2. The second stream which helps to fill the fountain of German bitterness, flows through rather

for Expansion. And although no territory is coveted, according to Herr Delbrück, in Europe, Asia, or the Americas, he makes no secret that in Africa "Germany sees possibilities worth cultivating." She looks towards the "inevitable eventual collapse of Portuguese power in Africa" with more than a platonic interest. Now Portugal, as The Spectator has recently put it, "in reality only holds the coast and a few posts in the interior, and holds them largely in the interests of slave-raiders and kidnappers." And doubtless, considered as an abstract question, it is practically certain that the substitution of a more just and virile administration for this nominal hold on large slices of South Africa, would be a great improvement. But the fact that Portuguese "possessions " now belong to Portugal, is a curious count in a German grievance against England!

Herr Delbrück is easier to understand when he complains that we have “resisted every overture for the cession of Walfisch Bay, at the gateway of German S.W. Africa, though it is of no earthly value to Britain." He declares this to be only a sample of the kind of "dog-in-the-manger attitude of blind, unyielding opposition" encountered by German diplomacy in all parts of the world. And he mainly attributes to England's intransigence in meeting Germany's ambition to expand, the dangerous resentment now aroused. As to Walfisch Bay, it is of course said in reply that its cession to Germany would raise a fearful storm in British South Africa. If that be so, it is greatly to be regretted that the splendidly magnanimous spirit pervading the whole political settlement since the South African war, should not have paved the way for greater magnanimity in neighbourly relations with other people. At the same time, from the German-grievance point of view, British Statesmen can scarcely be blamed if they have hesitated to invite the prophesied "tornado of protest from both Dutch and English elements in the South African Union by ceding Walfisch Bay. And it is a pity that Herr Delbrück's latest picture of the "inveterate political hostility" of Britain against Germany should be unrelieved by even a passing reference to such obvious acts of goodwill on England's part as the surrender to her of Heligoland in 1890, and in 1899 of two of the best islands in the Samoan group; or to our acquiescence in her desires as to the non-connection of Wei-hai-wei with the Shantung railways. Such examples plainly prove that England's ill-will is not invariable; and go some way at least to show that it is not "inveterate." In the matter of Markets, likewise, on which Herr Delbrück lays great stress, some credit might fairly be allowed for the fact that

delicate ground, as it appears in English eyes. In the course of the articles above referred to, “S” truly says

"To all Englishmen it is a fundamental fact that their country should hold the command of the sea. If she fails to keep open her communications with her Dominions and Dependencies, she ceases to be an Empire; if she cannot protect her commerce against hostile navies, she ceases to be a great nation; if she cannot secure her food supplies, she may cease to be a nation at all, and become a beleaguered fort."

In other words, our enormous Fleet is a necessity. Without it, as things now are,

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This precious stone, set in the silver sea,
This fortress built by Nature for herself,
Against infection and the hand of War,'

might seem too fair a prize, in a world not perfectly amenable to the still voice of Sovereign Law. Her Navy, then, is the needed sentinel of Britain, as well as of the far-set, but close-bound, belongings of the island throne.1 But nevertheless, however

no toll or restriction meets German trade with Britain, though British exports, on reaching German shores, encounter heavy duties. Not only do sixty million pounds' worth of untaxed German goods enter this country every year, but the Australian Government railways are largely supplied from the Essen works, and German machinery is used for Australian harbours. The chief German locomotive firm has just obtained, in competition with English builders, the engine-order from the English managers of the Egyptian State railways; and most of the electrical machinery in South Africa comes from Germany!

It is pleasant to find so influential an exponent of German feeling as Herr Delbrück so clearly in agreement :-" We do not dispute England's right to be supreme at sea. We recognise that her insular character and far-flung imperial ramifications make it imperative for Britannia to rule the waves.' I myself should consider German interests at sea perfectly secure if the proportion of British naval preponderance over Germany were in the ratio of two to one. Our naval tacticians would probably desire three to two. But they do not seek to outstrip or displace Britain at sea."

natural all this may seem from our insular point of view, the fair mind must acknowledge that this immense sea-power (however purely defensive we may mean it to be) can and does make its existence felt all over the world; and hence is bound to appear, in other eyes than ours, to give us an inordinate advantage.

