Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie, Volume 7

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Page 467 - And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of , those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.
Page 294 - Cela se fait par figure et mouvement, car cela est vrai. Mais de dire quels, et composer la machine, cela est ridicule; car cela est inutile, et incertain, et pénible. Et quand cela serait vrai, nous n'estimons pas que toute la philosophie vaille une heure de peine.] XCII.
Page 304 - Car la connaissance des premiers principes, comme qu'il ya espace, temps, mouvement, nombres, [est] aussi ferme qu'aucune de celles que nos raisonnements nous donnent. Et c'est sur ces connaissances du cœur et de l'instinct qu'il faut que la raison s'appuie, et qu'elle y fonde tout son discours.
Page 462 - Our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge from whence all the ideas we have or can naturally have do spring.
Page 483 - The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together ; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name...
Page 465 - To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us ; that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject ; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeneee of something existing without...
Page 438 - All knowledge of causes is deductive; for we know " none by simple intuition, but through the mediation of their " effects. So that we cannot conclude any thing to be the " cause of another, but from its continual accompanying it; " for the causality itself is insensible.
Page 477 - I say, that this way of speaking of faculties has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating to them.
Page 465 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Page 296 - N'est-ce pas là traiter indignement la raison de l'homme et la mettre en parallèle avec l'instinct des animaux, puisqu'on en ôte la principale différence, qui consiste en ce que les effets du raisonnement augmentent sans cesse, au lieu que l'instinct demeure toujours dans un état égal? Les ruches...

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