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CHAPTER I.

LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE UNIVERSALITY OF

LAW.

§ 47. The preceding chapters preparatory to what follows. THE remarks that have thus been made in the First Part of the doctrine of the Will have had relation to its general nature. It seemed important to take this general view. It was obviously necessary, before entering into the examination of the long-contested topics that are to follow, to review concisely the outlines of the mind in its three great departments, and to indicate their relations to each other. It seemed especially necessary, when we consider the mistakes that have prevailed upon that point, to assert and maintain the distinction existing between Desire and Volition. Nor was it enough to inquire into those things which distinguish the Will from the other mental departments, and to point out their relations. It seemed to be requisite also to indicate briefly some particulars which are especially characteristic of the Will, in itself considered, and which contribute to constitute its essential and distinctive nature. And in looking back upon what has been brought forward, we indulge the hope that some doubts have been cleared up, and some important principles established.

And it seems to come in place to add here, that in everything which has been said there has been an object. Every part of this discussion of the will is more or less connected with all other parts, and, perhaps, more closely than would at first seem probable. And accordingly, the doctrines and principles which have been brought forward, and more or less elucidated and established, are introductory to three distinct series of views of great interest in themselves, as well as of great practical importance, having relation respective

ly to the Laws, the FREEDOM, and the POWER of the Will. These leading topics will be successively considered.

§ 48. Of the importance of the topics now entered upon.

In examining the matters of inquiry which are to follow, particularly the Laws and the Freedom of the will, we presume to say that we have a claim on the strict and candid attention of the reader. While few questions present themselves to one's notice of greater interest than these, a regard to historical truth requires it to be added, that on few has there been a greater difference of opinion. These inquiries, moreover, which lie so closely at the root of human accountability, are as important as they are interesting, not only in a speculative point of view, and as presenting complicated and difficult problems for solution, but also on account of their practical results. If a man, for instance, adopts the opinion that there is no such thing as freedom of the will, and that men are the subjects of an irresistible fatality, it will generally follow that his practice will be correspondent to such a belief. Placing an erroneous interpretation on the words of Solomon, that "time and chance happen to all men,' such persons throw themselves upon the wave of their destiny, and are floated onward with an utter disregard of the issue, whether it be good or evil, shameful or glorious. No matter what takes place, say they; it is all from a higher power; and it would be wholly ineffectual and presumptuous in mere insects to prescribe plans for the Deity. The greatest circumspection, the most arduous labours, the most invincible determination, will effect nothing against the allotted and predestined course of events. Philosophers may speculate, and political cabinets may lay their plans; but, after all, the fate of Europe may depend, as it has once depended, upon a dispute about a pair of gloves, or some other trivial circumstance which happens to form a link in the unalterable chain of destiny.

* See the Prince of Machiavel, ch. xxv., and Examen du Prince.

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On the other hand, if a person fully believes that all things are in his own power, in the sense of excluding a wise and efficient superintendency, it leads to a presumptuous self-confidence altogether unsuitable and dangerous. Puffed up with an unwarrantable self-conceit, he does not feel the need of asking aid from on high; he does not conform his conduct to the indications of Divine Providence, but lays his plans, and attempts their execution, wholly in his own strength.

These respective systems, when adopted to the exclusion of other views which might control and modify them, may justly be pronounced false and dangerous, and as inconsistent with sound philosophy as they are with private duty and the general good. We are authorized, therefore, in saying, that the particular subjects on which we now propose to enter are very important in a practical point of view. It will be our desire and purpose to examine them with that care and candour which their practical importance demands.

§ 49. The inquiry, whether the will has its laws, preliminary to that of its freedom.

In order to approximate the true notion of the Freedom of the WILL, an inquiry which will receive particular attention in its place, it seems proper to attempt the settlement of a preliminary question, viz., whether the will is subject to laws, or more accurately, perhaps, whether it acts in harmony with laws. If it be true, as we shall introduce some considerations to show, that the Will, in acting in harmony with law, may be said to have its laws of action, then the freedom of the Will, whatever may be its nature, must accommodate itself to this preliminary fact. We will assume here that the Will is free. Undoubtedly its freedom is susceptible of ample demonstration; and it is equally evident that the fact of its freedom is one of the highest importance; but if there be other mental facts equally demonstrable, then it follows from

the nature and relations of things that the freedom of the Will must exist in accommodation to such other facts, and can be such a freedom, and such only, as is consistent with them. This, it would seem, is a very obvious view, and hence it is exceedingly important that this point should be settled first. It will, accordingly, now be our object to propose certain considerations to show that THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS.

§ 50. Analogical argument from the fact that everything throughout nature has its laws.

In entering upon the question whether the Will has its laws, may we not reason, in the first place, from the general analogy of nature? If the outward universe is everywhere legibly inscribed and written over with the great truth that all things are subject to law, and if the human mind in other departments and powers exhibits evidence of the same great truth, are we not furnished with a strong presumption that we shall not discover an exception in man's volitional nature? As to the alleged fact on which we base this analogical presumption, there can hardly be a doubt of it.Let us look, in the first place, at material things. The parts of the earth are kept in their relative position by the operation of some fixed law; the various immense bodies, composing the system to which the earth belongs, are made to revolve in obedience to some unalterable principle; there is not even a plant, or a stone, or a falling leaf, or a grain of sand, which can claim an exemption from regulation and control. And what is true in these few instances is true in all. No certain and undoubted exception can be found.

And this great truth holds good also of things which have life and intelligence. We have had abundant evidence of this in the discussions in relation to the mind which have been gone through. Objects of a spiritual or mental nature (if not in precisely the same sense in which the assertion is applicable to matter, yet in some true and important meaning of the expressions) have their appropriate and determinate

principles of being and action. There may, indeed, be some things which are as yet unexplainable by man; there may be some objects of knowledge, to the full understanding of whose nature limited human reason cannot as yet reach; but still the vast majority of objects, both inward and outward, mental and material, coming within the ordinary range of our inspection, obviously tend to found and to foster the general conviction that there are laws wherever there are existences, whatever the kind or nature of the existence. -There is, therefore, a sublime truth in the remark of Montesquieu, with which he introduces his great work on the Spirit of Laws, where he says, after some suggestions on the meaning of the term, "all beings have their laws, the Deity his laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws."

§ 51. Remarks of Cicero on the universality of law.

The mention of Montesquieu, a name equally dear to literature and to the claims of rational liberty, naturally suggests the recollection of some men of a kindred genius. The idea of the universality of law, operating in all spheres of existence, has ever been familiar to minds that were particularly distinguished for expansiveness of thought and for philosophical sagacity. They seem to have seized upon this great truth at once and intuitively; not by the slow inductions of reasoning, but by a sort of instinct of intellect, which appropriately bears the name of intuition. The illustrious orator of Rome, among others, asserts the existence of a law which has its foundation in nature, and which is universal, uniform, and eternal. He declares God to be the author of it; and adds, that no man can exempt himself from its control without fleeing from himself, and without putting off and alienating his own nature. It is of this law and in connexion with these statements that he employs those celebrated expressions, "nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes

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