptions the idea of a great central Power, possessed of perfect wisdom and justice, from whom emanates a paramount and controlling influence, which is binding upon nations as well as individuals, which extends to all parts of his dominions, making one of many, and harmonizing them all by requiring them to act in subjection to himself.

§ 52. Remarks of Hooker on the same subject.

We cannot forbear introducing here, as in accordance with the sentiments of this chapter, the memorable expressions of Hooker, although at the risk of repeating what may already be familiar to the reader. "Of law, no less can be said than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different spheres and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."+

We cannot agree with those, if such there are, who may be disposed to set down this sublime passage as a species of rhetorical exaggeration, an instance of well-selected and sounding language rather than of well-adjusted thought; but would rather regard it as the expression of a reality, uttered on the most sober consideration; a reality perhaps not perfectly obvious to minds of limited expansion, but of which undoubtedly the learned and eloquent writer, whose mind seems to have been open to the entrance of divine intuitions, had a clear and impressive perception. The train of thought which pervades the passage is

* Cicero, De Repub., lib. iii.

† Hooker's Eccles. Polity, bk. i.

essentially identical with that of Cicero. It involves and indicates the sublime truth, that law, the great bond of the Universe, finds its origin and support in the bosom of the Deity, and is, in its basis or elements, co-substantial with his nature; and going forth from that primitive and prolific centre in every possible direction, like rays from the sun, embraces, harmonizes, and controls every form and modification of being, whether intelligent or unintelligent.

We have a strong presumptive argument, therefore, from the general analogies of nature, both mental and material, that the will has not, and cannot have an exemption from law.

§ 53. The universality of law, including laws of the will, necessarily implied in the idea of God.

And let us look a little further. Is it too much to say that the idea of a God, an idea accepted by the people of all nations and in all ages, necessarily embraces and implies the notion of the universality of law? It will be conceded, I suppose, that the idea which men form of God involves the fact of his supremacy. He is regarded, in the just analysis of this great conception, as not only unlimited in power and boundless in knowledge, but as supreme in the administration of his government. To deny either the one or the other, either his omniscience, or his almightiness, or the supremacy of his administration, would be nothing less than to dethrone Him from his place in the universe, and virtually to deny his existence as Deity. Can that power properly be called omnipotent, within the sphere of whose operations there are objects which are entirely exempt from its supervision and control? Can that wisdom properly be called omniscient, which knows not what will be the determinations and acts of men in all assignable circumstances, in all time and place? Can that government be, with any propriety of language, denominated a Supreme government, within whose limits there are agents who are not reached and bound by

any of those ties, even the feeblest of them, which operate to unite the circumference to the centre, and to combine and assimilate the multiplied parts under one common head? We must repeat it, therefore, if there is a God, there must be a law, in other words some pervading and effective bond of connexion between himself and his creatures, which is, in the strict sense of the word, UNIVERSAL.

§ 54. An argument thus furnished in favour of laws of the will. And what, then, shall we say of the Will? Does not the position, that the Will is not subject to laws, imply an anomaly in the universe? Whatever is not under some sort of control, but is entirely irregular, contingent, and exempt from all conditions, is necessarily irresponsible to the supervision of anything, even. God himself. We have, then, a strong À PRIORI argument, drawn from the being of God, in addition to that drawn from the general analogies of nature, in support of the proposition that the Will has its laws. Especially when we consider the relation which the Will sustains to the other mental powers; that its action constitutes the great result to which the operation of the other parts of our nature tends; in other words, that, in all cases of movement or exertion, the volition is the consummation of all the other mental acts, and, in effect, represents the whole mind. If the Will acts accidentally or contingently, by which is meant out of and beyond the sphere of law, then the man_acts contingently; and while he retains this alleged specific character of acting in this way, he is not only independent of all law, thus destroying that peace and joy of which Hooker asserts her to be the mother, but he stands in a position in which he cannot be controlled even by the Deity himself. He has suffered a revulsion from the parent stock; he has gone off and set up for himself; he has established an empire of his own, where even the Most High must not enter; a state of things which certainly finds no parallel among the other existences powers, and

intelligences of the universe, and which is rebuked alike by the conclusions of reason and by the suggestions of virtue.

CHAPTER II.

LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT. § 55. Of the existence of a moral government.

THE argument at the close of the last chapter, an argument involved in the generally accepted idea of the being and relations of God, naturally leads us to a brief consideration of moral government in general. The doctrine of a moral government, in distinction from the facts and philosophy of mere physical control, is well worthy the attention of the student. Perhaps there is no subject more important. But in introducing this subject as we do, in connexion with the doctrines of the Will, our special object is to show that the will's subjection to law, or more exactly, perhaps, its action in harmony with law, is necessarily implied in the fact of moral government.

We, of course, assume in the argument that we are reasoning with those who fully believe and admit that Moral Government exists, and that men are subjects. of it. Certainly there is ample evidence that such is the case, independently of what is taught on the subject in Revelation. The light of nature clearly and strikingly indicates that a moral government, extending its authority over the human race in particular, has an existence. "Mankind," says Bishop Butler, who has investigated this subject with his acknowledged ability and candour, " find themselves placed by God in such circumstances that they are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour, and are often punished, and sometimes rewarded under his government, in the view of their being mischievous or eminently beneficial to society."* Revelation, whatever

* Butler's Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature, pt. i., ch. iii.

may be the clearness or obscurity of the indications of unaided nature, places the existence of such a moral government beyond all doubt. We suppose, therefore, the fact of such a government to be admitted.

§ 56. Laws of the will deducible from the first principles of moral government.

If a moral government exists, as is assumed to be the fact, and is known to be so, then it has its first principles or elements. It must, of course, have its predominant traits, its distinctive characteristics, some admitted and essential truths. If these traits or principles are assented to, they must obviously be assented to with such consequences as may fairly attach to them, whatever those consequences may be. And hence the mode of our reasoning.

In conducting the argument drawn from this source, we shall attempt to point out some of those things which are universally understood to be implied in, and to be essential to, a moral government; and as these elementary principles are successively pointed out, shall briefly examine their application to the subject under inquiry. And in this way we propose to make it appear, that the doctrine of the subjection of the volitional power to laws is implied in the existence of moral government. And if such a government exists, which is conceded to be the fact, then the doctrine in question is true.

§ 57. Laws of the will inferred from that supremacy or paramount authority which is implied in a moral government.

Every moral government implies, in the first place, a ruler, a governor, some species of supreme authority. The term government itself, separate from any qualifying epithet, obviously expresses the fact that there are some beings governed, which is inconveivable without the correlative of a higher and governing power. And what is true of all other government, is certainly not less so of that species of government which is denominated moral government. In all mor