ly thought to depend upon the feature of its voluntary action. We are not disposed to speak, as some on a slight examination might be inclined to do, of the possessory principle as being, in a moral sense, an unmixed evil. So far as its action may be regulated, either in the form of restraint or of encouragement, by reason, reflection, and the control, either direct or indirect, of the will (all of which is implied when we speak of its voluntary action), just so far it is capable of being either right or wrong, reprehensible or meritorious. When, acting independently of all comparison and reflection, it assumes the form of an instinct, it is often in that form beneficial, and always innocent; when it usurps the authority due to other and higher principles, prompting us to look with an evil eye on the rightful possessions of another, and to grasp with an earnest and unholy seizure what does not belong to us, it becomes vicious; when, on the other hand, its action is the reverse of all this, prompted by upright motives, and adhering strictly to the line of rectitude, it is to be regarded as virtuous. We apprehend it is impossible even to conceive of a being so far elevated in the scale of perception and feeling as to involve moral accountability, which shall be constituted on the principle of an entire exclusion of the possessory desire. If it desires its own existence and happiness, which we suppose to be a trait essential to every rational and accountable creature, it seems to follow, as a matter of course, that it will desire those attributes and gifts which are conducive to the preservation and perfection of such existence and happiness. What sin can there possibly be in desiring to expand the range of that existence, which in itself is such an invaluable good, provided it be done with a suitable regard to the relations and the claims of all other beings! So far from being a sin, it is, and must be, a duty. If it be not so, what shall be said of those passages of the Apostle Paul, not to mention other parts of Scripture of a similar import, where he directs the Corinthians not only "to covet to prophesy," but, in general terms, "to covet earnestly the best gifts," 1 Cor., xii., 31; xiv., 39. § 124. Of perversions of the possessory desire. Although the acquisitive propensity is susceptible, by possibility at least, of a virtuous exercise, there is too much reason to believe that its ordinary action is a perverted and vicious one. It is a great law of the mind, that the repetition of the exercise of the active principles increases their strength; and as the occasions of the exercise of the possessory principle are very numerous, it is the almost unavoidable result that it becomes inordinately strong. When this is the case, the otherwise innocent desire of possession assumes the form of the sin of Covetousness; a term which is universally understood to express an eagerness and intensity of acquisition, that presses upon the domains of some other active principles, and is at variance with some of the claims of duty. This is undoubtedly one of the great sins which attach to human nature; too prevalent, it is to be feared, in the heart of every individual; and which is not only condemned by philosophy, but receives, in all parts of the Scriptures, a decided and solemn rebuke. When the possessory principle becomes, by further repetition, increased in the intensity of its action, it assumes the still more aggravated and guilty form of Avarice. In this form it not only loses that character of innocence which it originally possessed, but becomes exceedingly loathsome and abhorrent in the unperverted eye of moral purity. § 125. Of the desire of power. Another of the original propensities is the desire of Power.-In regard to POWER, it is hardly necessary to say, that it is not an object directly addressed to, or cognizable by the senses; but is an attribute of mind, and is made known to us by an act of the Internal intellect; that is to say, of the intellect operating independently of a direct connexion with the senses. We do not see Power as we see any extended object; nor do we touch it, nor is it an object of the taste or smell; but it is revealed to the mind by an act of Intuition or Suggestion, on the occasions appropriate to that species of mental action. (See § 190, vol. i.) But, although it is not cognizable by the senses, it is as much a reality, as much an object of emotion and desire, as if that were the case. It stands out as distinctly perceptible to the mind's eye, as an extended and coloured body does to the bodily eye. This being the case, we may with entire propriety of language speak of the desire of power; for, wherever there is an object, that object may, in possibility at least, be desired; but where there is no object before the mind, it is not possible for desire to exist. These remarks are preparatory to what we have now to say, namely, that the desire of power is natural to the human mind; in other words, that the desire of power is an original principle of the mind. In support of this view, which may, perhaps, fail at first sight fail to commend itself to the reception of the reader, the first remark we have to make is, that power, in its own nature, is a thing desirable. It cannot be doubted that power is in fact, and is to be regarded, as an essential attribute of all mental being. -Accordingly, if an intellectual and sentient existence is desirable, then power is desirable also, as being necessarily involved in such existence. The desire of existence, by common acknowledgment, is natural to us; the desire of happiness is natural also; and since there can be neither the one nor the other without power, it seems reasonable to think that the desire of power is essential to and is implanted in our nature. There are various circumstances, obvious to every one's notice, which go to confirm this view of the subject, as will be seen in the following extract from the writings of Mr. Stewart. § 126. Facts in proof of the natural desire of power. "The infant, while still on the breast, delights in exerting its little strength on every object it meets with, and is mortified when any accident convinces it of its own imbecility. The pastimes of the boy are, almost without exception, such as suggest to him the idea of his power. When he throws a stone or shoots an arrow, he is pleased with being able to produce an effect at a distance from himself; and, while he measures with his eye the amplitude or range of his missile weapon, contemplates with satisfaction the extent to which his power has reached. It is on a similar principle that he loves to bring his strength into comparison with that of his fellows, and to enjoy the consciousness of superior prowess. Nor need we search in the malevolent dispositions of our nature for any other motive to the apparent acts of cruelty which he sometimes exercises over the inferior animals; the sufferings of the animal in such cases either entirely escaping his notice, or being overlooked in that state of pleasurable triumph, which the wanton abuse of power communicates to a weak and unreflecting judgment. The active sports of the youth captivate his fancy by suggesting similar ideas, of strength of body, of force of mind, of contempt of hardship and of danger. And, accordingly, such are the occupations in which Virgil, with a characteristical propriety, employs his young Ascanius. 'At puer Ascanius mediis in vallibus acri Gaudet equo; jamque hos cursu, jam præterit illos; Optat aprum, aut fulvum descendere monte leonem.' “As we advance in years, and as our animal powers lose their activity and vigour, we gradually aim at extending our influence over others by the superiority of fortune and station, or by the still more flattering superiority of intellectual endowments, by the force of our understanding, by the extent of our information, by the arts of persuasion, or the accomplishments of address. What but the idea of power pleases the orator in managing the reins of an assembled multitude, when he silences the reasons of others by supe rior ingenuity, bends to his purposes their desires and passions, and, without the aid of force or the splendour of rank, becomes the arbiter of the fate of nations!"* § 127. Of the moral character of the desire of power. If it be true that the desire of power is connatural to the human mind, it will probably be found, like other analogous principles, to possess a twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. So far as its action is instinctive, we may suppose it to be innocent at least, and probably useful. So far as it is voluntary, the virtue or vice which attaches to it will depend upon its regulation. If it be kept in subordination to the dictates of an enlightened conscience, and to the feelings and duties we owe to the Supreme Being, its exercise is virtuous. If, on the contrary, it acquires inordinate strength, as it is very likely to do, and is excessive in its operation, pushing us forward to the pursuit of forbidden objects and the invasion of others' rights, it then becomes vicious. When the desire of power becomes excessive, and exists and operates as a leading and predominant principle, we commonly denominate it Ambition, although it may be admitted that the term Ambition is susceptible of a modified and less objectionable sense. He, who is under the influence of AMBITION in this unfavourable sense of the term, desires power, not because it assimilates him to his Maker, not because it affords him the increased means of usefulness, nor for any other reason which commends itself to a strictly virtuous mind, but simply because it administers to the gratification of an unrestrained and inordinate selfishness. § 128. Veracity, or the propensity to utter the truth. It is in the propensive part of our nature that we are to locate the important principle of Veracity; in other words, that disposition and tendency to utter the * Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, chap. ii., § 4. |