and to destroy them where they lay. With this view it was that he put to sea as just described,because, his commission giving him supreme authority afloat as well as on shore, he trusted that his presence with the fleet would enable him to direct it in any operation calculated to promote the general success of the war. This night, however, his uneasy watch proved fruitless; the squadron came not; and he returned, soon after daybreak, disappointed to the land: but the night following he was more fortunate; being received, greatly to the astonishment of her commander, on board of a fifty gun ship, on the mainmast of which his flag was immediately hoisted. In the great object of his embarkation, however, the confusion attendant on the transmission of orders during the night caused him to fail. The progress of the fleet could not be arrested: it was seen at early dawn by the enemy's look-out frigates; and Toulouse, warned of the approach of an enemy, made no pause to ascertain his strength, but cut his cables and fled with the utmost precipitation.

While these things were in progress on board the navies of France and England, Peterborough's infantry, warned by the passing of so many ships of war, hastened, according to orders, on board their tiny squadron. The wind being light and variable, the craft soon came abreast of the fleet, which they passed amid the cheers both of seamen and soldiers; and then, turning their heads towards the mole, rushed into the basin, where the troops made good their landing. Great indeed was the joy experienced and expressed by all classes of people at Barcelona; men shouted, women wept, children screamed with delight; while the enemy received intimation of succours poured in by a general discharge of cannon and small arms from the ramparts. As a matter of course, all idea of reducing the place was on the instant abandoned; the stores and ammunition were secretly destroyed; and, on the 1st of May, under cover of a dense eclipse of the sun, marshal Thesse suddenly raised the siege. Nor was this the only advantage which Peterborough's admirable dispositions secured to the Austrian cause on the present occasion: after abandoning upwards of fifty pieces of cannon, under the idea that they would only retard his movements, Philip found the roads into the interior so completely blocked up, that he could not venture to attempt them; while the devastated condition of the surrounding country, and the low ebb to which his own supplies were reduced, rendered even a brief sojourn where he was impossible. Under such circumstances, one course of proceeding, and one only, lay open to him: he wheeled to the right, took the route by Hostalrich and Gerona, and escaped across the mountains into France.

While the king and his attendants gave loose to the most extravagant demonstrations of joy, Peterborough, with characteristic activity, was

arranging his plans for the future, and considering how present advantages might be best turned to a permanent account. Madrid lay at this time perfectly exposed; for scarce 500 men had been left to do the garrison duty; while marshal Berwick's force was known to be in full retreat before lord Galway, who had reduced Alcantara, and was advanced as far as Placentia. Once more Peterborough urged his favourite project,—an advance through Valencia upon the capital; and a council of war being summoned, the plan was pronounced to be judicious. Arrangements were therefore made for a proper distribution of the army, so as that Aragon and Castile might be secured by strong garrisons; while a corps of 6000 men, with an adequate train of artillery, was allotted to Peterborough for active operations. Finally, it was settled that, while the horse marched overland to Valencia, Peterborough should proceed with the infantry by sea; that the king should repair to Tortosa, there to abide till the road through Valencia and Cuença should be opened out for him; and that, joining lord Galway, under the earl's escort, with every disposable man, they should make a grand push for the total expulsion of the Bourbons from Spain. These several decisions were passed at a council of war held on the 18th of May, 1706; and preparations were immediately set on foot for the purpose of carrying them into execution.

Allusion has elsewhere been made to the froward and supercilious temper which, in all matters of public business, threw its baneful influence over Peterborough's character. Conscious of his own talents, and not inclined to under-rate them, he was at once impatient of contradiction, and sensitively alive to neglect; always devising schemes, always eager to carry them into execution, and always striving, as it were, to hinder in others that absolute freedom of opinion which he claimed to exercise as matter of right in himself. Such a man is not likely, under any circumstances, to be popular among his colleagues; but when we look to the description of persons with whom, in his present service, he was compelled to associate, we shall scarcely wonder that Peterborough should have become to them an object of jealousy and personal antipathy. Cold, reserved, haughty, and obstinate, Charles could neither brook the petulant language in which his general too much indulged, nor admit the force of arguments which came before him in the garb rather of commands than of suggestions. The royal attendants, in like manner, looked with undisguised abhorrence upon a man who neither courted their interest, nor affected to value their opinions; while the generals themselves complained, and with some show of reason, that, in the arrangement of plans of campaigns, very little care was taken either to conciliate their feelings, or convince their understandings. We would not, while expressing ourselves thus, be understood as desiring to convey an im

pression that solid and substantial ground necessarily existed for all the complaints which began now to be heard. Probably there was as much reason for disgust on the part of the general-inchief, as for the murmuring and discontent which prevailed among his confederates; but, however this may be, a bitter estrangement took place, the effects of which upon the public service were truly lamentable. Men whose honour and interest were equally engaged in supporting one another with cordiality, permitted personal feeling to over-rule even a sense of professional duty; and the common cause was forgotten amid the desire experienced on all hands to humble and thwart the devices of a rival.

