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to the predominance of a sense of duty, which is only another name for a sentiment or impulse within, which is morally obligatory. But there would evidently be no propriety in this distinction if desire and feelings of duty or obligations were the same thing, and it would certainly be premature and unjust to charge men with universally making such a distinction when there are no grounds for it.

§ 262. Further considerations on this subject.

If there is not a fixed, permanent, and radical distinction between desires and feelings of obligation, then there is an utter failure of any basis of morality, either in fact or in theory. It will readily be conceded that morality implies a will, a power of choice and determination. But the mere moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval, do not of themselves reach the Will. They operate on the Will through the feelings of obligation; that is to say, they are always succeeded by the latter feelings before men are led to action. All other emotions operate through the Desires. So that the will, in making up its determinations, takes immediate cognizance of only two classes of mental states, viz., Desires and Feelings of obligation. But brute animals, as a general statement, have all the desires that men have; we mean all those modifications of feeling which have been classed under that general head, viz., instincts, appetites, propensities, and the various forms of affections, such as resentment, love, and the parental affection. But still, being evidently destitute of all feelings of obligation, we never speak or think of them as possessing a moral character. We never applaud them for doing their duty, nor punish them for neglecting its performance. Our treatment of them proceeds on altogether different principles. And it would be the same with men if they were wholly destitute of feelings of moral obligation, and had no motive of action but the various forms of desire. They could never, in that case, be considered morally accountable. They

would be without reward when they went right, and without rebuke when they went wrong.

CHAPTER III.

UNIFORMITY OF ACTION IN THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

§ 263. Of uniformity in the decisions of the moral nature, and the principles on which it is regulated.

THE two classes of feeling which have been considered, viz., moral emotions, by means of which we approve and disapprove of actions, including perhaps feelings of remorse, which may be regarded as modifications of feelings of disapproval, and the subsequent feelings of moral obligation, embrace all the states of mind which are properly and strictly included under the head of the Moral Sensibilities; although there are a number of collateral or incidental inquiries, some of which have been attended to, which are worthy of notice. One of the most interesting of these inquiries relates to the Uniformity of moral decisions.--In entering upon the subject of the Uniformity of the decisions of our Moral Nature, we remark, in the first place, that there are two kinds of uniformity, viz., uniformity in fact or principle, and uniformity in manifestation or appearance. Uniformity in principle, which is the most important view of the subject, necessarily implies a rule or law, by means of which the uniformity which is alleged to exist may be measured and known. And the rule or law upon which the uniformity of the moral nature is unquestionably based is, that its decisions (excepting those extremely perverted acts which may justly be supposed to imply a state of moral alienation or insanity, and which do not properly come into consideration here) will in all cases conform to the facts perceived; in other words, will conform to the facts and their relations, as they exist in the view of the intellect.

Estimated by this law, we can hardly entertain a doubt that the decisions of conscience may justly be

regarded as being, at the bottom, uniform throughout the world. It is not true, as some seem to suppose, that nature has established one code of morals for civilized and another for Savage nations, one law of rectitude on the banks of the Thames, and another on the banks of the Ganges; but in all parts of the world, in every nation and in every clime, she utters the same voice, announces the same distinctions, and proclaims the unchangeableness of her requisitions.

§ 264. The nature of conscience, considered as a uniform principle of action, requires that it should vary in its decisions with circumstan

ces.

It is well known that one of the greatest and the only formidable objection which has been brought against the doctrine of a connatural moral sensibility or conscience is a want of uniformity in its decisions; in other words, that it approves at one time and in one place what it condemns at another time and place. The remarks which have been made enable us to meet this objection fairly and satisfactorily. We admit that there is a want of that kind of uniformity which, by way of distinction, we have denominated uniformity in manifestation or appearance; but it is not true (with the exception of those extreme perversions which come under the denomination of moral insanity or alienation) that there is a want of uniformity in fact or principle. It is the latter kind of uniformity only which we are desirous to witness as an attribute of the conscience. A uniformity of decision based upon any other view would be disastrous to its own authority. In meeting the objection, therefore, which has been referred to, all we have to do is to show that the moral sense or conscience conforms to its own law; in other words, is uniform in its action, relatively to the facts that are placed before it. As a general thing, we have already shown this in the Chapter on the Proofs of a Moral Nature; it appears to be unnecessary to prosecute that view of the subject further; and what alone seems to be requisite in order to complete the inquiry is to explain the apparent deviations.

And our first remark here is, that the nature of conscience itself involves that it must vary in its decisions in accordance with a variation or change of circumstances. And the important law of its own uniformity not only permits this, but requires it. As its uniformity exists in relation to the facts perceived, and involves the uniformity or sameness of those facts, it follows that a change in the facts and their relations will be attended by a change in the moral cognizance. The decisions of conscience, therefore, although erected upon a basis of uniformity, and although, in fact, uniform in reference to the principle which has been laid down, are nevertheless in their manifestations exceedingly diverse; like the multiplied forms of the kaleidoscope, which, although they always exist in accordance with fixed optical principles, are susceptible of almost every possible variety.-Going on the supposition, therefore, that the general uniformity of the decisions of conscience is understood and acknowledged, inasmuch as we have already had occasion to give some proofs of it, and particularly as it is not generally denied, we proceed now to give some account of its variations; and, in doing this, shall endeavour to show that they all take place in entire consistency with the permanent principle of its own nature; in other words, that the uniformity is real, and that the deviations are merely apparent.

§ 265. Differences in the decisions of conscience dependant in part on differences of intellectual power.

The diversities in the decisions of conscience will depend partly, in the first place, on differences of intellectual power. We may illustrate this view of the subject by a case of this kind. Two men are required to give an opinion on some question which involves moral duty. The question we will suppose to be, whether it would be right, in a supposed case, to attempt a revolution in the civil government. Of these two individuals, one will pronounce it to be right, the other will pronounce it to be wrong.-It is admitted

that we have here a manifested or apparent deviation in the moral action. At the same time, it is unquestionably the fact, that it is not owing to a difference of structure in their moral nature, but rather to a difference in their perceptive and comparing powers.

The one who pronounces the attempt to be right, in consequence of his greater reach of thought, is able to foresee, after the first convulsive struggles, the subsidence of the angry passions into a state of permanent quiet, and the reorganization of the convulsed frame of society into greater strength and beauty. With these views, he thinks it right to attempt to introduce a change into the government of the country. The other, whose intellectual vision is more limited, unable to extend the perceptive eye into the future, sees only the evils of the present moment; the discord and clamour, the breaking up of old habits and associations, the agony, and the blood. With these views, he thinks it would be wrong to attempt the change in question. The moral nature in each instance pronounces according to the light which is placed before it, and in each case does what it would naturally be expected to do.

The want of uniformity in this case, so far from being an evidence, as some seem to suppose, that there are no good grounds for the doctrine of a moral sense, is rather an evidence of the contrary. Although there is not an external or apparent uniformity, there is a uniformity in principle; that is to say, the conscience in each case decides according to the facts before it, which is the only proper ground of decision.

§ 266. Diversities in moral decisions dependant on differences in the amount of knowledge.

Diversities in the decisions of conscience will depend, in the second place, on differences in the amount of knowledge, whether such differences in knowledge be owing to differences of intellective power or to any other cause. In other words, the conscience may be led astray, so far as to decide other

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