to approve or disapprove a thing, in the moral sense of the terms, without first having some perception, some knowledge of the thing approved or disapproved.

And as the natural emotions are immediately followed by Desires, so the moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval (for these are all the states of mind that are properly comprehended under that phrase), are followed, in like manner, by Obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation. The position, therefore, of moral emotions, and they are found nowhere else, is between perceptions or intellective acts on the one hand, and Obligatory sentiments or Obligations on the other. And as there can be no moral emotions without antecedent perceptions, so there can be no feelings of moral obligation without antecedent emotions of approval and disapproval. Accordingly, if we are said in any given case to be under obligation either to do a thing or to abstain from doing it, we may always find a reason for our thus being under obligation in the antecedent action of the mind, viz., in our approval or disapproval, as the case may be, of the thing to which the obligation relates. (See § 14.)

§ 225. Changes in the moral emotions take place in accordance with changes in the antecedent perceptions.

If the emotions of approval and disapproval, which are the basis of the subsequent feelings of moral obligation, are naturally founded upon antecedent perceptions, we may expect, and such is the fact, that they will change in their character in accordance with changes in those perceptions. If, for instance, a statement of facts is made to us, clearly establishing in our view a case of great crime, our emotions of disapproval are prompt and decided. But if it should happen that afterward some new facts are mingled in the statement, throwing a degree of doubt and perplexity upon what was believed to have taken place, the feelings of disapproval would at once become per

plexed and undecided, in a degree precisely corresponding to the perplexity and indecision that, under the new circumstances, pervade the intellectual perception in the case. If, still subsequently, the introduction of other facts should show that what was supposed to be a crime was directly the reverse, our moral emotions would undergo a new change, and, instead of condemning the transaction either more or less decidedly, would approve.

Nor is this changeableness in the character and the degree of the moral emotions to be regarded as implying any defect in the moral nature. On the contrary, it is unquestionably one of the most decisive indications of its value. If the moral nature were so constituted as not only to pronounce a thing right or wrong under certain given circumstances, but necessarily to adhere to that decision under essential changes in the circumstances, it certainly could not be regarded as a safe rule for men's guidance. A man kills another by means of the infliction of a heavy blow, and, as we suppose, with evil intention or malice prepense, and the action is at once disapproved and condemned by conscience. But it subsequently appears that the blow, which had the appearance, at first, of being intentional, was entierly a matter of accident; and the conscience or moral nature immediately conforms its decision to the new aspect of the transaction, and annuls the disapproving and condemnatory sentence which it had before pronounced. If it were otherwise, if it did not promptly and fully conform itself, by changes in its own action, to antecedent changes in the percipient or cognitive action, it would confound vice and virtue, guilt and innocence; and, as a rule of moral conduct, would not only be without value, but absolutely and exceedingly injurious.

§ 226. Of objects of moral approval and disapproval. We are not to suppose that the sphere of that moral adjudication, which is involved in the existence of

emotions of moral approval and disapproval, extends to all objects indiscriminately. It is a proper inquiry, therefore, and in some respects an important inquiry, what are the appropriate objects of approving and disapproving emotions?-In answer to this question, we remark, in the first place, that such objects are voluntary agents. The feelings in question, in their announcements of the right and the wrong of any case that comes before them, have nothing to do with things without life. And more than this, they require, as the objects of their exercise, something more than mere vegetable and animal life, viz., intellective, sentient and volitional life. In other words, they require, in the appropriate objects of their adjudication, those attributes of perceiving, feeling, and willing, which are necessarily implied in voluntary agency.

(II.) In the second place, the legitimate objects of approval and disapproval are not only voluntary agents, but MORAL agents. No being is the object of moral emotions (that is to say, no being can by possibility be approved or disapproved in the moral sense of the terms) except such as have a conscience or moral nature. It is impossible that any others should have a knowledge of right and wrong; and, of course, impossible that they should conform themselves to the rule of right. Hence no one regards brute animals as the proper objects of these emotions.

(III.) Again, moral agents (this expression, of course, implies that they are voluntary agents) are morally accountable; in other words, are the proper objects of moral approval and disapproval, in respect to those things only which are truly in their power. This remark, which limits the sphere of moral approval and disapproval not only to moral agents, but to what is actually in the power of moral agents, is practically an important one. So far as we can regulate our outward actions, we are accountable; that is to say, we are the proper objects of the emotions of moral approval and disapproval. So far as we can regulate the action of the intellect, the sensibilities, and the

will, we are accountable also. So far as the action, whether physical or mental, is either involuntary or instinctive, it is not an appropriate object of the notice and adjudication of conscience; for all such action, although it belongs to and is not separable from the agent, is nevertheless not under his control.-Accordingly, when the moral agent, in the exercise of all his various powers, does what he ought to do, he stands approved. When, in the exercise of the same powers, he fails to do what he ought to do, he stands condemned. The extent of his capability is the basis of his duty, and the law of conscience is the measure of its fulfilment. And this simple statement intimates both the rule by which he is judged, and the vast amount of his responsibility.

§ 227. Of the original ground or basis of moral approbation and disapprobation.

If what has been said in the course of this chapter be true, we are so constituted that, in all cases of actual right and wrong which we are capable of understanding, we have the feelings, whenever such cases come to our knowledge, of approval and disapproval, corresponding both in kind and degree to the occasion which excites them. But there remains another interesting inquiry.-It has ever been, in the speculative and theoretical aspect of moral subjects, a much agitated question, what trait or quality it is in the thing approved or disapproved which excites the corresponding emotion. To this question different individuals are found to give different answers. We approve of an action, says one, because it is useful; because, says another, it is commanded by a higher power; because, says a third, it is agreeable to the fitness of things; because, says a fourth, it is in conformity to the will of God. But an answer of this kind does not appear to be satisfactory, because the question may always return with undiminished propriety and force, why utility, or the command of a superior, or the fitness of things, or conformity to the will of God, should, in

themselves considered, excite within us feelings of moral approbation more than anything else.

The fact is, that this question, viz., what is the foundation or basis in the thing approved of the emotion of approval which we exercise towards it, lies, in all probability, upon the extreme boundaries of human knowledge. Whenever we touch that boundary, we must either rest satisfied, or return in the track of our own footsteps. Whatever efforts we may make to resolve and explain a question which, by the nature of things, is placed in the outskirts and limits of human perception, we always find the train of thought moving, as it were, in a circle; and answering itself in a change of terms, and not in a change of position. If, for instance, we are asked why we approve the will of God, it may be answered with entire propriety, because it is morally right or virtuous. If we are asked why we regard his will as morally right or virtuous, the answer is, because, considered in all its circumstances, it is approved by an enlightened moral sense. If we are asked why it is that we thus put forth emotions of moral approval in relation to his will, then, instead of being able to take a new position and to give a new and distinct reason, we necessarily move round to a former one, and say, because his will is morally virtuous or right.-And the same in other similar cases. On being asked why we approve of a particular action, we may give a different answer, and say, with a degree of propriety, because it is beneficial or useful. On being further asked why we approve of a useful or beneficial action, we may answer again, because such an action is morally right or virtuous. If we are still further asked why an act of kindness or benevolence is to be regarded as morally right or virtuous, we answer, because in its own nature it commends itself to our conscience; in other words, excites within us emotions of moral approval. Which is the same as to say, in the assignment of reasons, that we approve, because we have emotions of approval. An instance, as well as the former one, of that