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Provoft-Marshalls, and Coroners, and other offices of Justice in the same, so as to lessen the taxes which it may be necessary for the Governors, Councils, and Assemblies of the said provinces to lay on the inhabitants of the lame for the said purpose : and that a separate receiver and collector of the said quit-rents and other royal ducs, be appointed by the several Governors of the said provinces respectively in every separate province, who shall hold his said office during the pleasure of the Governor of the province to which he shall belong, and his residence in the said province, and no longer, and who shall receive and enjoy such falary, or fees, or other emoluments, during his continuance in his said office, as shall be allowed by an Act of the Governor, Council, and Assembly of the said province. But the portions of the said quit-rents that shall be assigned to the Governor, and Judges, and other officers of civil government in the said provinces respectively, shall be such as his Majesty, in his royal wisdom, shall think fit to appoint.
Also it should be provided that no Governor, Judge, or other officer of the civil government of any such province, should receive any part of the salaries arising from those quit-rents, or other royal dues, during the time of his absence from the said province, or after his return to the province, in consideration of his having held the said office during such abfence; but that so much of his faid salary, arising from the said quit-rents and other royal dues, as would have accrued to him in the said space of time, if he had resided during the same in the said province, shall be deemed to be forfeited by his said absence, and shall make a part of the publick treasure of the province, and be disposed-of by the joint Act of the Governor, Council, and Assembly of the said province. The amount of these quit-rents and other royal dues in
Americà should be made good to his Majesty out of the sinking-fund.
NINTHLY.—The offices of Secretary of the province, clerk of the Council, Register of deeds and patents, or clerk of the inrolments of deeds and patents, Provoft-marshałyr sheriff, Commissary of stores, Receiver-general of the king's révenue, Coroners, clerks, or registers, of the courts of justice, Naval officer, Collector of the cultoms, Comptroller of the customs, in every province, should be given to persons relitent in the province, to be executed by themselves, without a power of making deputies ; and the fees to be taken by thein should be settled by Acts of the Governour, Council, and assembly of the said province, in which they are holden; and they should be holdlen during the pleasure of the Governour, or of the King, as his Majesty, in his royal wisdom, shall think hit, but should never be given by patents under the great seal of Great-Britain, to be holden during the lives of the patentees ; and they thould be holden by separate officers, fo that no two of them thould be holden by the same person.
The present pa:entces of any of these offices should have compensations made to them for the loss of their patents by pensions for their lives payable out of the sinking-fund.
TENTHLY.-In the governments called Royal Governments, (which are carried-on by virtue of the King's commillions only, without charters,) the Councils of the said provinces should be made more numerous than they now are, and the members of them Tould be appointed for life. They now usually consist of twelve members, all of whom may be removed at the pleasure of the crown, and fufpended from the execution of their offices of counsellors, by the Governours of the province, till the pleasure of the Crown can be known. This renders them of little weight and consequence in the eyes of the people, and confcquently of little advantage to the Governour in supporting his Majesty's authority, and preserving the peace of the
province. It would therefore be proper to enlarge their number to at least 23 members, and, in the more populous provinces to a greater number, (in Virginia, perhaps, to 43,) of whom at least 12 should be necessary to make a board, and do business; and it would also be proper to appoint them for life or during their good behaviour, fo that they could not be removed from their faid offices without a charge of some misconduct that shall be a fufficient ground for removing them from the said office, and a proof and convi&tion of the fame in a trial by jury upon a writ of scire facias tơ repeal the patent by which they had been appointed to such office, or some other law-proceeding analogous to such writ. This numerous council should be the Legislative Council of the province, and fhould concur with the Affembly in making laws. But, for the executive part of government, the King might appoint a leffer Council consisting of not fewer than 12 persons, who fhould advise the Governour in all thofe matters relative to the execution of the powers of his conimission, in which he was directed by his commission to act with the advice of his Council. And seven members of this Council should be neceffary to make a board, or do business. The members of this Council should hold their places at the pleasure of the Crown, as the King's privy Counsellors do in England ; but should not be removeable or fufpendible by the Governour. They might either be some of the members of the greater, or legislative, Council, or not, as his Majesty, io his royal wisdom, should think fit.
This measure, “ of making the members of the legislative councils more numerous than they now are, and independent of the Crown, in order to give them more weight and dignity in the eyes of the people, and thereby to render them more capable of being useful in the support of bis Majesty's government,” is recommended by some of the warmest friends of Great-Britain in North-America ; of which I will
mention an instance or two. In the year 1774 a very fenGble pamphlet was published by Thomas Cadell, in the Strand, entitled, " Confiderations on certain Political Transactions of the Province of South Carolina.” This pamphlet has been generally ascribed to Sir Egerton Leigh, baronet, his Majesty's attorney-general for that province. But, whosoever tħe author of it may be, he appears to be a person well acquainted with the affairs of America, and more especially of that province, and a zealous friend to the interests of Great Britain in America, and to the continuance of an amicable connection between the two countries, upon the old footing of a subjection of them both to the authority of the British Parliament. In pages 68, 69, 70, of this pamphlet there is the following paffage. “In “my apprehension it seems absolutely necessary, that the “numbers of the Council should be increased; and for this “plain and obvious reason, Because a body of Twenty-four “Counsellors, for instance, appointed by the King from the “first rank of the People most distinguished for their wealth, “merit, and ability, would be a means of diffusing a consi“derable influence through every order of persons in the “community, which must extend very far and wide, by " means of their particular connections; whereas a Council « of Twelve, several of whom are always absent, can have “ little weight, nor can their voices be heard amidst the clas mour of prevailing numbers.
“ I think this body, a&ing legislatively, ought to be made s independent, by holding that station during the term of 5 their natural lives, and determinable only on that event, or “ on their intire departure from the province. But the same 6 person might nevertheless, for proper cause, be displaced « from his seat in Council; which regulation would, in a
great measure, operate as a check to an arbitrary Governour, who would be cautious how he raised a powerful enemy in the Upper House by a rash removal; at the same
" time that the power of removal would keep the Member " within proper bounds. The life-tenure of his legislativo
capacity would likewise sufficiently secure that indepenie " dency which is so necessary to this station, and so agree« able to the constitution of the Parent-State. I know fome « folks will raise both scruples and fears; but for my owil “ part, I think without much reason : for, if we attend to " the workings of human nature, we shall find, that a cer"tain degree of attachment commonly arises to the fountain “ from whence an independent honour flows. Opposition “seldom settles upon the persons who are raised to dignity “ by favour of the Crown, it having so much the appearance “ of Ingratitude, one of the most detested vices; and it ever "acts a faint and languid part, till a descent or two are past, " and the author of the elevation is extinct. From this rea
soning it seems tolerably clear to me, that the Legislator,
being for life, and deriving his consequence from the “ Crown, will rather incline to that feale; and it is not
probable that his opposition would in any instance be ran
corous or fatiious ; inasımuch as, though his life-estate is “ secure, he would not wish unnecessarily to excite the re
fentment of the Crown, or exclude his descendants or con“nections, perhaps, from succeeding afterwards to such a “ post of honour and distinction in their native country: in
short, this idea seems to admit such a qualified dependency,
as will attach the person to the side of the Crown in that “ proportion which the constitution itself allows, and yet so “ much real independency, as will make him superior to acts “ of meanness, servility, and oppreßion. Whether thefe o sentiments are well-founded, or not, I submit to the impar“ tial judgement of my reader; what I principally mean to o infer is, that the happiness of these colonies much de“pends upon a due blending, or mixture, of power and “ dependence, and in preserving a proper subordination of rank and civil discipline,”