investigation of truth has not only the priority in point of importance, but should have the priority in order in a judiciously regulated education. It may be said, what use in learning to communicate truth till we have first learned to acquire it? But a little examination will be sufficient to convince us that this is one of the many instances in which mere abstract speculation, unaided by the light of experience, might lead us astray from nature and from truth. It is obvious, to every experienced observer of the order in which the powers of the human mind are developed, that the faculty of communication takes the precedence of the faculty of reasoning - of reasoning, at least, in all its higher and more dignified functions. Though it is a good rule to think before we speak, yet the faculty of speaking, we must admit, displays itself much earlier than the faculty of thinking. In many, indeed, the former faculty seems to be the only one having connexion with the intellect, which ever attains to any considerable development; a development sometimes more gratifying to themselves than to their neighbors, whilst the power of thinking that is of deep and accurate thinking either exists not at all, or remains completely dormant. But it is not the purpose of any judicious system of education to increase the number of mere talkers. There always has been, and we presume there always will be, without any artificial culture, an abundant supply, if not for the instruction, at least for the amusement may be to try the patience ofmankind. Yet to find fault with this, were unphilosophically to find fault with the distribution which nature has made of her gifts, who has evidently designed that the great bulk of mankind should acquire all their knowledge from others, and by whose impulse they freely communicate that which they have freely received. But, farther, nature has obviously intended that not only the great mass of mankind, but even those who in after life, may become the profoundest thinkers, should receive their first knowledge in the same way. The child learns through the exercise of its imitative powers, to lisp its first accents, whilst it has no idea, or only a very confused idea, of the sense attached to them. And the boy is capable of learning the appropriate usage of language, as a vehicle of communication, before he is capable of being put in possession of the truths of abstract science, though digested by others and prepared for his use; and, consequently, long before he is capable of engaging successfully in independent research, ex

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cept on the plainest and easiest themes. From this it follows that though a pupil should be trained, from a very early period of his education, to the investigation of such subjects as are suited to his capacity, yet, in accordance with the example which nature has set us, the system of training for the purpose of communicating knowledge to others may, and ought, to be carried forward in advance of the other process, and may even be finished before it, if any part of man's education can with propriety be said to be finished in the present stage of his existence. The truth of this position will be obvious if we reflect that there are many men, who can never hope to add the slightest contribution to the already accumulated stores of thought, or even to follow, save at a very humble distance, the adventurous discoverers in the fields of science, who yet are reputed eminent for their literary attainments, and are conspicuously useful either as teachers of christianity, or the instructers of youth in knowledge, for which they are exclusively indebted to the researches of others. In the case of such persons it is all important that the power of ready and impressive communication should be thoroughly exercised; whilst their researches being in a great measure confined to a selection of the best guides to useful knowledge, a long course of training for this purpose is only of secondary importance.

So much being premised respecting the general design of early intellectual training, it will not be very difficult to show that classical instruction conduces powerfully to promote both the purposes which we have mentioned, and especially the latter.

As regards the first purpose of mental training, classical instruction when properly conducted, serves as a constant exercise in criticism, commencing with the lower and more minute verbal and grammatical criticism, and ending, when the course is sufficiently extended, with the higher and more philosophical criticism. It habituates the pupil to pay the closest attention to the sense of what he reads, (a habit which of itself constitutes a very important and essential part of a good education), as without this it is impossible that he can make any progress in the business of translation. Almost every time. that he is obliged to have recourse to his lexicon, his taste, his powers of discrimination, are called into exercise in the selection of appropriate terms to express the meaning of his author. And his judgment is still more severely exercised in unravelling intricate constructions when they occur. The

parsing, in the commencement of his course, of all that he recites, and in his after progress, of every word or sentence which presents any difficulty, affords, as at present conducted by careful teachers, excellent training in the art of analysis, and might, with some judicious improvements, afford still better. We would observe, as we pass, that this is a part of classical instruction which we think might be simplified and improved, and much better directed to the development of the sense of the subject parsed; and this is its proper and only object, though one, which under the present system, a young pupil does not, in every instance, clearly discover. The improvements of modern times seem to be very slow in reaching this important branch of classical-and the same is also true of English-education. It is still handed down from one race of teachers to another, with the same imperfections, and the same barbarous, and to boys, unmeaning terminology, with which it was transmitted from the scholastic ages. But it would lead us into a tedious discussion to present our views fully on this subject. Besides, we should think it wrong to propose any sweeping innovation in a part of instruction so important, till the plan suggested as an improvement were very completely matured, and subjected to the rigorous test of experiment.

