truth, which characterizes men generally, and which there seems abundant reason to regard as original or connatural to the mind. When we utter the truth, we fulfil the functions of our nature; the action of the mind flows easily in an undisturbed and even channel; there are none of those mental jars and revulsions which generally attend an effort of falsification. To utter a falsehood is against nature; and is as much at variance with the structure of the Pathematic as of the Moral Sensibilities. That is to say, when we deliberately utter a falsehood, we are not only condemned by Conscience, but are obliged to stem the natural current of the Desires.

There are undoubtedly occasional exceptions to this statement, but they may probably be reduced to two classes of persons: first, those in whom the original principle has been perverted by the influence of evil example or some other unfavourable cause; second, those, still fewer in number, who are the subjects of an original mental malformation. In the first class, the tendency to falsehood is the work of the man rather than of his nature; the second indicates a state of mind more or less approaching the regions of insanity. In addition to these cases, it may be said further, that sometimes, under the influence, perhaps, of a sudden and powerful temptation, men of acknowledged veracity are betrayed into the utterance of an untruth. But still the general fact, to which these cases must be regarded merely in the light of exceptions, remains good. The utterance of the truth is in conformity with nature; falsehood is against it. And this is so much the fact, that, in ordinary cases, the utterance of thousands of truths secures to a man no especial credit, for this is what we naturally expect; while the utterance of a very few falsehoods will be likely to destroy his reputation forever.

§ 129. Of the twofold action of the propensity to truth. The principle of Veracity, as might be supposed from the circumstance of its being admitted into the

class of the propensions, has the twofold action already often mentioned. In all ordinary cases, the probability is, that its action is INSTINCTIVE. A thousand times a day, in answer to the questions of others, or in giving directions, or on some other occasions, we utter what is true in fact, or what we suppose to be true. And we do this without stopping to reflect whether it is a matter of duty, but apparently and in reality by a natural or instinctive movement, just as the hungry man instinctively seeks to gratify his appetite for food.

In other cases, the action is obviously VOLUNTARY. If, for instance, a man is strongly tempted, by the presentation of some pecuniary inducement, to utter a falsehood, the instinctive action of the principle is interrupted. By an effort of the Will we check it; we stop; we examine the nature and weight of the inducement which is presented; conscience is called in to give its decision in the case; and the action of the principle under such circumstances evidently becomes a voluntary one. It is, indeed, difficult in some cases to draw the line distinctly between the instinctive and voluntary action; but it is the latter alone which can properly be said to have a moral character. When, under the influence of a strong temptation, the instinctive tendency is overruled, and we utter the truth in compliance with the mere dictates of conscience, we are the subjects of moral merit. When, on the other hand, we deliberately and voluntarily utter falsehood, we are the subjects of crime. And it may also be added, that the circumstance of the utterance of the truth being in all ordinary cases instinctive, increases the crime of its violation; because falsehood under such circumstances generally implies a high degree of deliberate and voluntary effort.

§ 130. Propensity of self-love, or the desire of happiness.

We proceed to explore this part of our sentimentive nature still further by adding that the desire of enjoyment or happiness appears to be an original or connatural element of the mental constitution. No

one will presume to assert that the desire of suffering is natural; that we ordinarily rejoice in the prospect of coming woes, and endure them with gladness of heart. Nor are there satisfactory grounds for the opinion that enjoyment and suffering are indifferent to the human mind, and that there is no choice to be had between them. Such a supposition would be contrary to the common experience and the most obvious facts. On the contrary, our own consciousness and what we witness in others effectually teach us, that the desire of happiness is as natural as that of knowledge or esteem, and even hardly less so than it is to desire food and drink when we experience the uneasy sensations of hunger and thirst.

