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briefly to attempt some explanation of their nature. And in doing this, we are obliged, in the first place, to repeat the remark already often made, that we must turn the acts of the mind inward upon itself, and consult the intimations of our own consciousness. We do not suppose that any definition of desire, inasmuch as it is obviously a simple state of the mind, could possibly throw any such light upon it as to preclude the necessity of an internal reference. It is the light of the mind, if we will but turn our eyes to behold it, and that alone, which can truly indicate what may be called the essentiality of its nature.-At the same time, while we must obviously consult consciousness for a knowledge of its distinctive character, we may probably render our conceptions of it more distinct and perfect by considering some of the circumstances or incidents of its origin, and some of the re lations it sustains.

§ 91. Of the place of desires in relation to other mental states. It is important to possess a well-settled and definite idea of the place of Desires, considered in relation to other mental states, especially as a thorough understanding of this point throws light upon the important subject of the philosophy of the Will.-(1.) And the first remark to be made here is, that desires never follow, in direct and immediate sequence, to intellections or the cognitive acts of the mind. There is a distinct department or portion of the mind, located, if we may be permitted to use that expression, between the intellect and the mental states under consideration. It requires no further proof than the simple statement itself, when we say that we never desire a thing simply because we perceive it or have a knowledge of it. The mere perception of a thing is of itself no adequate reason why we should make the thing an object of pursuit. There must obviously be some intermediate state of the mind, existing as the proximate and causative occasion of desires, viz., an emotion. Accordingly, the prerequisite condition to desire is some

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antecedent feeling, generally of a pleasurable nature, which intervenes between the desire, and the perception or knowledge of the desired object.

(2.) In illustration of what has been said, it is the fact, that, whenever we desire the presence or possession of an object, it is because we are in some way pleased with it. Whenever, on the other hand, we desire its removal from our presence, it is because we are in some way displeased with it. And these expressions, indicative of pleasure or displeasure, obviously involve the existence of that distinct state of the mind which we denominate an EMOTION; a state of feeling entirely different both from the perception of the object which goes before such emotion and the desire of the object which follows after it. Accordingly, we may feel at liberty to state, in general terms, that no man ever desired an object, or could by any possibility desire it, in regard to which he had experienced no emotion, but had always been in a state of perfect indifferency. Such, in the matter under consideration, is obviously the fixed law of the mind.

(3.) In this connexion, and in view of what has now been said, we may properly recur a moment to the mind's general structure. The general division of the Mind, it will be recollected, is into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. The External or Sensuous Intellect is first brought into action; followed, in greater or less proximity of time, by the developement of the Internal or Super-sensuous. The subsequent process of the mental action, when carried through in the direction of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, is from intellections to emotions, and from emotions to desires, and from desires to acts of the will. When carried through in the direction of the Moral sensibilities, it is from intellections to emotions (not natural, but moral emotions); and then, diverging into a different track, and avoiding the appropriate domain of the Desires, passes from emotions to feelings of moral obligation, and from the Obligatory feelings, like the corresponding portion of the

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sensibilities, to the region of the Voluntary or Volitional nature.

§ 92. Of an exception to the foregoing statement.

The statements of the last section to this effect, that emotions are the prerequisite condition of desires, and that the latter never exist except in connexion with the fulfilment of this condition, is probably subject to an exception, which, although it may be of no great importance, it is proper to notice in this place. We have reference to those modifications and acts of desire which are instinctive. It is worthy of inquiry, whether some instincts, and some mental acts of an instinctive nature, are not capable of existing, and do not in fact exist, independently of antecedent emotions, considered as grounds of such existence. Such is the rapidity of their action, that they certainly have, in some cases, this appearance, although this circumstance may not of itself be decisive. They are also, in some cases, where this action is less rapid, directed and guided to their appropriate objects as ultimate ends, without any foresight of, or regard to the pleasure or pain which may be attendant, either antecedently or subsequently, on the acquisition of that object. The truth is, that some of the instincts (for it is probably not the fact, in an equal degree, in respect to all) receive their direction, not merely in the general sense of the term, but their specific direction, from a power out of the mind. They are moulded by a hand unseen to a particular object, and are impelled in its pursuit, without being at liberty to regard either the good or evil which may follow from it. And, under these circumstances, there is not that absolute necessity of the antecedence of intellections and emotions, which exists in the case of other desires.—With this slight exception, the general statement holds good. We speak of it as a slight exception, because, among other reasons, we are not obliged to suppose that it exists in respect to all even of the instincts. When, for instance, we make an instinctive effort to recover

the balance which we have lost, may we not suppose, although the effort is instantaneous, that we have a perception of the danger, and a sentiment or emotion of fear, antecedent to making the effort?

§ 93. The desires characterized by comparative fixedness and per

manency.

There is one mark or trait attending the feelings under consideration which appears to be worthy of notice. We refer to the fact, that the desires, as compared with the emotions, appear to possess a greater degree of fixedness or permanency. It is well known that our emotions rapidly go and come, sinking and rising on the mind's surface like the unfixed waves of a troubled sea. But the desires, which are subsequent to them in the time of their origin, and may be regarded as produced in and as emerging from the troubled waters of emotion, evidently exhibit less facility and elasticity of movement. Having once entered their allotted position, although they are not absolutely immovable, they occupy it with so much pertinacity as to render it proper to regard this as one of their characteristics.

There certainly can be no great effort necessary in understanding the statement which has been made, and no great difficulty, as we suppose, in recognising and substantiating its truth. Take, for instance, the case of a man who is an exile in a foreign land, or of the unfortunate individual who is unjustly condemned to the occupancy of a prison, and they will assuredly tell you that the desires they have to see once more the light of heaven, their native land, and the countenances of their friends, sustains itself in their bosoms with a pertinacity which defies all change; and that they might as well rend away the fibres of the heart itself as to separate from it a feeling so deeply rooted. We give this as an illustration; but it is more or less so in every case where the desires have decidedly fixed themselves upon any interesting object.

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§ 94. Desires always imply an object desired.

An additional characteristic of Desires is, that they always have an object, generally a distinct and welldefined one, and cannot possibly exist without it. To speak of a desire, without involving the idea of an object desired, would be an anomaly in language. They differ in this respect from emotions, which, although they have their antecedent causes or occasions, do not possess, in their own nature, a prospective or anticipative bearing, but terminate in themselves. Desires, on the contrary, are always pointing onward to what is to be hereafter. And this is probably one reason of their greater degree of fixedness or permanency. The desires lean upon the object which they have in view as a sort of pillar of support; they may be said, with strict truth at the bottom of the expression, to cling around it, as the vine encircles and rests itself upon the elm; and, of course, are not left loose and fluttering, which is substantially the case with the states of mind which immediately precede them, at the mercy of every passing wind.

§ 95. The fulfilment of desires attended with enjoyment. As a general thing, it may be said of the emotions that they are either pleasant or painful, although in some instances even of those feelings, it might not be easy to predicate distinctly and confidently either the one or the other. And this last statement is true particularly of the desires; which, although they exist distinctly and well defined in the view of the mind's consciousness, and constitute a powerful motive to action, can hardly be said, for the time being, to involve, in their own nature, either pleasure or its opposite. At any rate, we find it difficult, in ordinary cases, distinctly to detect either of these traits.

But, however this may be, there is still another characteristic circumstance which aids in distinguishing them from other mental states. It is this. Every desire, when the object towards which it is directed is attained, is attended with a degree of pleasure. It is

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