It is stated, in a work entitled "An account of the Earl of Peterborough's Conduct in Spain," which, as it proceeded from the pen of the earl's physician, is of course not unfavourable to the subject of this memoir, that the council of war which had arranged the plan of campaign was scarcely dissolved, when some of the most important of the conclusions at which it had arrived were, by the king's command, evaded. Instead of 6000 men of all arms, only 4000 infantry, with a few squadrons of horse, accompanied lord Peterborough to Valencia; where, without money, and totally unaided by the local authorities, he was required to equip his little army for the field. Three whole weeks were accordingly expended in purchasing mules and laying up stores; while a corps of cavalry was formed, partly by the enrol ment of raw levies, partly by mounting some of the most efficient of the companies of infantry. Peterborough was not of a temper to bear even these slights calmly; but when, at the end of a month, he found the king still lingering at Barcelona, his patience entirely forsook him. He wrote both to the persons about the Spanish court, and to the ministers at home, in the most querulous and irritating tone; he protested against being responsible for the issues of events which he had opposed to the utmost of his power and not satisfied with writing, began in some degree to act as if the game had entirely changed its character. Instead of pushing upon Madrid, as he had originally proposed to do, he employed his troops in the reduction of certain places along the coast; the possession of which, though not absolutely valueless, might have certainly been deferred without detriment to the interests of Charles. Yet let him not be hastily condemned for thus acting. Charles not only wasted a precious month at Barcelona-a space more than sufficient to have carried him, by way of Valencia, to Madrid-but, on the invitation of certain persons in Aragon, he suddenly adopted a totally new line of route towards his capital. He set off, under a slender escort, to Saragoza; from which no entreaties on the earl's part could, during many weeks, withdraw him.

It is exceedingly difficult, amid the conflicting evidence with which party spirit has overlaid the

subject, to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion touching the motives which dictated this unfortunate journey into Aragon. The friends of Charles and of lord Galway contend, that the former was driven to undertake it, partly by the exhausted state of his treasury, and the failure of the English general to afford supplies, partly in order that he might personally escape from the intolerable insults to which lord Peterborough was now in the constant habit of subjecting him. Peterborough's adherents, on the other hand, assert that the ar rangement was dictated by the pitiful jealousy of the court, which could not brook the idea of being conducted to Madrid in triumph by an officer whom they one and all abhorred. Let the truth rest where it may, no doubt can exist that to this fatal journey may be, in a great measure, attri buted the disasters which eventually clouded over the prospects of the allies. It is beyond dispute, moreover, that a sense of the personal wrongs endured by himself operated, in a degree which cannot be justified, in abating the zeal of Peterborough; while the delays incident upon such relaxation, coupled with the gross incapacity of those in comniand elsewhere, gave ample time to the enemy to recover from a situation which, at one moment, seemed to be all but desperate.

Finding that his arguments entirely failed of producing any effect upon the determinations of Charles, Peterborough, whose activity of enterprise amounted to positive restlessness, began to devise numerous schemes of conquest apart from his original design upon Madrid. Expeditions were fitted out against Alicant and Carthagena, both of which places were reduced; though not till much time had been expended in attacking them, which might have been better employed in operations elsewhere. Nor are these the only errors which seem to be justly attributable to Peterborough at this stage of the war. Influenced by feelings unworthy of a man of genius, and quite at variance with his professions of patriotism, he abstained from acting in support of lord Galway, on the ground that he had not been formally solicited so to do; while he appealed, in defence of his own remissness, to the terms of a council of war, which had long ceased to be an object of attention to any person affected by it. How this came about, and to what consequences it led, it will be necessary to give some account.

