which desire is a characteristic and controlling element. And it is in Desires, thus understood and thus comprehensive in their extent, that we find a class of immediate antecedents to the acts of the Will. They present to it a powerful motive. They furnish to it one of its broadest grounds of action.

§ 18. Obligatory feelings also in proximity with the will. And here, considered relatively to its freedom, comes the important fact, that we may also approach the Will in another direction. The class of mental states, which are termed emotions, existing in the two distinct forms of pathematic emotions and moral emotions, are followed not merely by Desires, but also by another class of mental states, distinct from Desires, and yet sustaining the same relation of proximity to the will, variously denominated feelings of obligation, or more simply and not inappropriately obligations. Desires are founded on the Natural emotions, or those which involve what is pleasurable or painful, while Obligatory feelings or obligations are exclusively based on emotions of a different kind, viz., Moral emotions, or emotions of moral approval and disapproval. The Obligative states of mind, although they are easily distinguished by our consciousness from Desires or the Desirive states of mind, agree with the latter in being in direct contact with the volitional power, and not unfrequently these two classes of mental states stand before the Will in direct and strong opposition to each other. A state of things which could not exist if desires and obligations held the relations of antecedence and sequence, and were not collateral, and placed side by side in their position.

We are aware that the representation has sometimes been given by writers, that the moral emotions of approval and disapproval are in direct proximity with the Will, and exert a direct control over it. But internal examination shows that this is not true of any emotions whatever. They all stop short of the Will, and require the intervention of some other state

of the mind. We put forth emotions in approval or disapproval of a certain action or of a certain course of conduct, but they will never lead us to exert any effort of our own until they are followed by the distinct feelings of obligation. Hence the common remark, that we feel an obligation to pursue a certain course, because we approve it; which implies that, while the feeling of approval is the antecedent to that of obligation, the latter or obligative feeling is the direct and effective antecedent to volition. A view of this portion of the mind which is of great importance, and which, we are persuaded, will bear the strictest internal scrutiny, and will not fail to be found true.

§ 19. Further remarks and illustrations on this subject.

We are now able, looking at the mind in its great outlines, to understand the precise relation which its prominent parts hold to the Will. Volition is the great result, to which they all, in their appropriate position, contribute, and with which they all, therefore, sustain an established connexion, though not with the same degree of nearness. The immediate antecedents and psychical grounds of volition are not intellections, are not emotions, and are not exclusively either desires or obligations; but are both desires and obligations standing side by side in equal proximity, and with equal psychical or mental possibilities and rights. They furnish, therefore, a basis for the operations of the Will sufficiently extensive not only for the purposes of action, but of moral accountability.

And hence it follows, in accordance with what is constantly presented to our notice, that, in the exercise of volition, men are not shut up to one form of action, but are enabled and required, in all cases where such a distinction actually exists, to discriminate between the UTILE and the HONESTUM, between the desirable and the just, between what is merely profitable or prudential, and what is virtuous. And it is of great importance that these views should be carefully borne in mind, for they have a direct and

close bearing upon man's accountability; and also upon that which is the basis of his accountability, viz., his volitional freedom.

§ 20. Of the strength of the desires.

While we are upon this part of the general subject, we may properly remark, as it may be found to have some connexion with what will be said hereafter, on the strength of the desires. The intensity of the desires, and also of the emotions on which they are founded, will not unfrequently vary in different individuals, even when they are acting together in reference to the same object, and nearly under the same circumstances.-The cause of this variation may be found, in the first place, in the Intellect or Understanding. The relation existing between the understanding and the sensibilities has already been, in some measure, explained. And those explanations will throw a ready and clear light upon the present topic. We are so constituted, as it would seem from the remarks now referred to, that the emotions we have, whether pleasant or painful, will vary, as a general thing, with our knowledge. If we happen on some occasion to be pleased with any natural or artificial object, we shall find that the pleasurable emotion will be increased or diminished by our further knowledge, either of its excellences or its defects. And as the natural progress of the mind is from the emotions to the desires, it will also happen that the strength of the desires will vary in accordance with the variation in the intensity of the emotions.

§ 21. Illustrations of the strength of desires.

We will illustrate this by a single instance. We may assume (and, indeed, have abundant reason to believe it to be the fact) that the celebrated Clarkson, who was the instrument of effecting so much for suffering Africa, was naturally a person of a kindly and amiable disposition, and easily moved by exhibitions of human wo.

But how did it happen that this in

dividual felt and effected so much in opposition to the Slave Trade, while others of equal amiability neither felt nor acted? The explanation is an easy one, and it throws light upon the operations of the human mind. In the year 1785, the vice-chancellor of the English University of Cambridge, with which Mr. Clarkson was at that time connected, gave out as the subject of a prize essay, "Anne liceat invitos in servitutem dare? Is it right to enslave others against their will?" He wrote upon this subject, and gained the prize. And it was the knowledge which he acquired in writing this Essay that affected his heart; he became acquainted with facts which were before unknown to him, and his sensibilities were moved; he knew, and then he felt; he wept over the mass of human suffering that was displayed before him, not because he was actually of a more benevolent disposition than he was the year before, or of a more benevolent temperament than a hundred others in Great Britain, but because he had become acquainted with it. And when he had known, and when he had felt new desires and new feelings of obligation enkindling within him, he saw there was nothing remaining for him but to will and to do, to resolve and to act. And from that time he devoted his useful life to Africa.

(2.) But it is necessary to add, that the mere amount of knowledge does not seem sufficient of itself to explain fully the differences of sensibility which we notice in different persons. Whatever may have sometimes been said to the contrary, there can hardly be a doubt, that the minds of men, though compacted of the same essential elements, differ from each other in the modification and exhibition of those elements, as much as the general form of their bodies and their looks differ. And if we find that there is a constitutional difference in the powers of perception, memory, reasoning, and the like, we may expect to find that there is naturally and constitutionally a greater quickness and strength of emotions and of consequent desires in some than in others. And this is confirmed

by constant observation. It would certainly be deemed a very reasonable assertion, and fully confirmed by the whole course of his life, that the benevolent Howard was possessed of greater quickness and power of sensibility than many others. We do not mean to say that all he did was owing solely to the natural quickness of his sensibilities. It was undoubtedly the fact, that the food which he furnished to the understanding nourished the sensibilities also; but it was equally true, that the sensibilities were naturally and strongly predisposed to receive such nourishment.

If these views be correct, then in endeavouring to influence a person to pursue a certain course of conduct, we must consider not only the character and value of the object which is presented before him, but the temperament of the man. The object that will bring one promptly into action, may approach heavily and weakly the more sluggish and indurated heart

of another.

§ 22. Of the strength of feelings of obligation.

Essentially the same views will apply to the feelings of Obligation. Like the desires, their degree of strength will vary, in the first place, with the amount of knowledge. In other words, the more fully and completely we understand a moral action in itself and in its relations, the stronger, we may reasonably expect, will be our feelings of approval or disapproval. But it has been seen that the mere feelings of approval and disapproval never of themselves excite the Will, and lead us to action. They must be followed by Obligative states of mind or feelings of Obligation; and the strength of these last will correspond very nearly with that of the antecedent moral emotions. If the emotions be strong, and there is an opening in the matter for any personal action, the feelings of obligation, which necessarily follow them, will be proportionately strong.

But here also, as in the case of the desires, there may be a constitutional difference in individuals. As