CHAPTER I. RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE WILL. § 1. General relation of the will to the other departments of the mind. HAVING Completed our proposed outline of the Intellect and the Sensibilities, we now enter upon the last division of this great subject, the Will-a subject difficult in itself, and the occasion in past times of more controversy than any other, and yet placed in its true position, and rendered comparatively easy, by means of the analysis, which we have just gone through, of the other mental departments. The Will comes last, and may be regarded, in certain respects, as sustaining to the Intellect and the Sensibilities a higher and more authoritative position; not so diversified in its action, not presenting so many points of interest, but laying the basis of personality and responsibility; completing the unity of the mental action by giving it an authoritative centre, and thus bringing the mind to a completeness and effectiveness of developement which could not be possessed without it. So that, in considering the position, in its relations and effects, which the Will sustains to what has gone before, we are reminded of the passage which Horne Tooke has made so celebrated, """Tis the last keystone That makes the arch; the rest that there were put § 2. All the great mental departments connected together. The three great departments of the mind, the recognition of which alone furnishes the satisfactory basis of a true mental philosophy, are connected with each other by most intimate and important relations. So much so that they are worthy, in consequence of the light they throw upon the mind's action, of a careful attention. Relational affiliations and influences exist not only in the great departments, but are found more or less in all the subordinate powers and susceptibilities, both cognitive and sentimentive. For instance, as we have had occasion to remark and to illustrate in other places of this Work, there is no perception without the antecedent sensation; there is no memory without attention; no reasoning without both memory and association; and neither reasoning nor imagination without the power of perceiving relations or relative suggestion. And if such be the state of things in these and other instances, then we are supported by analogy in affirming that there are connecting relations and influences running through the more general departments. § 3. The intellectual part the foundation or basis of the action of the other parts of the mind. Of the Understanding or intellect in particular, it may be said with great appearance of truth and reason, that we find in it the foundation, the basis of the existence and of the action both of the Sentimentive and of the Volitional nature. Let us examine this point, in the first place, in reference to the Sensibilities. When that part of our nature is in action, we find ourselves, according to the circumstances of the case, pleased or displeased; we are filled with admiration or disgust; we love or hate; we approve or disapprove, and exercise other emotions, desires, and passions. But the slightest examination will teach us that this could not be the case; that these states of mind could not exist without the acquisition of knowledge, which of course implies the exercise of the intellect. If we approve or disapprove a thing, it is very evident that we must have a knowledge of some object of approval or disapproval; that there must be something upon which these emotions can fasten. And again, if we exercise love or hatred, the intellect must have been previously employed in making known the existence and qualities of those objects towards which the passions of love and hatred are directed. § 4. The connexion of the intellect with the will. And these views will be found equally applicable to the Will. There can no more be an act of the will without some object of knowledge before the mind, than there can be remembrance without a thing remembered, or association without an object, to which the principle of association attaches itself. Hence, if we could find a man in whom the intellect is entirely destroyed in fact, or is virtually destroyed by being entirely dormant, we should find at the same time an extinction both of the passions and the will. Happily the records of the human race, with the exception of cases of idiocy and mental malformation; furnish but a solitary instance of that extreme extinction of the intellect which we now have in view; we refer to the case which has already come under notice, that of the unfortunate Caspar Hauser. As the intellect cannot be brought into action and made to develope itself except by first coming into contact with the material world, the result of this young man's confinement from childhood in one place, and of his entire seclusion from everything external to his horrid prison, was, as would naturally be expected, the utter prostration of his Understanding. Scarcely a ray of knowledge illuminated the intellective region. The feeble perceptions of early infancy, such as we find in those that have scarcely explored the boundaries of the cradle that rocks them, were in his case combined with a body that had nearly expanded itself to the fulness of manhood. Such imbecility and vacuity of the Intellect of course furnished no foundation for the developement of the Sensibilities. If we may rely upon the accounts that are given of him, there was in general an unruffled and placid surface, a great calm of the mind. And as there was no excitement, no tossing to and fro of the sensibilities, but everything there was wrapped up in slumber and inactivity, so there was no developement of self-determination, no firmness of resolve, no inward vigour and promptness of the volitional power. The slightest impulse from the minds of others was followed by the consentaneous and unresisting movement of his own; and his Will, so far from indicating any elements of decision and stability, could be likened only to the flexible reed of the desert, which, without knowing the power that presses it, is shaken and bent by every changing breeze. § 5. The connexion of the understanding with the will shown from its connection with action. As it is the object of this chapter to consider particularly the connexion existing between the Intellect and the Will, and the relation they sustain to each other, we may remark further, that the connexion of the intellectual with the volitional department is apapparent from the connexion of the intellectual part or understanding with action.-Whatever difference of opinion there may be in other respects, there is a general agreement in this, that the mind, both in its internal constitution and in its adaptation to outward objects, is evidently framed for movement. It was never meant to be essentially dormant, either in a state of unconsciousness or of mere contemplation and emotion; but was rather, when we consider its connexion with other states and modes of existence, designed to be an attendant and ministering angel to the great Being who made it, performing His errands of observation and mercy, in whatever sphere of activity He might see fit to designate.-And it seems to be further assented to on the grounds both of consciousness and of observation, not only that the various parts of man's nature conspire to action, but also that the immediate and proximate seat and source of action is in the Will; in other words, that the Will emphatically sustains the part of the directing, controlling, and executive power of the mind. The Will, in particular, leads to outward action. It must be obvious to every one that there can be no bodily ac |