While these unfortunate misunderstandings gave a turn to affairs in one quarter, errors scarcely less glaring in kind, and equally fatal in their consequences, marked the progress of the war in another. The Portuguese army, after advancing as far as the bridge of Almaroz, and surprising in Alcantara the rear-guard of Berwick's columns, suddenly stopped short; Das Minas, the general, refusing to penetrate a league further into Spain, so long as Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo remained in possession of the enemy. This halt occurred during the second siege of Barcelona, on the re

sults of which the fate of the war was supposed to turn; nor could all the entreaties of lord Galway induce his colleague to undertake an enterprise of moment, till intelligence of the relief under Peterborough reached him. Even then, however, it availed not to press a march upon Madrid: Das Minas insisted upon reducing one, at least, of the two fortresses which command the principal approaches into Portugal; and as Rodrigo was supposed to offer the greatest facilities to a besieging army, Galway consented to re-open the campaign under its walls, Rodrigo was attacked, and in due time opened its gates; after which the order was issued to march upon Madrid: but the arch itself was both languidly and discreditay conducted. Marshal Berwick, one of the ablest officers of his day, more especially in the conduct of a defensive war, kept the invaders constantly on the alert, beating back their patrols and arresting their progress at every point where the slightest advantage of ground displayed itself. Meantime Las Torres, after throwing garrisons into Requena, Cuença and other strong places, drew off entirely from Valencia, and took up a position amid the broken country which surrounds the sources of the Tagus. Nor was Philip neglectful of the breathing space which the indolence and want of cordiality among his enemies afforded him: bursting again into Spain at the head of a formidable cavalry, and pursuing the road by Pampeluna, he made his appearance in Madrid at a moment when such an apparition was least of all expected; and bearing off his consort, as well as the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, removed them all in perfect safety to Burgos. Then followed a series of masterly movements, which brought the corps of Berwick and Las Torres into communication; strong reinforcements were pushed from France along every route that was passable; while bands of armed peasants were hastily enrolled, both in Andalusia and the Castiles. In a word, the critical moment which might have decided the war in Charles's favour was gone: the enemy had recovered their confidence; the passes from Navarre were in their possession; the capital alone was lost; and even that, as the troops of Galway and Das Minas beheld it, presented no cheering or encouraging aspect. On the 26th of June, the Anglo-Portuguese columns took up their quarters in Madrid; where amid a death-like silence, because in streets absolutely deserted, Charles was proclaimed king.

The policy of the allies, circumstanced as they now were, appears so obvious and so simple, that we are at a loss to account for the. strange infatuation under the influence of which it was neglected. Had Das Minas and Galway, with the troops under their immediate command, amounting at the lowest computation to 8000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, pushed upon marshal Berwick, as yet greatly inferior in point of numbers, not all his

skill could have averted the necessity of a retreat into Old Castile: the allies might have then seized the mountain passes which separate Old Castile from New, and thrown open the roads both into Aragon and Valencia; along which it was fair to conclude that reinforcements would move promptly to their aid. Again, the arrival of the AngloPortuguese forces in the vicinity of Madrid ought to have drawn the attention both of Peterborough and the king exclusively to that point, whither every disposable man was bound to hasten, for the purpose of swelling their divisions to the greatest possible amount. Strange to say, however, neither of these events befell. The Portuguese entered Madrid, as has just been stated, on the 26th of June; on the 27th, king Charles was proclaimed; after which, as if the war were finished, both officers and men sat down to enjoy the pleasures of a large, a vicious, and then the reverse of a polished city. It is but fair to add, indeed, that detached corps were sent both to Toledo and Segovia, of which the allies made themselves masters without resistance; and that the generals despatched messengers in all haste to the king, to urge his immediate removal to the capital.

If there was one point more than another on which lord Peterborough piqued himself, it was on the excellence of the intelligence which he contrived to secure relative to the movements both of friends and enemies. We cannot, therefore, give credence to Dr. Friend, when he asserts, that of the occupation of Madrid the earl remained ignorant during several weeks; more especially as we find him exacting a certificate from one of Galway's messengers, that he was not the bearer of any communication addressed directly to himself. It is much more probable that certain meaner passions to which he was miserably the slave,—a jealousy of control altogether irrepressible, and an ambition, if such it may be termed, which forbade him to act except in the most prominent capacity,-blinded him to a consideration of his own honour not less than of his country's welfare. He had heard from various sources, that the authority which he had hitherto exercised would cease so soon as his troops came into contact with those of lord Galway; he had received, moreover, numerous hints of the complaints lodged against him by the king of Spain; and hence he experienced no desire to place at the disposal of a rival, power which would certainly be used for his own destruction. He therefore delayed his movement till the period had long passed when any substantial benefit could be expected to arise from its accomplishment. Yet let justice be done: if Peterborough deserves censure on the score of time mis-spent, Charles lies open to charges still more serious; inasmuch as he not only abstained, himself, from following the course which became him, but proved in a great measure the cause of misconduct in others.

