our Consciousness, we never find any difficulty in distinguishing them from other emotions, those of beauty or sublimity, for instance. § 208. Evidence of a moral nature discoverable in what we notice in children. (II.) Again, we may unquestionably discover the evidences of a moral nature in the operations of the mind, as they develope themselves in early life. It can hardly have escaped the notice of any one, that if some affecting story of cruelty and crime on the one hand, or of benevolence and virtue on the other, be rehearsed in the presence of children, they will generally discover decided feelings, not only of mere joy or sorrow, but of approval or condemnation, corresponding to the facts in the case. Beattie, in his poem of the Minstrel, describes Edwin, the progress of whose thoughts and feelings it is his principal object to unfold, as being made acquainted at an early period with the affecting old Ballad called the Children in the Wood. "Behold, with berries smear'd, with brambles torn, Nor friend nor stranger hears their dying cry." But when, in the conclusion of the Ballad, it appears that the awakened anger of Heaven, in the most terrible forms of want and death, overtook the uncle, who for private ends had been guilty of this horrible cruelty, the poet adds, with entire truth to nature, "A stifled smile of stern, vindictive joy Brighten'd one moment Edwin's starting tear." But it is unnecessary to appeal, in support of what is a matter of every day's observation, to testimonies of this kind, however frequently they may be found, particularly in the earlier and simpler forms of literature. It is not easy to witness the sports of children, even for a few moments, without having evidence, loud and eloquent evidence, of their disposition to appeal to the right and wrong of actions. The oft en-repeated declaration that wrong play will never prosper, expresses the secretly-lurking conviction, not only that there is such a thing as justice, but that justice will be found capable, in some way or other, of vindicating its own rights. While, however, we may properly appeal, in support of our general proposition, to those exhibitions of moral sentiments which we often notice in early life, we are aware that some exceptions are to be made, and some explanations to be offered, in order to present this view of the subject in a proper light.-We do not mean to say, nor is it true, that children will give a correct moral decision on all possible moral subjects. There are many subjects involving high moral principles, which, in whatever aspect they may appear to mature minds, will probably fail of eliciting from children and youth either approbation or disapprobation. And the simple reason is, because they have not capacity enough to understand them. It is one of the leading characteristics of the moral nature, as we shall have occasion to see more fully hereafter, that its operation depends upon the antecedent operation of the intellect; in other words, that it cannot act otherwise than in view of knowledge. When, therefore, we maintain that there are decided evidences of a moral nature in children, it is proper to add, that this is the case so far, and so far only, as they are capable of understanding the subjects brought before them. When the matter proposed to them is one level to their comprehension, if it involve anything of a moral nature, they seldom fail to show, and that, too, promptly and decisively, that they have a knowledge of it in that respect. § 209. Proofs of a moral nature from the manner of our intercourse with our fellow-men. (III.) In the third place, the existence of conscience is taken for granted in our intercourse with our fellow-men. We make our agreements and bargains with them (we do not say always, but, at least, as a general thing) as if they had a conscience; we converse with them, and consult with them, and rejoice with them, and weep with them, as if they had a conscience; and in our more formal addresses and exhortations, we always take the same thing for granted. How many customers would a tradesman have, how long would any person be admitted into good company, how many public and responsible duties would any citizen whatever be called to fulfil, if it were known or suspected that they had no conscience! We shall feel more fully the force of the facts we have now in view, if we consider the mode of address which is usually employed when a person wishes to persuade men to pursue a certain course. He appeals at first, we will suppose, to their INTEREST; he tells them of the various advantages which would attend the course he proposes; but he reserves, as his last and most efficacious argument, an appeal to their sense of DUTY. If every other consideration is found to fail, the orator assures them of his perfect persuasion that they will not so disgrace themselves in the eyes of the whole world as to refuse obedience to the calls of conscience. He calls upon conscience to speak out on this important occasion, and he knows full well, if that voice of God and nature, implanted in the human bosom, can be made to utter itself, there will no longer be occasion for his own humble efforts. § 210. Proofs of a moral nature from the terms used in different languages. (IV.) Another proof of the existence of à moral nature is to be found in the fact, that there are terms in all languages, probably we may say without a single exception, expressive of such a nature and its operations. If it be true that there is no such thing as a moral nature and no such thing as original moral sentiments in men, the fact is obviously unprecedented and unaccountable, that terms expressive of a moral power, and of moral distinctions and sentiments, are to be found so generally. The ancients, it is well known, were accustomed to speak of the SENSUS RECTI ET HONESTI; by which there can be no question they intended to intimate what at the present time we commonly express by the term Conscience. They also, in particular, made a distinction between the HONESTUM or honourable, and the UTILE or beneficial, considered as principles of action; and it certainly would be easy to show that like distinctions are to be found in all modern tongues. In English, for instance, we not only constantly speak of a man's acting from interest and also acting from the sense of duty, but always regard these two modes of action as involving, in our apprehension, two distinct active or motive principles. We repeat, therefore, that, on the doctrine of the negation or absence of a moral nature, the use of such terms and the making of such distinctions is inexplicable. Without the existence of a moral nature as their basis, there would seem to be no import and no propriety in them. On the contrary, the use of such terms and the making of such distinctions is what would naturally be expected on the supposition that the foundation of moral emotions and of feelings of moral obligation is actually laid in the human constitution. We may, therefore, properly infer from them, among many other sources of proof, the existence of such a moral constitution. § 211. Proofs from the operation of the passions of anger and gratitude. (V.) It may be remarked, in the fifth place, that the manner in which the passions of anger and gratitude are often found to operate, implies the existence of a power of moral perception.-The facts to which we refer are these: If we suffer what we suppose to be an injury, we are angry; and this, too, not merely with an instinctive, but a voluntary and deliberate anger. On the other hand, if we receive what we suppose to be a benefit (not merely a good, but a designed or well-meant good), we are grateful. Now we will suppose, that soon after we discover, on the one hand, that the injury was wholly accidental, and, on the other, that our supposed benefactor was governed by selfish motives, seeking his own good instead of ours. We shall generally find, under these altered circumstances, that both our anger and our gratitude will immediately disappear. But it does not appear why this marked and sudden change should take place, if we have not the pow er of making moral distinctions. The actual benefit on the one hand, and harm or suffering on the other, remain the same as they were at first. So far as the mere effects to ourselves are concerned, there is obviously no reason for a change in our feelings. The basis of the change which we experience is not a perception of any difference in the beneficial or hurtful results, but simply in the motives which led to them. It is the knowledge of the real nature of the motives which causes this sudden alteration. The moral sense (and, so far as we can judge, nothing short of or other than the moral sense) requires and exacts from us, as soon as their motives are discovered, that we shall place a new and far different estimation on the persons concerned. § 212. Proofs of a moral nature from feelings of remorse. (VI.) Another proof of the existence of a moral nature (it will be recollected that we are considering the subject now in the most unrestricted point of view, and directing our attention simply to the general fact of a moral department) is to be found in the important circumstance that men are evidently constituted with a susceptibility of feelings of REMORSE. It is unquestionably a matter of common consciousness, that the feelings of remorse are to some extent distinct and peculiar in their nature. Considered in reference to the classifications which have been made, they obviously belong, although no distinct notice was taken of them under that head, to the class of moral Emotions; being feelings of disapproval, but sharpened and intensified, and thus discriminated from other forms of disapproval by the circumstance that |