gives its testimony, which it is thought may be easily and clearly pointed out. Every one must have felt, what we have already noticed in the chapter on the general nature of desires, that our desires possess a very considerable degree of fixedness or permanency. Our volitions, on the contrary, change with great rapidity, exhibiting within their allotted sphere of operation a remarkable quickness and variety of movement. It is not equally so with the desires. We may, indeed, change them after a time, and ultimately secure a greater or less degree of conformity to what we conceive they ought to be. But they are so slow in movement, so heavy and refractory in the mutations they undergo, that they remind us rather of a burden to be borne than of a living and self-operating principle.

We believe that this statement will be easily and clearly understood. Can the man who is in prison suppress in a moment and without an effort his desires to see his beloved family? Can he who is an exile and a wanderer in a distant land easily cease to remember, and to long for the woods, and the green fields, and the mountain airs of his childhood? Every one must know, when a desire is once deeply implanted in the heart, how long it lingers, how hard it is to be overcome. But a fixedness of the desires in a particular direction does not necessarily imply a fixedness of the volition in the same direction. The will may be active when certain desires are immoveable, because there may be other objects of desire laying the foundation of its various decisions, or there may be objects of a moral nature presenting a still higher and nobler motive. When the heart is sick, and heavy, and burdened, the purpose and high resolve may be elastic and full of energy. We feel at liberty, therefore, to assert, as a general statement, that we are not conscious of that immoveableness of the volitional power, and that want of elasticity, which often attend the desires. But these statements, which, we presume to say, are founded on the common ex

perience, cannot be true, if desires and volitions are identical.

§ 37. Further proof of this distinction from language.

May it not also be said with a good degree of confidence, that, in the use of language, we have a further proof of the distinction between Desire and Volition? It is certainly the fact, that men commonly utter themselves, both in their ordinary conversation and in writing, in such a manner as to imply their conviction of a distinction between mere desires or wishes on the one hand, and purposes, resolves, or determinations on the other. As this distinction, so easily and frequently observed, may be found prevalent, not in one only, but in all languages, it may well be regarded as a strong evidence of the universal consciousness on the subject. This fact has been noticed, and set in a strong light by Dr. Reid.-" Desire and Will agree in this, that both must have an object of which we must have some conception; and, therefore, both must be accompanied with some degree of understanding. But they differ in several things. The object of desire may be anything which appetite, passion, or affection leads us to pursue; it may be any event which we think good for us, or for those to whom we are well affected. I may desire meat, or drink, or ease from pain; but to say that I will meat, or will drink, or will ease from pain, is not English. There is, therefore, a distinction in common language between desire and will."

§ 38. Sentiments of esteem and honour often imply this distinction. It will further be seen, on a little reflection, that the distinction under consideration is implied in the sentiments of esteem and honour which, on various occasions, we entertain in respect to others. It seems to be the fact, that we often bestow esteem and honour on a person because he has resisted and withstood the obvious tendency of his own inclinations or desires. We will take a very common instance, that of

the confirmed drunkard. The wine sparkles before him; his tongue and throat are parched, and the strongest desires arise. But conscience at the same time urges upon him the claims of his family, his country, and his God. After enduring this inward conflict for a season, he resolves, he wills, he acts, and dashes the alluring bowl to the ground. Every one rejoices at, and honours the deed. But it cannot be because the desire has been gratified, but because the person has willed and acted against desire; because, in the opposing array and contest of the powers of his inferior nature, desire has been beaten, and the sense of obligation and duty has triumphed by the award of the only possible umpire, viz., the Will. We evidently make a distinction, in all such cases, between the cravings of a man's appetite, which necessarily involve desire, and the act of volition, by which the tendency of such desire is counteracted.

This illustration reminds us of an additional statement of Dr. Reid on this subject." With regard to our actions," he remarks, "we may desire what we do not will, and will what we do not desire; nay, what we have a great aversion to. A man athirst has a strong desire to drink, but, for some particular reason, he determines not to gratify his desire. A judge, from regard to justice and the duty of his of fice, dooms a criminal to die, while from humanity or particular affection, he desires that he should live. A man for health may take a nauseous draught, for which he has no desire, but a great aversion. Desire, therefore, even when its object is some action of our own, is only an excitement to the will, but is not volition. The determination of the mind may be not to do what we desire to."*

§ 39. Strictures on the foregoing remarks of Reid.

We are not ignorant that this very passage of Dr. Reid has called forth some strictures, the object of which is to show that its statements are in some re

* Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Essay ii., chap. i.

spects defective. It has been contended, that, in the instances above adduced by Dr. Reid, the volition has reference to the muscular motion, and to that alone. In respect to the judge who pronounces the doom of his prisoner, it is maintained by the objector that the judicial announcement is the result of volition, so far, and so far only, as volition puts certain muscles in motion; and that all such acts of volition are identical in their nature with desires. And a like view is maintained to hold good of all similar cases, viz., that no volition exists except in respect to the muscular action which immediately follows, and that such volition is not different from desire. Upon views of this kind we have two remarks to make.

In the first place, if we were to admit the correctness of limiting the application of volition to the production of mere muscular motion, still it would not follow that volition and desire are identical. But, on the contrary, in regard to muscular motion, as in all other cases, we may confidently assert that they are entirely distinct from each other, although we are ready to admit, as a general thing, that they do not stand in opposition. It is undoubtedly true that we are sometimes liable to confound with the desires those volitions which have no higher office than the mere regulation of the muscles, in consequence of their generally being in the same direction, and the volition being in immediate succession to the desire, and both existing perhaps in a very slight degree. Still we may safely appeal to every one's consciousness, whenever he bestows a suitable examination on the subject, whether he is not able, even in very slight instances of muscular movement, to draw a distinction between the desire and the volition. The desire to move the muscles of the foot, or hand, or throat, may have existed for minutes or hours; but, till the volition came, there was no motion; nor had the desire the least possible tendency to secure the motion, except through the medium of volition. A man goes from his house to his counting-room; and it is readily admitted that

he puts forth various acts of volition, that he wills to arise from his chair, that he wills to open the door of his house, to set one foot before another, and that all his muscular movements are preceded by volitions. And we may admit also that he had a desire to put forth these successive acts; but it does not at all follow that the volitions were identical with the desires, any more than that they were identical with the various sensations and perceptions which existed at the same time. On the contrary, in all instances whatever, the distinction between the two exists, although it may be less obvious at some times than others. The desire (the same as in other analogous cases of a higher kind) is merely the forerunner and preparative of whatever is to be done; the distinct act of volition is necessary to the execution of it.

§ 40. Volition may exist in respect to those complex acts which the mind can embrace as one.

But we remark, in the second place, as we had occasion to show in the preceding chapter, that there may be volition in respect to combined action and plans of action, as well as in respect to single acts. He who supposes that volition is exercised solely and exclusively in reference to the motion of the muscles, must have a very inadequate notion of the sphere in which this part of the mind is called to operate. This view will seem the more admissible when we consider that we have it in our power to give a mental unity to actions, which, as they are successively brought to their fulfilment, are many, and are distinct from each other. It is presumed that the existence of this ability will not be denied. Dr. Brown himself, in whose writings the strictures on the views of Dr. Reid are found, acknowledges that we can give a unity in 66 In our conception to things which are complex.

considering," he remarks, "the physical changes which come under our view, it is impossible for us, in many cases, not to give a sort of unity, in our conception, to phenomena which are in their nature complex.