some persons appear to inherit from nature a quicker sensibility to the beauty or deformity of natural objects than others, so in regard to things of a moral character, the emotions of some persons are found to be faint, while those of others, though there is precisely the same amount of knowledge in both cases, are distinct and vivid. And if nature may thus lay a foundation for a difference in the emotions, it necessarily lays a foundation for a difference in those feelings of obligation, of which moral emotions are the basis. Did not nature do more for the moral constitution of Aristides than for that of Alcibiades? Was he not morally of a higher type? And was Regulus, who sacrificed his life to preserve his honour, on an equality in this respect with Cæsar, who, if history has not failed to do him justice, sacrificed both his honour and his country to his ambition?

CHAPTER III.

VOLITIONS, OR VOLITIONAL STATES OF MIND.

§ 23. Necessity of the controlling power existing in the will. In the remarks hitherto made, although enough has perhaps been said to evince clearly the distinct existence of the Will, and also to explain its relation to other mental departments, very little has been said in illustration of its own specific and appropriate nature. This will now be made a distinct subject of consideration. But, before entering directly upon its examination, we take this opportunity to say something further of the great necessity of that regulative and controlling Power, of which the will is justly deemed to be the depository.

Destitute of the power of willing, is it not evident, in any view we are capable of taking of the subject, that man would be an inefficient and useless being? He would indeed be possessed of the Intellect and the Sensibilities; but it is well understood, and has already been remarked in respect to the intellect, that

the value of these depends, in a great degree, upon action; in other words, upon the practical results to which they lead. But the doctrine, that man can bring himself into action without the power of willing, can realize activity without the appropriate instrument of activity, seems incomprehensible. And if we could suppose it to be otherwise, and if it were possible to try the experiment of basing human action directly upon the emotions and passions instead of the Will, it would soon show itself to be a species of action of the most perplexed and desultory kind. Like the passions themselves, it would be addicted to unforeseen obliquities, and would everywhere be characterized by indications of violence and change. No language could fully express its unfixedness, its versatility, its movements hither and thither, in various. and contradictory directions. It follows, therefore, that there must be somewhere in the mind a power, which, amid the complicated variety of mental impulses, exerts a regulative and controlling sway.

The question. then arises, what the internal regulative power is. And we point at once to the mental principle under consideration. In other words, it is the authoritative voice of the Will, which, holding a central position in relation to the conflicting claims of interest and passion on the one hand, and of conscience on the other, pronounces the decisive and final arbitrament.

The Will, therefore, may be spoken of with some degree of propriety as the culminating point in man's spiritual nature. It sits in some sense as the witness and arbitress over all the rest; holding a position which is essential alike to action and accountability, to freedom, and order, and virtue. It is in reference to this that all other susceptibilities keep their station and perform their functions. They revolve around it as a common centre; and while they prescribe the sphere and lay the foundations of its activity, they are attracted and harmonized by its power, and controlled by its ascendency.

§ 24. Remarks on the nature of the will.

Having seen, in the first place, that the mind is to be contemplated under the threefold aspect of INTELLECTUAL, SENTIMENTIVE, and VOLITIONAL, and having considered the relation which the Intellect and the Sensibilities bear to the Will, in the specific statements and analyses which have hitherto been given, we are now prepared to pass to the consideration of the precise nature of the last-named power.

And here let us interpose a word of caution. It is not to be inferred, when we speak of one part of the mind in distinction from another, and of passing from one part or power to another, that the mind is a congeries of distinct existences, or that it is, in any literal and material sense of the terms, susceptible of division. Varieties of action do not necessarily imply a want of unity in the principle from which they originate. The mental principle, therefore, is indivisible. In itself it is truly and essentially a unity, though multiplied, in a manner calculated to excite the greatest astonishment, in its modes of application. It is merely one of these modes of its application, or, rather, one of these modes of its exercise, which is indicated by the term Will. Accordingly, the term Will is not meant to express anything separate from the mind, but nevertheless embodies and expresses the great fact, founded upon psychical existence developing itself through fixed psychical relations, of the mind's ability to operate in a new and specific way.

And hence the Will, considered as a distinct susceptibility of the mind and as sustaining a causative relation to its appropriate results, may be defined, or at least may be described, as the MENTAL POWER or

SUSCEPTIBILITY BY MEANS OF WHICH WE PUT FORTH VO

LITIONS.-And in accordance with this descriptive definition, justified alike by its simplicity and its truth, if we wish to understand more fully what the nature of the volitional power is, a sound philosophy requires us to look at its results, and examine the nature of those states of mind which it gives rise to.

"It is necessary," says Mr. Stewart very justly, "to form a distinct notion of what is meant by the word volition, in order to understand the import of the word will; for this last word properly expresses that power of the mind, of which volition is the act, and it is only by attending to what we experience while we are conscious of the act, that we can understand anything concerning the nature of the power.

§ 25. Of the nature of the acts of the will or volitions. Of volitions, which are the results of the existence and exercise of the voluntary power, we are unable to give any definition in words, which will of itself make them clearly understood. They are simple states of the mind, and that circumstance alone precludes the possibility of a definition, in any strict and proper sense of the term. It is true, we may call them determinations or decisions of the mind, or resolutions of the mind, or acts of choice, and the like, but this is only the substitution of other terms, which themselves need explanation, and, of course, it throws no light upon the subject of inquiry. And hence we are thrown back upon our consciousness, as we are in all cases where the nature of the simple states of mind is the matter of investigation. And whenever we have made this appeal to the internal experience, and have received its testimony, we are then placed in the possession of all that knowledge which the nature of the case seems to admit of. And we must suppose that every one has, in some degree, done this. It is not presumable, at least it is not at all probable, that men who are constantly in action, pursuing one course and avoiding another, adopting one plan and rejecting another, accepting and refusing, befriending and opposing, all which things, and many others, imply volitional action, are still ignorant of what an act of the Will is.t

* Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix i., § i. + It will be noticed by the reader that we have employed as a designative epithet in this department of the mind the term "volitional,"

§ 26. Volition never exists without some object.

Although we are obliged to depend chiefly upon consciousness for a knowledge of the nature of volitions, it is still true that we can make some statements in respect to them which may aid us in forming our opinions. Among other things, it is an obvious remark, that every act of the will must have an object. A very slight reflection on the subject will evince this. It is the same here as in respect to the act of thought, of memory, and of association, all of which imply some object, in reference to which the mental act is called forth.

"Every act of the will," says Dr. Reid, "must have an object. He that wills must will something; and that which he wills is called the object of his volition. As a man cannot think without thinking of something, nor remember without remembering something, so neither can he will without willing something. Every act of will, therefore, must have an object; and the person who wills must have some conception, more or less distinct, of what he wills."*

§ 27. It exists only in reference to what we believe to be in our power.

Another circumstance may be pointed out in illustration of volitions, viz., that they never exist in respect to those things which we believe to be wholly beyond our reach. As no man believes that it is in his power to fly in the air like a bird, so we never find a person putting forth a volition to do so. As no man believes that he can originate what never had a being before; in other words, that he can create a new existence out of nothing, so we never find a man dewhich is analogous in its formation to the terms intellectual and emotional, and which, although not very frequently used, is not without good authority. It is obvious that it is rather more definite, in its application to the acts of the Will, than the epithet voluntary. A volitional act is simply an act of the Will, and nothing more. A voluntary act may mean, according to the connexion in which it is found, either an act of the Will, or some act which is performed in consequence of an act of the Will.

* Reid's Essays on the Active Powers, Essay ii., ch. i.