While the operations against Carthagena and

Alicant were carried on, Peterborough ceased not to importune the king on the subject of an immediate removal of the court to Valencia, and a prompt advance upon Madrid. To many of his letters he received no reply; and when replies did come, they contained little besides excuses, grounded upon the want of adequate resources, and the impossibility of deserting the faithful inhabitants of Saragoza. The same tone of correspondence, continued on both sides after Requena had fallen, and the road lay open as far as the very heart of Castile. In a letter bearing date July 5, 1706, Peterborough writes-"Carthagena has submitted, and the garrison consists of 500 men : Requena has capitulated; the soldiers prisoners of war-the inhabitants without terms, to be disposed of at your pleasure. Your majesty will find the horse and foot near Alarcon, half way to Madrid. The Spaniards and Germans are on that side. The way is so free betwixt this and Madrid, that the deserters pass three or four in a company: your majesty may pass to your capital this way as in a most profound peace, and with what expedition you think fit." Neither this intelligence, however, nor a proposal subsequently made to repair himself to Saragoza, for the purpose of examining into the actual state of affairs, produced the smallest effect on Charles's determination: he continued fixed in his resolution of passing through Aragon to Madrid, and positively prohibited the earl's journey to Saragoza.

It will be seen that, in his communications with the king, Peterborough studiously avoided all allusion to the occupation of the capital by Das Minas. Of that event, indeed, he affected a profound ignorance, though lord Galway subsequently asserted, in the house of lords, that one of his first acts after the proclamation of Charles, was to communicate the fact of his arrival to lord Peterborough. Neither has it been denied by the most devoted of the earl's partisans, that so early as July 6th, an officer passing by way of Valencia from the head-quarters of Das Minas's army, reported, though not officially, the capture of Madrid. Yet Peterborough wrote and acted as if Madrid were either held by the enemy, or at most laid open to the occupation of whatever force might first arrive in its vicinity; for he persisted in holding back till the king should consent to adopt his views, and pass under his escort to the capital it were a long and tedious tale, were we to enumerate, one by one, the mischiefs which arose out of so much perverseness on both sides: enough is done when we state that, after a fruitless sojourn of five weeks at Saragoza, Charles became at length convinced of his inability to proceed through the heart of Aragon; that he then wrote to Peterborough, soliciting that protection which he had so often so coldly declined; that Peterborough hastened, with 700 horse and 1500 foot, to meet the king at Pastrana; and that, on the 6th of August, the royal cavalcade arrived at the head

quarters of the Portuguese army. That army, however, was no longer in possession either of Madrid or the fortresses near: a sad reverse had overtaken it; and now not even the presence of the sovereign sufficed to restore unanimity among the leaders, or confidence to the men.

We have spoken of the inactivity which, for some days after their arrival in Madrid, márked the proceedings, if such a term may be used, of lord Galway and Das Minas. It seemed, indeed, as if their plans had all been framed on the assumption of a belief that the king would precede them in the capital; and that these failing, they were utterly at a loss how to use the advantages which they had unexpectedly gained. No magazines were formed; nor was the slightest attempt made to raise, among the inhabitants of the city or country round, fresh battalions: nay, even the duke of Berwick, who, with a very inferior force, watched them so near as the vicinity of Alcala, suffered for a time neither interruption nor alarm. It is scarcely necessary to add, that o the indecision of the allies Philip and his generals made the best use; and that the days which the former wasted in indolence and folly, were devoted by the latter to the bringing up of succours or the organisation of corps of partisans.

On the 8th of July, information at length reached Madrid, that the king had removed to Saragoza for the purpose of passing from thence to the capital. It became necessary, in consequence, to drive the enemy from Alcala, as well as to clear the road through Guadalaxara and Torrija; and lord Galway advancing with a portion of the troops for this purpose, Berwick retreated before him. On the 11th, Das Minas, who had halted with the remainder in Madrid, joined his colleague at Alcala; and the possibility of crushing Berwick, of whose resources they possessed very defective information, was considered. It is at least doubtful whether the attempt, even if hazarded at once, would have succeeded; for Berwick was already joined by Philip, and their combined armies occupied a strong position in a fork of the Henarez, near Jadraque; but as no movement took place till the 1st of August, a failure could alone be anticipated. Nor was the result different from what might have been expected a brisk fire from the enemy's batteries satisfied lord Galway and Das Minas that the river could not be passed, nor the lines approached; and hence they fell back again to Guadalaxara, where, for some days, they rested on their arms. By and by came intelligence that the king's route was changed, and that he had gone to meet lord Peterborough at Pastrana. To that point, therefore, was attention immediately paid, and with such absolute devotion of zeal and common sense, that the thoughts of the two chiefs seemed to be wholly abstracted from the consideration of possible accidents elsewhere. Again did Berwick: ably take advantage of the carelessness of his in

fatuated opponents: leading a strong detachment along the roots of the hills, he came suddenly upon Madrid, of which, as it was entirely drained of troops, he gained possession without resistance; and then pushing as far as Segovia and Toledo, he made himself master of both ere the garrisons seemed to be aware that danger impended.