Under the instigation and guidance of this strong propensity, men not only flee from present evil and cling to present happiness, but, foreseeing the events of the future, they prepare raiment and houses, fill their granaries in anticipation of a day of want, and take other measures for the prolonging of life, health, and comfort. It is kindly provided that they are not left, in taking precautions subservient to their preservation and well-being, to the suggestions and the law of reason alone, but are guided and kept in action by this decisive and permanent principle. And it is proper to add, that this desire operates not only in reference to outward and bodily comforts, but also in relation to inward consolations, the inspirations and solaces of religion in the present life, and the anticipated possession of that more glorious happiness which religious faith attaches to a future state of existence.

..

But it should ever be remembered, that the desire of our own happiness, like the other desires which have been mentioned, ought to be subjected to a suitable regulation. An enlightened conscience will explain under what conditions our personal welfare may be pursued, and in what cases, whether it relate to the present or the future, it should be subordinated to considerations of public benefit and of universal benevolence.

§ 131. Of selfishness as distinguished from self-love. We cannot but suppose, for the reasons that have just been suggested, that the desire of happiness, or propensity of personal good, is an attribute of man's nature. This opinion is not only accordant with the suggestions of the light of nature, but is sanctioned by other and higher authority. The pursuit of our own happiness is obviously recognised in the Scriptures, and is urged upon us as a duty. While we are required to love our neighbour, it is nowhere said that we must perform this duty to the exclusion of a suitable regard for our own felicity.-The desire of happiness thus implanted in our own constitution we denominate by a simple and expressive term, SELF-LOVE. But it cannot be denied that the import of the term is frequently misunderstood, and that the term itself is liable to erroneous applications.

This is owing to the fact that the principle is not always, and perhaps we should say, is not generally regulated and restrained as it ought to be, but frequently degenerates into a perversion, which ought to be carefully distinguished from its innocent exercise. It is not self-love, but the perversion of self-love, which is properly called SELFISHNESS; and while selflove is always innocent, and, under proper regulations, is morally commendable, as being the attribute of a rational nature and approved by God himself, SELFISHNESS, on the contrary, is always sinful, as existing in violation of what is due to others, and at variance with the will of God.-It is due to the cause of morals and religion, as well as of sound philosophy, to make this important distinction. Self-love is the principle which a holy God has given; selfishness is the loathsome superstructure which man, in the moments of his rebellion and sin, has erected upon it.

§ 132. Modifications of selfishness; pride, vanity, and arrogance. Selfishness, it will be kept in mind, is employed as the general name for any excessive or inordinate exercises of self-love whatever. But selfishness is sus

ceptible of various modifications, and exhibits itself to the notice of others in different ways and under different aspects. One of the most marked and important of its modifications is Pride.

Pride not only implies an inordinate estimate and love of our own interests, but appears to be distinguished from the other forms of selfishness in being attended with a desire that others, either for the sake of our own gratification or for the sake of humbling them, should be made sensible of what we suppose to be our superiority. Accordingly, the feeling of pride is not to be considered as limited, in the occasions of its exercise, to the possession of any one object or quality, or to any single circumstance or combination of circumstances. It will be likely to attach itself to any object whatever which becomes predominant in our affections, and in which we suppose ourselves to have the advantage over others. One is proud of his ancestry, another of his riches, a third of his intellectual ascendency, and a fourth of the beauty of his dress or person.

We may not only consider pride as one of the modifications of selfishness, but pride itself seems to be susceptible of some subordinate modifications, so distinct as to be known by appropriate names. When, for instance, it is very officious, and makes an ostentatious display of those circumstances in which the subject of it supposes his superiority to consist, it is termed VANITY. When it discovers itself, not so much in the display of the circumstances, or supposed circumstances of superiority, as in a contempt, and in sneering disparagements of the inferior qualities of others, it is termed HAUGHTINESS or ARROGANCE.

It may be further added, that we are always, if we would be exact in our discrimination of the sources of human action, to make a distinction between pride and a mere desire of esteem, which has already come under our notice. The desire of esteem may exist in all its forms distinct from pride; and, when properly regulated, is not only useful, but is morally commend