will itself, will be found to depend on various causes, two of which are particularly worthy of notice.-In the first place, as volitions cannot exist except in respect to those things which we believe to be in our power, the strength of the volition will naturally be in proportion to the strength of such belief. It has already been seen, that, where there is no belief of an object's being attainable, there can be no volition; and we should, therefore, conclude À PRIORI, that the natural tendency of a diminution of belief would be to operate a correspondent diminution of the volitional energy. Accordingly, we find it to be generally the fact, that, whenever the possibility of securing any object in view is decidedly doubtful, the volitional act, imbibing a sort of contagious hesitancy, becomes wavering and weak. We may, accordingly, lay it down as a general truth, that the strength of volitions will depend, in part at least, on the probability of securing the object placed before us. We do not mean to say that there is necessarily no energy of volition where one's path is hedged up with doubts and difficulties, for it is not unfrequently otherwise; but merely to assert, that the tendency of such doubts and difficulties is, all other things being equal, to infuse into such energy a mixture of vacillancy and lassitude. And hence it is a common artifice, if a man wishes to shake another's resolution, to represent to him the difficulties in the way of his success, and to insist on the improbability of his securing the object before him. And if we notice carefully, we shall find it to be generally true, although it may not always be the case, that a person's efforts will become enfeebled and less energetic in proportion as he yields credence to such discouraging statements. And a diminution of active efforts, of course, implies a diminution of volitional

power.

§ 32. Further illustrations of the same subject.

(2.) The strength of the volition will depend, furthermore, upon the state of the Sensibilities. If, for

instance, our desires are strongly directed towards a particular object, and if there be no antagonist feeling arising up to obstruct and counteract them, it may be expected that the volition will be proportionably strong. And if it happen in any given case that these strong desires are approved and aided by the feelings of obligation, the motive to action will thus be greatly increased, and the force of the volitional determination or resolve will be likely to be increased in proportion. And if it be the case that there is not only a concurrence of the Obligatory feelings with the Desires, but that the feelings of obligation as well as the desires are intense and energetic, it may reasonably be anticipated that the energy of the volitional act will still further be augmented. And there is ground for saying even farther than this, that it is in the combination of the proximate and side-by-side states of desires and obligations, existing at the same time in the highest degree and in reference to the same object, that the very highest energy of the volitional act is attained.

CHAPTER IV.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIRES AND VOLITIONS. § 33. Of an objection sometimes made to the general arrangement. In making the general classification of intellective, sentimentive, and volitional states of the mind, it is necessarily involved that we separate Volitions, which constitute the third class, from Desires, which are included in and make a part of the second. Of the correctness of this general arrangement, in its great features, we cannot permit ourselves to doubt, with the various proofs in its support which present themselves from all sides. But it cannot be denied, that, in one respect, which we now proceed to notice, it has not been perfectly satisfactory. We refer to the objection sometimes made and urged with some confidence, that, although volitions may clearly be distinguished

from intellections and also from emotions, they are not so easily distinguished from that portion of the Sensibilities which are denominated the DESIRES. Indeed, by some writers, and writers too of no small note and influence, they have been considered the same as desires, and their claim to a distinct and independent nature has been wholly rejected.

As the general arrangement of the mind into three great departments is a fundamental one, and is absolutely essential and indispensable to a true knowledge of the Will, it is proper to attempt, not only to establish it by direct proofs in its favour, which was done in one of the introductory chapters, but to meet and obviate any objections which may have been made against it, whether those objections relate to the arrangement as a whole or to any of its parts. The objection which has been referred to is one of special importance, and we shall proceed to bestow that notice upon it which its prominence claims for it. We speak of it as important, because it is undoubtedly true, that much of the obscurity which has rested upon the whole subject of our Volitional nature has been owing to a mistake here. And obscurity will exist as long as the mistake continues. We may even assert with confidence that the greatest minds will fail of bringing the important inquiries involved in this discussion to a satisfactory conclusion, without first fully and correctly settling this point, viz., that the state of mind which we term VOLITION, though the two are closely connected in the relation of antecedence and sequence, is entirely distinct in its nature from that which we term DESIRE.

§ 34. Probable cause of confounding desires and volitions.

Before proceeding to propose our comments on the subject before us, we may properly make the remark, that it is, on the whole, not extraordinary that this tendency to confound Volitions with the Desires should exist. We always find it difficult to separate and discriminate those things which have been long

and strongly associated. Now it is well known that volitions and desires are in fact very closely united together, as antecedences and sequences. By the very constitution of our minds they go together, and are the sequents and precursors of each other. We do not mean to say or to intimate that the acts of the Will are based upon the desires alone, exclusive of every other possible motive or ground of its exercise. But it is undoubtedly true, that the desires constitute the sole antecedent causes of volition (by which we mean the sole grounds or occasions of volition), in a multitude and perhaps a considerable majority of cases. In the discharge of the common duties of life, in those every-day matters which concern what we shall eat and with what we shall be clothed, it is undeniable that we generally choose those things and pursue that course of conduct which are most pleasing and which most strongly excite our desires. In other words, our desires and our volitions go together. The one precedes, and the other follows. And, in consequence of this regular consecution, which is also, for the most part, very quick or rapid (so much so, in fact, as hardly to furnish any basis for remembrance), we gradually fall into the habit of confounding the two together, and at last come to believe that there is, in truth, no difference between them.

§ 35. Desires and volitions discriminated in our consciousness. With the single further remark that the tendency mentioned in the preceding section to confound together these two states of mind, ought to be carefully guarded against, we proceed to the consideration of some things, clearly evincing the distinction between them which we maintain to exist. And the inquiry naturally presents itself here, as in respect to every other mental state, How do we obtain a knowledge of either of them? If we consult our consciousness, which we are obliged to regard as an original and authoritative source of knowledge, notwithstanding the unphilosophical attempts which have been made to re

move it from that important position, we find it decisively ascribing to the desires a distinct existence, and a distinct and specific character. If we consult it again, we find it returning an answer with equal decision and clearness, that volitions too have an existence and a character equally distinct and specific. But if consciousness asserts, in both cases, the reality of an existence stamped with a specific and distinctive character, it does not and cannot, in those same cases, assert a oneness or identity. On the contrary, it must be considered as decisively pronouncing an entire separation of the two things, as far as their nature is concerned, however nearly they may sometimes approach each other in their consecutive relations.

And it seems proper, when we consider the difficulties that have attended these inquiries, to insist upon this testimony from within. It is exceedingly desirable that every one should reflect carefully and patiently upon the nature of Desire and the nature of Volition, as they present themselves to our internal notice in those various circumstances of enticement, and temptation, and action in which we daily find ourselves placed. Those cases, in particular, deserve notice, which not unfrequently occur where the volitions exist, and where we resolve to carry our plans into effect, in disregard of certain opposing desires which have been overruled and baffled. Has not every man had this experience? When under the influence of high moral sentiments, has he not sometimes determined to pursue a course to the disappointment of many fond wishes, of many lingering and cherished desires? Now let him recall the mental feelings and acts at such times; let him carefully reflect upon them, and will not consciousness not only clearly indicate a distinction, but even assert the impossibility of an identity in the case under consideration? We cannot entertain a doubt that it will.

§ 36. Desires differ from volitions in permanency. There is one particular on which our consciousness