That England is constantly appearing, not only to Germany but on the Continent generally, as an object of jealous regard, is notorious. The feeling is there, though it may not often be so plainly voiced as it was last summer by the Austrian Radical Deputy who urged, before a delighted Salzburg audience, a coalition of Mediterranean Powers,-Austria, Italy, and France-to solidly oppose 66 a Power which has its hands on the affairs of the world." And if the feeling is general, it is not surprising that it should be shared by a multitude of peaceable folk in Germany who are neither Pan-German Jingos nor victims of Anglophobia. Now a sentiment so widely prevalent cannot be dismissed as mere unreasoning jealousy. Protestations of injured innocence only exasperate. But, when all is said, there does remain the solid fact that the modern British Navy has never fired a single shot in any naval war;—a fact which, at the very lowest, can stand as a parallel to the static use of dominant military power by the German Empire since 1871.

Germans freely declare themselves convinced that, despite the actual silence of our naval guns, their 66 power " has selfishly blocked the diplomacy of other countries; acting recently against Germany very much as formerly (for forty unwise years) it

acted against Russia. But when Germans indulge in such thoughts, they should at least recollect the difficulty we have, in coping with the convictionwhich, rightly or wrongly, has informed most of the diplomatic encounters of late-that the German Empire aims at a hegemony in Europe far exceeding what is already rightly and reasonably hers by virtue of her grand position in the hierarchy of nations,— a hegemony in which, to put it baldly, "we shall be the next victim, after France is disposed of." But the German will of course reply that, in view of the Kaiser's explicit words,' and even quite apart from them, the idea of any such design is nothing but a baseless suspicion; whereas the English diplomatic hindrances met by Germany are no mere suspicions, but matters of fact; as sundry specific thwartings witness. In China, for example,-in Persia over the

2

1 Quoted supra, p. 79.

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2 Herr Delbrück is explicit on this point: Cannot Britons rid themselves of the nightmare that Germany wants war with England? We know perfectly well that war has nothing to bring us, even if we should win. Is the German régime so beloved by the Arabs, the Irish, the Dutch, or the French Canadians, or the Britons oversea, that they would accept it without making us fight interminably to impose it upon them? If Germany humbled Britain in war, it would only be to find ourselves precisely in the desperate position of Napoleon I;-the masters of Europe, with all Europe united to encompass our overthrow. That is a vision which the sane and sensible business Germany of 1911 conjures up only to banish as wild and irresponsible."

3 On this Professor Delbrück writes with bitterness. But he adds no fresh count to the indictment recited above, except that he accuses us of "losing no opportunity to unite Russian and Frenchman against Germany; and that we even seek to undermine his country with the Turk, of whom Germany is the only friend." But these allegations lack foundation. The fact is that there has been no inimical movement on the part of England, France, or Russia, against Germany. Whatever drawing together of these nations has occurred, has been purely defensive; and the

Baghdad Railway,-in German S.W. Africa over the desired gate at Walfisch Bay, and more recently in connection with Morocco.

The moral of all which is plain: that if better relations between England and Germany are to prevail, a higher spirit must take possession of the Chancelleries and Foreign Offices of both countries;a spirit which will reduce diplomatic friction to the lowest possible point consistent with sound reason. National opinion, in each case, badly requires to be convinced that these two great branches of a Teuton stock are actually engaged, not in a hostile endeavour each to oust the other, but in a friendly policy of give and take;-the "giving " never to include "pinpricks," and the "taking" to exclude "offence."

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More sympathy than The Spectator gave it, is really due to Professor Caldecott's appeal for “a higher political sagacity.”

"If expansion is fundamentally equitable, as British Imperialists must always allow, let us all weigh the equities in calmness of mind, and proceed along our several paths in friendly emulation.

German expansion is bound to take place; and it is a legitimate aspiration of the German people that it should be set out on larger lines without delay." It is unreasonable to expect them to be contented only with "territories which are either fertile but unhealthy, or healthy but unfertile; " and Britain is "called upon to go deeper than conquest or nominal appropriation in a

natural result of Germany's own aggressive attitude. She deliberately preambled her Navy Act of 1900 with a reference to her relations "with the greatest naval Power," of which we were presumably intended to take note. In 1905 France suffered the serious threatenings of the Delcassé crisis. In 1908 came the Casablanca affair. In 1911 the Panther came to Agadir. Meanwhile Russia had had to face a Balkan crisis in 1909. It was the action of Germany, and no machination of England, which set these three countries in a common attitude of defence, in which only aggressive intention could find a ground of grievance.