termining, resolving, or willing to that effect. Indeed, we are obviously so constituted, that, whenever we believe an object to be wholly and absolutely beyond our power, volition does not and cannot exist in respect to it. The farmer, for instance, in a time of severe drought, desires rain, but he does not will it. He is conscious of a desire, but he is not conscious of a volition. The very nature of the mind interposes in such a case, and effectually obstructs the origination of the volitional act. And this is so promptly and decisively done, and done too in all cases without exception, that we find it very difficult even to conceive of anything which we are certain is wholly beyond our power, as being an object of the will's action. There may be a desire in such cases, but there is no volition.

And the usage of language will be found to throw light on this distinction, making the term DESIRE applicable both to what is within our reach and what is not; and the term VOLITION applicable only to the former. In some cases we speak of willing or determining to do a thing, while in others we invariably limit ourselves to the mere expression of a wish or desire. Accordingly, it would comport with and be required by the usage of language, if our thoughts and conversation were directed to those matters, to say, that we determine or will to walk, but desire to fly; that we will to build a house, but desire to create a world. As has already been intimated, the structure of the mind itself seems to require the application of terms in this way. While nothing is more common than to speak of determining or willing to sail from New York, New Orleans, or some other mercantile place to London, no one is ever heard to speak of willing, but of only desiring or wishing, if such a fancy should enter his mind, to sail from those places to the Peak of Chimborazo, or to some remote planet.

§ 28. Volition relates to our own action and to whatever else may be dependent upon us.

Although the statements thus far made tend to throw some light upon the nature of the Will's acts, something further remains to be remarked. It does not seem definite enough merely to assert that volitions relate solely to those things which are in our power, or are believed to be so. We may inquire further what is meant by being in our power, and how far the import of the phrase may justly extend itself. -And hence it is necessary to add, that volitions relate, in the first place, to our own action, either some bodily movement or some act of the mind. In saying this, however, we do not mean to say that volition is necessarily limited to the present action. We may will to perform something of the simplest kind, which will exact, in its execution, merely the present moment, or something of a more complicated nature, which will require no inconsiderable time. Any series of actions, intellectual or bodily, capable of being performed by us, which the understanding can embrace as one, and by means of any relations existing among them can consolidate into one, the will can resolve upon as one. So that the action, dependent upon volition, may be the mere movement of the foot or finger; or it may be the continuous labours of a day, a week, or a year, or some long and perilous expedition by land or sea. It is just as proper to say that a man wills to take a voyage to England, as to say that he wills to put one foot before the other in stepping from his door to the street.

Volition may exist, in the second place, in respect to anything and everything which is truly dependent upon us, however circuitous and remote that dependence may be. It is proper to say that a merchant has determined or willed to fit a vessel or a number of vessels for sea, and to send them to different parts of the world, although his own direct and personal agency in the thing is hardly known. The effect of his volition, extending far beyond his own direct and per

sonal capabilities, controls the acts of a multitude of individuals who are dependent on him. Previous to the commencement of his celebrated expedition into Russia, the Emperor Napoleon undoubtedly brought all the objects relative to the intended expedition distinctly before his understanding; the number and the kinds of troops, the arms and ammunition with which they were to be furnished, the means of subsistence in the various countries through which they were to pass, and the expenses incident to the arming and support of a body so numerous. The action of the intellect enabled him to assimilate and combine this vast complexity of objects into one. Although numberless in its parts and details, it assumed, as it passed before the rapid glances of his understanding, an identity and oneness, which, for all the purposes of volition and action, constituted it one thing. And, accordingly, it is altogether proper to say, that Napoleon purposed, determined, or willed the expedition into Russia, although the agencies requisite to carry it into effect were not lodged directly in himself, but in millions of subordinate instruments, that were more or less remotely dependent upon him. Certain it is, if he had not put forth his volition, the subordinate instrumentalities, however numerous and powerful in themselves, would never have united in and secured the result in question.

"It is not necessary," says a recent writer in remarking upon this very subject, "to consider volition as directing merely our own physical powers. Any power, of which wealth, rank, or character gives us the command, is as truly the instrument of our will as a hand or a foot. The despot, who leads forth his army of obsequious slaves to overthrow cities and desolate empires, as truly wills these events as to move a finger or change an attitude."*

§ 29. Volitions involve a prospective element. Another mark or characteristic of volitions, by Essay on Moral Freedom, by Thomas T. Crybbace, sect. ii.

which they are distinguished from some, though not from all states of the mind, is, that they have exclusive relation to the future, to something which is to be done.-A volition is "futuritive" in its very nature; it involves in itself, and as a part of its own essentiality, a prospective element; it has no capacity of turning its eye backward, but always looks for ward.

An intellective or perceptive act rests in itself. As soon as it assumes the form of a cognition or knowledge, it accomplishes, so far as its own nature is concerned, the mission for which it was sent. It takes its position, and there it stands; furnishing an occasion, it is true, for other feelings to exist and to operate, but in itself remaining not only complete, but satisfied and quiescent.

But it is not so with a volition, which, from its very nature, cannot rest satisfied with the mere fact of its own existence. If we may be allowed the expressions, it continually reaches forth its hand to grasp objects which have not as yet a being. In other words, it always has in view something which is to take place hereafter; something which is to be done, the completion of which is, therefore, necessarily future. This trait is an element of its nature, or, rather, is naturally and necessarily involved in its nature, and may be regarded as one of the characteristics which help to distinguish it from the perceptive and emotive states of the mind at least, if not from others.

§ 30. Volitions may exist with various degrees of strength. There is one additional characteristic of volitions worthy of some notice, viz., that the volition does not always exist with the same degree of force. Undoubtedly every one must have been conscious in his own case that the exercise of the voluntary power is more prompt and energetic at some times than others. We are aware that it is liable to be objected to this statement, that if we will to do a thing, there can be nothing less than the volition; and that it is nec

essarily the same under all circumstances. And it is undoubtedly true, that we never will to do an act with anything less than a volition; and that, if there be any act of the will at all, it is one truly and fully so. That is to say, the act is in all cases the same, as far as its intrinsic nature is concerned. And yet we may confidently urge, there is no inconsistency in saying that it may exist with different degrees of force.

The existence of a mental state, which is always the same in its nature, in different degrees, is not peculiar to volition. The same trait is characteristic of the mental acts in many other cases. It is not only true of perceptions and emotions, but of the propensities and affections, that they exist with such variations. We speak as often, perhaps, of indistinct or feeble perceptions as we do of clear perceptions; we speak of weak emotions and of strong emotions; and of propensities and affections more or less intense; forms of expression, which indicate that differences of degree are consistent with the fact of identity of nature. And what is true in these cases is true also of acts of the will. We put forth the volitional act with much greater strength at some times than others. Sometimes it is so feeble as hardly to be distinguished from a mere desire or wish, and is scarcely recognised as a volition, while under other circumstances it is exceedingly marked and energetic.

§ 31. Causes of the variation of strength in volitions.

It may tend to throw some light on the nature of the varieties or degrees in the energy of the volitional act, if we make a remark or two in explanation of the causes of them. We do not, however, intend to say anything here of original or constitutional differences of the voluntary or volitional power. We set that topic aside for the present, because we shall find hereafter a more suitable opportunity, where we can pursue it at length. The degree of strength in the volitional act, considered independently of any constitutional differences which may perhaps exist in the