internal experience which is implied in an act of that great source of knowledge. There are, however, some accessory or incidental circumstances, which are in some degree characteristic of them, and which have been enumerated in the analysis of the Sensibilities already gone through. For instance, the circumstance that emotions are generally evanescent, while there is a greater fixedness and permanency in the desires. Under the class of Desires may be included (1), the INSTINCTS in their various forms; (2), the APPETITES, which, as well as the instincts, have been noticed and examined in their appropriate place, such as hunger and thirst; (3), the PROPENSITIES, such as curiosity or the desire of knowledge, approbativeness or the desire of esteem, imitation, sociality, acquisitiveness, and the like; and (4), under this head, viz., the Desires, may be classed also, since desire is the leading element which characterizes them, the AFFECTIONS, both the Malevolent and the Benevolent, with the general nature of all of which the reader is now supposed to have an acquaintance.

But man has a Moral nature as well as a purely Pathematic nature; in other words, a nature which estimates the justness and right, as well as the mere natural good of things; and which has this important peculiarity in the mental arrangement, that it does not come after the natural or pathematic sensibilities, but stands side by side, collateral rather than subsequent. The moral sensibilities, in distinction from the natural or pathematic sensibilities, give rise to two distinct classes of mental states, the first in order known as Moral Emotions, the second as feelings of Moral Obligation. There are various points of dif ference between these two classes of mental states, which are particularly pointed out in the explanations which have already been given on the Sentimentive part of our nature. The emotions, for instance, of approval and disapproval have reference to the character of objects and actions that are either past or present; to things that have existed in time

past, or that have an actual existence at the present time, or are conceived to exist at the present time. The states of mind, on the contrary, which involve obligation and duty, have reference to the future; to something which is either to be performed or the performance of which is to be avoided. They bind us entirely to what is to come.-There is also this additional ground of distinction between the two, that the feelings of obligation are always subsequent in point of time to the approving or disapproving emotions, and cannot possibly exist unless preceded by them. Accordingly, it is a common thing for a person to say that he feels no moral obligation to do a thing, because he does not approve it, or, on the contrary, that, approving any proposed course, he feels under obligation to pursue it; language which undoubtedly means something, and which implies a distinction between the mere moral emotion and the feeling of obligation; and which tends to prove the prevalence of the common belief, that the feeling of obligation is subsequent to and dependent on that of approval or disapproval.

§ 14. Acts of the intellect in immediate proximity with emotions. In thus briefly recalling those states of mind which are termed SENTIENT or SENTIMENTIVE, in distinction from the INTELLECTIVE, we have to remark further, that of the various classes of feeling named in the preceding section, the Emotions come first in order. That is to say, in proceeding from the Intellect to the Will through the Sensibilities, which is the great and magnificent pathway that nature has laid out and established, we find the intellections in contact, or, more properly speaking, in immediate proximity, with the emotions. The first step taken from the understanding to the heart is into the region of the Emotions, and not into that of the Desires, or of the feelings of Obligation. This may be regarded as an ultimate fact or principle in our mental constitution. Whenever an object of knowledge is presented before us,

of whatever kind, we are so constituted that we necessarily have a correspondent emotion, either pleasing or displeasing; though in some cases, it must be acknowledged, the emotion is so very slight as to give the object the appearance of being perfectly indifferent. And even if we should admit that there may be some objects of knowledge (or, in other words, some intellectual perceptions, which amounts to the same thing) that are perfectly indifferent, being wholly unattended with emotions, it will still remain true, on the other hand, that there can be no emotions without some object of knowledge, without some preceding intellectual act. The natural progress of the mind, therefore, in bringing the Will into action, is from intellections to emotions.

Furthermore, whenever there is a clear and just perception of an object, the corresponding emotion will not only necessarily arise, but there will generally be an entire correspondence between the two. That is to say, the emotion will be the true and precise measure of the natural and moral beauty of objects, and of their deformity, and the true measure of all other qualities which are fitted to excite emotions. We say, where there is a clear and just perception, for it is undeniable that the perception is often perplexed and clouded by inexcusable carelessness, by inordinate passion, by strong casual associations, and for other reasons; and that, in consequence of this, the correspondence which ought to exist between the emotion and the true nature of the object before the mind frequently fails. But in all those cases where there is no erroneous and unnatural influence operating on the understanding, we may reasonably expect to find a due adaptation and harmony between these two parts of our nature.

§ 15. Emotions not in proximity with volitions. Acts of the understanding or intellections are, by the constitution of our nature, antecedent to EMOTIONS. But while it is thus obvious that emotions

stand between intellections and volitions, we are not to suppose that emotions, although they are one step nearer the Will than the mere acts of the Understanding, are in direct contact with it, or have of themselves alone any power over it. It may be asserted with perfect confidence, if we had these feelings alone, the Will would never be brought into action. They have no more natural tendency to cause volition than mere thought, than the most unimpassioned and abstract speculations of the intellect.

Let us take some illustration. A person contemplates some picture of excellent workmanship, which appears to him beautiful or sublime, and excites within him emotions of that character: but the existence of these emotions merely never calls forth any act of volition. He stands, and gazes, and the tide of emotion swells in upon him, and he is overwhelmed with it. But while this portion of his Sensibilities alone is awakened and called into exercise he will remain as inactive as if he had been formed of intellect merely. He will take no measures to possess the painting, or to do anything else in respect to it, until he is under the influence of another portion of the Sensibilities entirely distinct from emotions.

§ 16. Emotions followed by desires and obligations.

We behold here the admirable economy of the mind; a decisive and striking proof of that wisdom which pervades its wonderful structure. Intellectual perceptions lay the foundation of emotions. But with emotions alone, activity, at least activity having a unity of purpose, would not follow. But if emotions, restricted by the sphere which nature has allotted them, cannot reach and influence the higher and more authoritative power of the Will (as a thorough analysis of the mind shows they cannot), it is so ordered in the mental constitution that they lay the foundation of other mental states which can. The classes of feelings, of which the emotions may be regarded as the basis, appear to be two in number, namely, the desires,

founded on the various natural or pathematic emotions, or those which give pleasure or pain; and feelings of obligation, founded on the moral emotions, viz., emotions of approval and disapproval.

§ 17. Desires in proximity with the will.

And, in the first place, a word or two may be said on the position and relations of the Desires. It has been seen that intellections are not in direct connexion with the desires, but that emotions intervene. The acts of the understanding alone can never raise a single desire. In no case whatever does a man assert his desire of a thing unless he is pleased with it either in itself, or in its relations and applications. But if there be no desire without the intervention of some emotion, then it is evident that the mere knowledge of the thing, towards which the desire is directed, is not sufficient to excite it; but, on the contrary, without something more than the mere acts of the understanding, it could never exist. The process of the mind, therefore, is, in the first place, from intellections to emotions, and then from emotions to desires. The intellectual perceptions lay the foundation for the various emotions both pleasant and painful; and the desires are attendant upon these. We desire a house and its furniture; we desire a picture or a statue, or other objects of convenience, utility, and beauty, because they excite emotions and give us pleasure, but not otherwise.

Ánd if we are here asked why the emotions should lay the foundation of desires, we can only say (as also in respect to the general fact that intellections lay the foundation of emotions), IT IS THE CONSTITUTION OF OUR NATURE. The same creative power that requires emotions to follow the perceptions of the understanding, has instituted the succession of the desires to emotions. It will be remembered, that, for reasons already given, we include under the general head of Desires the important modifications known as the appetites and propensities, and also the affections, of