It may be objected to what we have said above, that, though classical instruction trains the mind to the investigation of truth, the subjects of investigation are in their nature trifling, and remote from the important concerns of human life, - the mere philosophy of words and not of things. In reply to this, we might ask, Is the vehicle by which we obtain nearly all our knowledge, and hold all our communication with our fellow-men, which constitutes one of the chief distinctions betwixt us and the lower orders of creation, without which our minds, even though possessed of all their present powers, would remain in a state of comparative darkness a mere uncultivated waste is this vehicle of thought, this glorious gift of our Creator, a thing of small importance? Besides, what species of training possesses closer analogy with the pursuits of the theologian, the lawyer, the statesman, the cultivator of polite and of useful literature, and especially the now rapidly increasing class of productive laborers in the various departments of human learning, who devote their time and their talents to the honorable employment of enlightening, or amusing their fellow citizens?-not to speak

of the less esteemed, but certainly not less useful class, whose toils are devoted to the improvement and direction of the powers of the youthful mind.

On this very point, at which the objection is levelled, classical learning has certainly a decided superiority over the study of the mathematics. And this study is perhaps the one of all others, which might be brought most successfully into competition with classical learning, as a means of training the intellectual powers. Whilst we are on this subject, and as we have not time to institute a formal comparison between these two rival courses of intellectual discipline, we may as well candidly admit the superiority of a mathematical education, (at least so far as the ancient Geometry forms a part of it), for some special purposes. It secures in the case of every successful student, more perfect habits of attention. It compels him to abstract himself more completely from all impressions of surrounding objects, not on account of any peculiar difficulty in comprehending the separate steps of the train of reasoning of which he must possess himself, but in order to preserve the concatenation of the successive acts of judgment uninterrupted, till he arrives at the conclusion. This not only strengthens the power of excluding every thing irrelevant to the present subject of speculation, but tends to improve the grasp of the understanding, its capacity of embracing at once an extensive subject in its most important bearings and details

an attainment which distinguishes the man of large and comprehensive views in every department of knowledge and in every situation in life, and which is absolutely necessary to all who would fill with advantage the more elevated stations in society, who would aspire to guide, in a judicious manner, the counsels of the community to which they belong, or to manage successfully extensive and complicated operations of any kind. We may also remark, though it belongs not exactly to this place, that the mathematical sciences train the mind to precision and methodical arrangement in the communication of its acquired stores of thought. But, as regards the objection stated above, a very little reflection will show that it applies to what are called the exact sciences more forcibly than to classical learning. It is not correct to say that the one treats of ideas, the other only of words, or the signs of ideas. The subjects of philology and of grammar are ideas as much as the subjects of the mathematics, and the former are certainly far less remote from the common employments of life, especially

amongst educated men. The kind of reasoning to which it trains the mind that which deals in the probable, and pretends in most cases only to an approximation to absolute truth

is also the kind best suited to the ordinary affairs of life, to which the exact reasoning of the mathematician is generally wholly inapplicable.

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As to the second object of intellectual training aration of the student for the ready and accurate communication of his thoughts in speaking, or in writing - the advantages of classical learning are great and obvious. All that we have time at present to say in illustration of this part of the subject, and all perhaps that it is necessary to say—is that classical instruction, when properly conducted, serves as a continued and most effective training in English composition. This we consider as by far the most important advantage which it affords; this in conjunction with some of the direct advantages, which we have enumerated above, we think, fully accounts for that decided superiority in the use of our own language, which it appears to us, that a good classical education always confers. The ancient author whom he translates, supplies the student with the thoughts which he is to clothe in appropriate language. The difficulty which is commonly encountered by those who attempt in any other way to instruct in composition--that the youthful scholar not having yet acquired a fund of ideas, only learns to string together unmeaning words, or borrowed phrases, to the perversion of his taste- is thus obviated, and facility afforded for cultivating the power of communication, (which, as we have already said, is earlier developed,) in advance of the power of investigation. It may be observed that the value of the Latin and Greek languages as affording an exercise of this kind, is much enhanced by the fact that their structure is so unlike that of the modern languages. Not only is their general structure different, but the separate terms, especially the abstract terms, express ideas which cannot in many cases be exactly represented, at least, by any single word in English. So that translation from these languages very frequently, especially when the subject treated is abstruse, when general and abstract terms, and particularly those expressive of mental qualifications are employed, amounts to nothing more at best, than approximation to the sense of the original, the merits of the translator being estimated by the closeness of his approximation without sacrificing the propriety of his