ruin. On the contrary, he who does good in his day and generation, infuses, whether he designs it or not, the effulgence of his example into a multitude of hearts, which nature has opened for its reception; and thus, with better and higher results, lights them upward to happiness and glory.

§ 119. Of emulation considered as a propensive principle. EMULATION is sometimes regarded as a distinct propensive principle; and yet, without venturing a positive affirmation on the subject, there is ground for saying that it is only one of the forms or modifications of Imitativeness. When we see a thing done by another whom we have been disposed to regard as an equal, we are led, it is true, by the principle of imitation to do as he has done; but we are attended with a conscious feeling also, in view of our supposed equality of power, that we are able to do it; and that, if it is a right thing, we ought to do it. It is reasonable to suppose that the Imitative propension receives a new impulse, and possibly to some extent a new direction, from the peculiarity of the circumstances under which it is now brought into action. It is under such circumstances, and with such resulting modifications, that Imitativeness is sometimes allowed to change its name. In other words, when the thing to be imitated, and, if possible, through the accessory suggestion and influence of self-love, to be surpassed by

us,

is brought to our notice by an equal, who thus stands in the position of a rival or competitor, Imitativeness, which proposes to do as well and perhaps better than the other party, is so modified in our consciousness, and also to the observation of others, that it is called Emulation.

§ 120. Of approbativeness or the desire of esteem.

Another important propensity, not resolvable into anything else, but original, and standing on its own basis, is approbativeness, or the desire of esteem.—In proof of the natural and original existence of this

principle in the human mind, we are at liberty to appeal, as in the case of all the other propensities, to what we notice in the beginnings of life and the first developements of the mental nature. Before children are capable of knowing the advantages which result from the good opinion of others, they are evidently mortified at expressions of neglect or contempt, and as evidently pleased with expressions of regard and approbation. As it is impossible satisfactorily to account for this state of things on the ground of its being the result of reasoning, experience, or interest, the only explanation left is, that this desire is a part of the connatural and essential furniture of the mind.

(II.) We may further remark, that the desire of esteem is found to exist very extensively and strongly in the more advanced periods of life. If we look at the history of nations and of individuals, how many men do we find who have been willing to sacrifice their life rather than forfeit the favourable opinion of others! When they have lost all besides, their health, their fortunes, and friends, they cling with fondness to their good name; they point triumphantly to their unsullied reputation, as a consolation in their present adversities, and the pledge of better things in time to come. This is especially true of those periods in the history of nations when the original sentiments and traits of the people have not been corrupted by the introduction of the arts of luxury and refinement.

(III.) There is this consideration also which has a bearing upon this topic. We are sometimes in such a situation that the favourable or unfavourable opinion of others can have no possible bearing, so far as we can judge, on our own personal interests. And further than this, the unfavourable sentiment which we suppose to exist is not responded to in a single instance out of the particular circle of those who indulge it. It exists there, and there alone, without the possibility of affecting injuriously either our property or our general reputation. And yet it is difficult for

us not to be affected unpleasantly; we feel as if the intentions of nature had been violated; as if some real wrong had been done us; as if we had been deprived of that which is obviously a right.-If this view of the subject is correctly stated, as we have reason to think it is, it goes strongly against the doctrine that the desire of esteem is based upon personal. and interested considerations, and not upon the intrinsic nature of the mind.

(IV.) It is an additional proof in favour of the natural origin of this propensity, that it operates strongly in reference to the future. We not only wish to secure the good opinion of others at the present time. and in reference to present objects, but are desirous that it should be permanent, whether we shall be in a situation directly to experience any good effects from it or not. Even after we are dead, although we shall be utterly separated both from the applauses and the reprobations of men, still we wish to be held in respectful and honourable remembrance. Fully convinced as we are that no human voice shall ever penetrate and disturb the silence of our tombs, the thought would be exceedingly distressing to us if we anticipated that our memories would be calumniated. We may attempt to reason on the folly of such feelings, but we find it impossible to annul the principles planted within us, and to stifle the voice of nature speaking in the breast.

121. Of approbativeness or the desire of esteem as a rule of conduct. The operation of this principle, when kept within its due and appropriate limits, is favourable to human happiness. It begins to operate at a very early period of life, long before the moral principles have been fully brought out and established; and it essentially promotes a decency and propriety of deportment, and stimulates to exertion. Whenever a young man is seen exhibiting an utter disregard for the esteem and approbation of others, the most unfavourable anticipation may be formed of him; he has

annihilated one of the greatest restraints on an evil course which a kind Providence has implanted within us, and exposes himself to the hazard of unspeakable vice and misery. It is narrated of Sylla, the Roman Dictator, that, on a certain occasion, happening to see Julius Cæsar walking immodestly in the streets, he remarked to those around him that he foresaw in that young man many Mariuses; distinctly intimating that a person so destitute of regard for the feelings and opinions of others, would be likely to take a course dictated by his sensuality or ambition, irrespective in a great degree of the admonitions of conscience and of considerations of the public good. A prediction founded in a knowledge of the principles of human nature, and abundantly verified by the result.

But, while we distinctly recognise in the desire of esteem an innocent and highly useful principle, we are carefully to guard, on the other hand, against making the opinion of others the sole and ultimate rule of our conduct. Temporary impulses and pecu liar local circumstances may operate to produce a state of public sentiment, to which a good man cannot conscientiously conform. In all cases where moral principles are involved, there is another part of our nature to be consulted. In the dictates of an enlightened Conscience, we find a code to which not only the outward actions, but the appetites, propensities, and affections are amenable, and which infallibly prescribes the limits of their just exercise. To obey the suggestions of the desire of esteem, in opposition to the requisitions of conscience, would be to subvert the order of the mental constitution, and to transfer the responsibility of the supreme command to a mere sentinel of the outposts.

§ 122. Of acquisitiveness, or the desire of possession.

We are so constituted that we naturally and necessarily have not only a knowledge of objects, but of a multitude of other relations which they sustain. And,

among other things, we very early form a notion of the relation of POSSESSION. There are but few suggestions of the intellect with which the mind forms so early an acquaintance as with this. Whenever we see children, as we constantly do, contending with each other for the occupancy of a chair or the control of a rattle, we may be assured that they have distinctly formed the idea of possession. They know perfectly well what it is, although they cannot define it, and may possibly not be able to give a name to it. Although there can, in reality, be no actual possession without involving the existence of a relation, since the fact or actuality of possession implies, on the one hand, an object which is possessed, and, on the other, a possessor; nevertheless, as the notion or idea of possession exists in its suggested and abstract form, it is to be regarded as a single and definite object, distinctly perceptible in the mind's eye, and sustaining the same relation to the sensibilities as any other object or relation, either mental or material, which is susceptible of being intellectually represented. Of possession, as thus explained, existing as it were distinctly projected and imbodied in the light of the mental vision, all men appear to have a natural or implanted desire. The fact of its existence, either actual or possible, is revealed in the intellect; and the heart, not by the command of the will, but by an instinctive impulse, corresponds to the perception of the intellect by yielding its complacency and love. And this welldefined desire, thus implanted by nature, is variously called the possessory desire or the possessory principle; and not inappropriately acquisitiveness, the name given by phrenological writers, some of whom have thrown much valuable light on this portion of the mind.

§ 123. Of the moral character of the possessory principle. Although the desire of possession has undoubtedly, like the other propensities, its instinctive action, yet its morality, that is to say, its moral character, is just