ALEXANDER HAMILTON. HAMILTON, ALEXANDER, an American statesman; born on the island of St. Nevis, West Indies, January 11, 1757; died at New York, July 12, 1804. He was sent to New York to be educated. He entered King's (now Columbia) College just before the breaking out of the American Revolution. Hamilton joined the army and attracted the notice of Washington, by whom, in March, 1777, he was appointed aide-de-camp, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and he took a prominent part in the military operations which ensued, commanding a battalion at the siege of Yorktown. Near the close of the war Hamilton studied law, and was licensed to practise in 1782; and a few days after he was elected a delegate to the Continental Congress. To bring about the adoption of the Constitution, Hamilton, in conjunction with Jay and Madison, undertook the writing of a series of essays, known as "The Federalist." When the new government went into operation in 1789, Hamilton was selected by Washington as Secretary of the Treasury, and he bore a leading part in establishing the financial system of the country. In 1795 he resigned the secretaryship, and resumed the practice of law at New York; but he remained an earnest supporter of the administration of Washington. He was killed in a duel with Aaron Burr, July 11, 1804, at Weehawken, N. J., just across the Hudson River from New York. The "Works of Alexander Hamilton" have been edited by his son, John C. Hamilton (7 vols., 1851), who also wrote a "Life" of his father (2 vols., 1834, 1840), and a voluminous "History of the Republic of the United States, as traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton and his Contemporaries" (1850). FROM "THE FEDERALIST." DEFENCE OF HIS VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTION. THUS have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not failed, in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my en deavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant not to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men; and the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which have been in various ways practised to keep the truth from the public eye have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not intend: it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been neither often nor much. THE WISDOM OF BRIEF PRESIDENTIAL TERMS OF OFFICE. It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the duration in office can affect the independence of the executive on the legis lature, unless the one were possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the other. One answer to this inquiry may be drawn from the principle already remarked; that is, from the slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage, and the little inducement it affords him to expose himself, on account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. Another answer, perhaps more obvious though not more conclusive, will result from the consideration of the influence of the legislative body over the people; which might be employed to prevent the re-election of a man who, by an upright resistance to any sinister project of that body, should have made himself obnoxious to its resentment. It may be asked also whether a duration of four years would answer the end proposed; and if it would not, whether a less period, which would at least be recommended by greater security against ambitious designs, would not for that reason be prefera ble to a longer period, which was at the same time too short for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and independence of the magistrate. It cannot be affirmed that a duration of four years, or any other limited duration, would completely answer the end pro posed; but it would contribute toward it in a degree which would have a material influence upon the spirit and character of the government. Between the commencement and termination of such a period there would always be a considerable interval, in which the prospect of annihilation would be sufficiently remote not to have an improper effect upon the conduct of a man indued with a tolerable portion of fortitude; and in which he might reasonably promise himself that there would be time. enough before it arrived, to make the community sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue. Though it be probable that as he approached the moment when the public were by a new election to signify their sense of his conduct - his confidence, and with it his firmness, would decline; yet both the one and the other would derive support from the opportuni ties which his previous continuance in the station had afforded him, of establishing himself in the esteem and good-will of his constituents. He might then hazard with safety, in proportion to the proofs he had given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he had acquired to the respect and attachment of his fellow-citizens. As, on the one hand, a duration of four years will contribute to the firmness of the executive in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition; so, on the other, it is not enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty. If a British House of Commons, from the most feeble beginnings, from the mere power of assenting or disagreeing to the imposition of a new tax, have by rapid strides reduced the prerogatives of the Crown and the privileges of the nobility within the limi' they conceived to be compatible with the principles of a free government, while they raised themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the legislature; if they have been able in one instance to abolish both the royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient establishments, as well in the Church as State; if they have been able on a recent occasion to make the monarch trem ble at the prospect of an innovation attempted by them, what would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four year's duration, with the confined authorities of a President of the United States? What, but that he might be unequal to the task which the Constitution assigns him? OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PRESIDENT AND A SOV EREIGN. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretence for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the King of Great Britain. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group. The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for four years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a qualified negative upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an absolute negative. The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of declaring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties; the other is the sole possessor of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners, can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national Church! What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism. |