Such was the melancholy state into which affairs had fallen, when Charles, with his scanty escort, arrived a Guadalaxara; he found his generals labouring under the combined influence of dissatisfaction with themselves and distrust the one of the other; while the men as little resembled the conquerors of a kingdom, as soldiers usually do when desponding and disheartened with reverses. The appearance of the king, and the coming up of further reinforcements which occurred on the day following, soon restored confidence to the soldiers; but among the generals, feelings the most decidedly hostile to unity of purpose seemed to gain strength from hour to hour. Head-quarters presented, indeed, but one continued scene of altercation and mutual complaint. Peterborough accused Das Minas of shameful ignorance of his profession : Das Minas retorted, by laying to the charge of Peterborough's dilatory conduct the blame of all the disasters that had occurred. This was followed by bitter and acrimonious disputes as to the assumption of command and precedence of rank. Lord Galway, to do him justice, expressed himself willing to serve under Peterborough till his order of recall, which he had solicited, should arrive; but the Portuguese would not, in like manner, yield the palm; and Peterborough refused to act in a secondary capacity under any one. Nor was he more fortunate in a proposition which he ventured to make for the distribution of the forces into three or four separate corps. Neither to that, nor to his express desire of attempting, with 5000 men, the recovery of Madrid, was any attention paid: in a word, it became evident, even to himself, that a longer continuance with the Spanish army could not possibly redound either to his own honour or the public service. He accordingly remembered that his original instructions contained a clause authorising him to proceed, whenever it should appear desirable, to the assistance of the duke of Savoy; and, as Turin was now closely invested, he abruptly declared his determination of acting upon that order.

The extreme readiness with which the suggestion was sanctioned, could not fail to mortify a man of Peterborough's extravagant vanity. When he stated his intention in a council of war, not only was no voice raised against it, but the king, in order to confirm him in the design, laid upon, him a commission to raise, at Genoa, a loan of 100,000l., to be secured on the hereditary possessions of the house of Austria. He was then formally invested with the command of the fleet, and instructed, at the conclusion of his important ser

vices abroad, to employ himself in the reduction of the islands of Majorca and Minorca ; but not a hint was dropped, calculated to produce a belief that his return to head-quarters was either expected or desired. Yet Peterborough did not quit this somewhat ungrateful prince, without tendering him, as a last legacy, a few cautions as to his future proceedings. In direct opposition to the opinions of the other generals, he advised that no effort should be made to bring Berwick to a ba:tle; but that ground should be taken up and maintained throughout the winter, defensively, in the heart of Castile. As Peterborough was not a witness to the consequences arising out of the neglect of this solemn warning, we need not pause to describe them in detail; but we may mention, that they led not only to a second failure in the enemy's presence, but to a disastrous retreat into Valencia.

With the avowal of his determination to quit the army of Spain, ends what, in strict propriety of speech, deserves to be termed the military biography of lord Peterborough. The remainder of his career is but that of an English nobleman; though marked with a degree of eccentricity rarely to be found in such histories, which it will not be necessary, in a work like the present, to trace with the same minute attention which we have bestowed on his services in the field: yet there are, even in his private life, if, indeed, his life can be said ever to have partaken of privacy, several passages which we are not authorised to omit; and of these we now proceed to give as succinct a relation as any regard to perspicuity will permit.

The council of war, which virtually deprived of his command by far the ablest officer in the service of Charles, concluded its delibertions on the afternoon of August the 9th. On the 11th, Peterborough set out under a slight escort of eighty dragoons, for Valencia. But he had not travelled far, when intelligence reached him, little calculated under any circumstances to excite a feeling of satisfaction. He learned that the whole of his baggage had been attacked and plundered by the enemy, the guard having suffered themselves to be surprised at Huette near Cuença, while following his rapid march to Guadalaxara. Peterborough's indignation became greatly roused, when an inquiry into the circumstances of the case led to a suspicion that the inhabitants of Huette had betrayed his soldiers. He instantly marched into the place, and would have burned it to the ground, had not the magistrates implored his clemency, and undertaken to make good his losses, which fell little short of 10,000l. Nevertheless, though he exacted the full value of the property stolen, he refused to apply any portion of it to his own use. Corn and other necessaries, of which the army began already to be in need, were accepted in lieu of money; and the whole was forwarded, in cars furnished for the purpose, to the royal commissaries at Chincon.