ward. But peevishness is like an obscure, drizzling fog; it is less violent, and lasts longer. In general, it is more unreasonable and unjust than violent anger, and would certainly be more disagreeable, were it not often, in consequence of being so disproportioned to its cause, so exceedingly ludicrous.

§ 159. Modifications of resentment. Envy.

One of the most frequent forms of resentment is Envy. By this term we are accustomed to express that ill-will or hatred which has its rise from the contemplation of the superiority of another. Considered as a mere state of the mind, Envy is to be regarded as only one of the perversions of resentment; but considered in respect to the occasions of its origin, it must be added, that it is one of the most degrading and hateful perversions. There is no passion which is more tormenting in the experience, as might be expected from its hatefulness; and none which is more decisively condemned by the sentiments of justice.

If we are asked why it is that, on the mere contemplation of the more favourable situation and the greater advancement of another, we experience such an odious perversion of a principle apparently good in itself, we shall probably find a reason in the irregular and inordinate action of the principle of Self-love. Men frequently become so intensely selfish that they cannot admit others to an equal participation of what they enjoy, much less see them advanced to a higher situation, without a greater or less degree of repining and discontent. And it is this state of mind which is appropriately denominated Envy.

§ 160. Modifications of resentment. Jealousy.

There are still other varieties of that Resentment or Hostility, which may be regarded, in some important sense, as the basis of the whole series of the Malevolent passions. Among these is Jealousy, which includes a painful emotion, caused by some object of love, and attended with a desire of evil towards that

object. The circumstance which characterizes this passion and constitutes its peculiar trait is, that all its bitterness and hostility are inflicted on some one whom the jealous person loves. The feeling of suspicious rivalship, which often exists between candidates for fame and power, is sometimes called jealousy, on account of its analogy to this passion.-There are various degrees of jealousy, from the forms of mere distrust and watchful suspicion, to its highest paroxysms. In general, the strength of the passion will be found to be in proportion to the value which is attached to the object of it; and is, perhaps, more frequently found in persons who have a large share of pride than in others. Such, in consequence of the habitual belief of their own superiority, are likely to notice many trifling inadvertencies, and to treasure them up as proofs of intended neglect, which would not have been observed by others, and certainly were exempt from any evil intention.

The person under the influence of this passion is incapable of forming a correct judgment of the conduct of the individual who is the object of it; he observes everything, and gives it the worst interpretation; and circumstances, which in another state of the mind would have been tokens of innocence, are converted into proof of guilt. Although poetry, it is no fiction:

"Trifles light as air

Are to the jealous confirmations strong
As proofs of holy writ."

Hence it is justly said to be the monster that "makes the meat it feeds on;" for it perseveringly broods over the slightest suggestion, even when made with the most sincere kindness, and rears up a shapeless and frightful form, which in turn nourishes the baleful passion from which is derived its own existence.

It may be remarked of this passion, that it is at times exceedingly violent. At one moment the mind is animated with all the feelings of kindness; the next it is transported with the strongest workings of

hatred, and then it is suddenly overwhelmed with contrition. Continually vacillating between the extremes of love and hatred, it knows no rest; it would gladly bring destruction on the object whom it dreads to lose more than any other, and whom, at times, it loves more than any other.

§ 161. Modifications of resentment. Revengė.

Another of the marked modifications of Resentment is REVENGE. By the spirit of revenge, as we sometimes express it, we generally understand a disposition, not merely to return suffering for suffering, but to inflict a degree of pain on the person who is supposed to have injured us, beyond what strict justice requires. So that revenge seems to differ from resentment rather in degree than in kind; in other words, it is unrestrained or excessive resentment. It is true, however, that it generally implies something more than mere excess. It commonly exhibits the aspect of coolness and deliberateness in its designs, and is as persevering in the execution of its hostile plans as it is deliberate in forming them. If resentment, when properly regulated, may be considered, on the principles of nature, as morally right, revenge, which is the unrestrained or inordinate form of resentment, is always morally wrong. It is a passion which is not only greatly inconsistent with the due exercise of the other powers of the mind, but is equally condemned by enlightened conscience and the Scriptures.

§ 162. Illustrations of the malevolent passions.

It would not be a difficult matter to bring forward some affecting illustrations of the unrestrained and undue influence of the malevolent passions which have thus far come under our notice. In the tragedy of Othello, the pen of Shakspeare has successfully employed itself in developing the workings and the results of the fatal passion of Jealousy; and if this great poem be styled a fiction considered in relation to history, it will probably be admitted to be immutable

truth considered in relation to nature. Revenge, in its more determined and persevering exhibitions, is a passion at least equally dreadful. Among Savage tribes in particular, as we learn from the frequent testimony of those who have travelled among them, to take vengeance, deep, unabated, ample, would seem to be the surest passport to an honourable place and name. But it is not among Savage nations alone that revenge is found, even in its more embittered forms. There is mention made in the writings of Garcilasso of a Spanish gentleman named Aguire, who, having on one occasion offended a governor of some of the cities of South America, was sentenced to be ignominiously scourged in public. The citizens took an interest so far as to interpose and entreat a remission of the punishment; and the person himself implored that death might be substituted instead of it, but without effect."Aguire, esteeming himself eternally disgraced, retired from the military service, and patiently awaited the expiry of the governor's appointment, when he followed him incessantly as his shadow. The governor, warned of his danger, armed himself in mail, and hurried from place to place in quest of safety. But no sooner had he hopes of rest, than he found his implacable enemy treading on his footsteps. He fled again; and again Aguire pursued him. Thus did three years elapse, while many hundred miles were traversed by both. At last, Aguire ventured to enter the governor's house, and, finding him asleep in an inner chamber, he pierced him with a dagger where unprotected by his armour."

Such are the deplorable evils that are likely to result when the malevolent passions gain an ascendancy. And as, in the present imperfect and perverted state of man, there is a constant proneness to inordinate malevolent action, it becomes the more important to restrain and duly regulate a tendency so unfavourable, by allowing their full weight to the forgiving and benevolent principles of the Gospel.

§ 163. Nature of the passion of fear.

We conclude this review of this portion of the Affections with a single other notice. The passion of Fear, like the other passions or affections that have passed under examination, embraces both a simple emotion of pain, caused by some object which we anticipate will be injurious to us, and also, additional to the painful emotion, the desire of avoiding such object or its injurious effects. The question might suggest itself, with some appearance of reason, whether Fear, in view of the definition just given, should be included under the general head of the Malevolent passions. And this is one of the cases referred to, in separating the Affections into the twofold division of the Benevolent and Malevolent, when it was remarked, it might not, in all respects, be easy to carry the arrangement into effect in its details. Nevertheless, the fact that we experience pain in viewing the object feared, accompanied with a desire of avoiding it, seems very clearly to involve the idea that it is an object of greater or less aversion. In other words, that we have more or less of ill-will towards it. It is certainly the case, if the object is of such a nature. that its presence is painful, that we can hardly be said to love it. So that, at least, it would seem to come more naturally under the head of the malevolent affections than under the other class.

But to return to the nature of the passion itself. The strength or intensity of fear will be in proportion to the apprehended evil. There is a difference of original susceptibility of this passion in different persons, and the amount of apprehended evil will consequently vary with the quickness of such susceptibility. But whatever causes may increase or diminish the opinion of the degree of evil which threatens, there will be a correspondence between the opinion which is formed of it and the fearful passion.

When this passion is extreme, it prevents the due exercise of the moral susceptibility, and interrupts correct judgment of any kind whatever. It is a state of