Constitutionalism and Democracy
Jon Elster, Rune Slagstad, Gudmund Hernes
Cambridge University Press, 1988 - Philosophy - 359 pages
The eleven essays in this volume, supplemented by an editorial introduction, center around three overlapping problems. First, why would a society want to limit its own sovereign power by imposing constitutional constraints on democratic decision-making? Second, what are the contributions of democracy and constitutions to efficient government? Third, what are the relations among democracy, constitutionalism, and private property? This comprehensive discussion of the problems inherent in constitutional democracy will be of interest to students in a variety of social sciences. It illuminates particularly the current efforts of many countries, especially in Latin America, to establish stable democratic regimes.
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Notes on contributors
Gag rules or the politics of omission
Democracy as a contingent outcome of conflicts
Consequences of constitutional choice reflections on Tocqueville
Liberal constitutionalism and its critics Carl Schmitt and Max Weber
Democracy and the rule of law some historical experiences of contradictions in the striving for good government
Precommitment and the paradox of democracy
American constitutionalism and the paradox of private property
From liberal constitutionalism to corporate pluralism the conflict over the enabling acts in Norway after the Second World War and the subsequent c...
Arguments for constitutional choice reflections on the transition to socialism
Constitutions and democracies an epilogue
Other editions - View all
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