sort of Paralogism or false reasoning which is called reasoning in a circle.

§ 228. Emotions of moral approval are called forth in connexion with the existence of right or rectitude in the things approved of.

It is unquestionable, however, when we take into view the necessarily limited nature of the human mind, that there is a suitable and satisfactory stopping-place in this successive announcement of reasons. The proper answer in all these cases, when we are asked why we approve of a thing, is, because it is right. With the assignment of this reason, if the cir cumstances of the case obviously warrant us in assigning it, we may rest satisfied.

But then comes the question, what is RIGHT? We approve of a thing because there is in that thing the trait or quality of RIGHT. What is Right? The examination of this significant inquiry will more properly come up in another place. Nevertheless, a word or two may be said here.-We admit that Right or Rectitude, like many other things that are elementary and are intellectually revealed to us, cannot be defined. But can we define what existence is; what identity is? Can we define intelligence, or power, or succession, or space, or time? From the nature of the case, there must be some things elementary and ultimate. We are too apt to forget that there are, and of necessity must be, limits which the human mind cannot pass; and that there are ultimate moral suggestions or intuitions as well as intellectual. When we say an action is approved because it is right, the expression not only has meaning, but proclaims a truth which has nature for its basis. That is to say, the expression imbodies in language a conviction, which in some way or other is necessarily attendant on the action, considered as the occasion of its origin, of the Moral Sensibilities, viz., that there is, in fact, such a thing as Right or Rectitude. At the same time, we do not hesitate to admit, as has already been intimated, our inability to explain what Right is. While we claim that it is per

ceptible in the mind, we do not deny that it is unexplainable, in the sense of being defined, in language. Nevertheless, we have no hesitation on this account, either in asserting its existence, or in assigning it as a reason for whatever naturally depends upon it. (See vol. i., § 192, 193, and the subsequent chapter on the Immutability of Moral Distinctions.)

CHAPTER III.

RELATION OF REASONING TO THE MORAL NATURE.

§ 229. Of the doctrine which confounds reasoning and conscience. WE are now prepared, in view of what has been said in the last Chapter, particularly in connexion with the subject of the grounds or principles on which changes take place in moral emotions, to proceed to another subject not more interesting than it is practically important.-The opinion has sometimes been advanced, that those moral decisions or judgments, which, as moral beings, we are capable of forming, are the direct results of REASONING. The advocates of this doctrine, rejecting the idea of a distinct moral principle or conscience, appear to regard the reasoning power as entirely adequate to the causation of all those results in the mind which have a moral aspect. In a word, they may be regarded, either as denying entirely the existence of conscience, or, what is philosophically, if not practically, the same thing, as identifying it with mere ratiocination.

It is not surprising, on the whole, that this mistake, which is certainly a very serious and prejudicial one, should have been committed, when we consider how close the relation is which reason sustains to conscience. It will be noticed that we speak without any hesitation of the doctrine referred to as a mistaken one. We do not suppose it to be necessary, after what has already been said, to attempt to show that reasoning and conscience are not identical, and that the moral nature has a distinct and substantive

existence. Nevertheless, we freely admit the intimate and important relation which they sustain to each other-a relation so important in a practical, as well as in a philosophical point of view, that we shall delay here for the purpose of entering into some explanations of it.

§ 230. Of the close connexion between conscience and reasoning. Reasoning, it will be recollected, is purely an intellectual process, consisting of successive propositions arranged together, and a succession of relative suggestions or perceptions, but, in itself considered, involving nothing which is properly called an emotion or desire. This single circumstance separates the reasoning power entirely from the moral nature, which, in its appropriate action, never originates, like the reasoning power, perceptions or new intellectual views, but merely moral emotions and feelings of moral obligation. Probably every one can say with confidence that he is conscious of a difference in the moral emotions of approval and disapproval, and the mere intellectual perceptions of agreement and disagreement which are characteristic of reasoning. In the view of consciousness, there can be no doubt that they are regarded as entirely diverse in their nature, and as utterly incapable of being interchanged or identified with each other. The moral feeling is one thing; and the intellectual perception or suggestion, involved both in the process and the result of reasoning, is another.

Although the reasoning power and the conscience or moral being are thus distinct from each other in their nature, they are closely connected in their relations, as has been intimated already, inasmuch as the intellect, particularly the ratiocinative or deductive part of it, is the foundation or basis of moral action. We must first know a thing; it must first be an object of perception, before we can take any moral cognizance of it. And this is not all. The moral cognizance, as we have already had occasion to explain, will conform itself with great precision to the intel

lectual cognizance. That is to say, it will take new ground in its decisions, in conformity with new facts perceived. Consequently, we cannot rely perfectly on a moral decision which is founded upon a premature or imperfect knowledge. The more carefully and judiciously we reason upon a subject, the more thoroughly we understand it in itself and its relations, the more confidently may we receive the estimate which the voice of conscience makes of its moral character.

§ 231. Illustration of the preceding section.

The views of the preceding section may be easily illustrated. When, for instance, one man is alleged to have stolen the property of another, we find the conscience, as a general thing, ready to discharge the duty which the Author of our nature has assigned to it; but it is sometimes the case, that its decisions are arrested and postponed, in order to give time for the inquiries and conclusions of the reasoning power. Such inquiries inform us, perhaps, that the theft was long and coolly premeditated; and was committed, not only without any special temptation to it, but with a full knowledge of the aggravation of the crime. In view of this state of things, conscience immediately passes its decision. Perhaps our inquiries inform us that the theft was committed at a time of extreme want and consequent great temptation; and, furthermore, was committed upon a species of property, in respect to which the right of individual possession is regarded by common consent as less strict and exclusive than in other cases. The conscience here, as in the former instance, condemns the criminal, but probably with a mitigated sentence. On further inquiry, we learn that, although the property was taken, and that, too, much to the damage of the owner, it was taken wholly by mistake; it was a thing entirely accidental. In this case, conscience, adapting itself to the newly-discovered circumstances, pronounces the supposed thief altogether guiltless.

The conscience, therefore, however distinct the two may be in themselves, is aided and supported by the powers of perception and comparison or judgment, and particularly by the reason. The reasoning power, however high the rank which we justly ascribe to it, sustains, in this case at least, a subordinate position, and is to be regarded as the servitor and handmaid of the moral power. And, moreover, the latter will vary in exact accordance, if there are no collateral disturbing influences, with the new facts and the new relations which are from time to time presented by the former. It is in consequence of this close connexion, and the important assistance rendered to conscience by reason, that they have sometimes been confounded together. But it is very essential to right views of the mind that this erroneous notion should be corrected, and that the precise relation existing between these two distinct parts of our mental nature should be fully understood.

§ 232. Further illustrations of the same subject.

We may, perhaps, further illustrate the subject of the connexion existing between the perceptive nature, particularly the reasoning power, and the moral nature, by the interesting case of Caius Toranius, which Dr. Paley, in a translation from Valerius Maximus, has introduced in his Moral Philosophy in nearly the following terms.-The father of Caius Toranius had been proscribed by the Roman Triumvirate. Caius Toranius, coming over to the interests of that party, discovered to the officers the place where his father had concealed himself, and gave them, withal, a description by which they might distinguish his person when they found him. The old man, more anxious for the fortunes and safety of his son than about the little that might remain of his own life, began immediately to inquire of the officers who seized him whether his son was well; whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of his generals. "That son," replied one of the officers, "so dear to thy affections, be