good ordinarily fare much better than the bad; for in true computation, necessity and greatness are the only unfortunate states of human life, and in these there are far more bad men than good: but between those two all conditions are in a manner indifferent as to the happiness of men; and in this happy mean there are far more good men than bad; and then the minds of good men having infinitely the advantage of the minds of bad, as to the rendering their outward condition happy, it is impossible but that ordinarily and generally they must be the more happy and prosperous.

Secondly, So far as the maxim, that all things happen alike to all, is true, it is no argument at all against a providence; and that upon these following accounts. 1. Because many of the goods and evils of this world happen to us, not as rewards and punishments, but in the necessary course of secondary causes. 2. Because the goods and evils of this world are in themselves so mean and inconsiderable, that it would be beneath the wisdom of Providence to be very exact and curious in the distribution of them. 3. Because this life is properly the state of our trial and probation, and not of our reward and punishment. 4. Because the goods and evils that befall us here are not so truly to be estimated by themselves, as by their effects and consequents. 5. This promiscuous distribution of things, so far as it is, is very requisite to assure us of a judgment to come. 6. Because the exact adjustment of things is reserved for a future judgment.

1. The happening of all things alike to all is no argument against providence; because many of the goods and evils of this world happen to us, not as

rewards and punishments, but in the necessary course of second causes. For in this life good and bad men are so mingled together, that, in cases of common calamity, what happens to the one must happen to the other, without a miraculous interposal of Providence. Thus, while God leaves second causes to their natural course, how is it possible that war, or plague, or famine, should distinguish between the good and bad, that are incorporated together in the same societies? And so long as free agents are left to act freely, wicked parents will frequently spoil their constitutions by the repeated excesses of their riot and wantonness; and while they do so, their diseases, without a miracle, will descend upon their righteous as well as unrighteous posterity: and wicked neighbours, whilst it lies in their way, or serves their interest, will wrong and oppress the just and unjust without any distinction. But you will say, Why then doth not Providence interpose between second causes and good men, and miraculously protect them from their mischievous effects? To which in short I answer, that in some extraordinary cases God hath interposed, of which there are innumerable instances both in sacred and profane history; but to expect that he should ordinarily and constantly do this, is very unreasonable, because it cannot be done without giving a perpetual disturbance to the course of nature, which being in the whole most orderly and regular, full of admirable beauty and contrivance, ought not to be disturbed and inverted upon ordinary occasions. For if the established course of things be wise and regular in the whole, why should we expect that God should be perpetually tampering with it, and interrupting and varying it by his im

mediate interposals, as if he were dissatisfied with his own contrivance, and upon every revisal of this great volume of the world did still discover new erratas in it to be corrected and amended. The evils therefore which good men suffer are not ordinarily so momentous as to oblige a wise and good God to interrupt the course of nature to prevent them; and it is much better that some violence should be offered to good men, than that a constant violence should be offered to the nature of things: and since God can carry on his good designs to good men in a still and silent path, and cause all their adverse accidents to unwind of themselves, and at last to clear up into a blessed close, is it not much better he should do it this way, than by offering perpetual violence and disturbance to nature?

2. The happening of things alike to all is no argument against a providence; because the goods and evils of this world are so mean and inconsiderable, that it would be beneath the wisdom of Providence to be very exact and curious in the distribution of them. It is no part of wisdom to be nice and curious about trifles. It was ridiculous enough in Caligula to employ a mighty army only to gather a great heap of cockle-shells; but when he had gathered them, it would have been much more ridiculous to have taken a great deal of care to divide them amongst his soldiers in exact proportions to each one's merit and desert. Now, though we look upon the goods and evils of this world as things of vast and mighty moment; yet God, who sees them with far better eyes than we, knows very well that they are but trifles, in comparison of those endless goods or evils we must enjoy or suffer in another

world, and that it is a very inconsiderable thing whether we fare well or ill this moment, who immediately after must fare well or ill for ever; and therefore he looks on it, as he justly may, as a thing beneath his infinite wisdom, to be very exact and curious in dividing to us these momentary trifles in just proportions to our particular deserts: and did we not strangely magnify them, by looking on them through the false optics of our own fantastic hopes and fears, we should be so far from objecting against God's providence these unequal distributions of them; and were they more exact and equal, we should rather object against his wisdom, as thinking it a very mean employment for a Deity to be very nice and curious in proportioning such momentary enjoyments and sufferings to the merit or demerit of immortal creatures. So that considering of what little moment the present goods and evils are, which good men suffer and bad men enjoy, they ought rather to be looked on as an argument of God's wisdom than as an objection against his providence; for he understands the just value of things, and knows that the best of these worldly goods are bad enough to be thrown away upon the worst of men, and so expresses his just scorn of these admired vanities, by scattering them abroad with a careless hand. For why should he partake of the errors of vulgar opinion, and express himself so very regardful of these trifles, as to put them in gold scales, and weigh them out to mankind by grains and scruples?

3. That all things here do happen alike to all is no argument against providence; because this life is properly the state of our trial and probation, and not of our reward and punishment. The divine

providence hath placed us here as candidates and probationers for those everlasting preferments it designs us hereafter, that so by training and exercising us in all those excellent virtues that are proper to our natures, it may improve us from one degree of perfection to another, till at last it hath accomplished us for the heavenly state; in order to which design it is necessary that there should be an unequal distribution of things, whereby good men may sometimes suffer, and bad men prosper; otherwise there would be no occasion for any of our passive virtues, nor any trial of our active. For affliction is the theatre of our patiente, and fortitude, and resignation to God, and without it there would be no room in the lives of good men for the exercise of those virtues, which, for want of objects to act on, would rust and wax languid. Again, difficulty is the touchstone of our love, and faith, and ingenuity, but should providence be always crowning the righteous, and dragging offenders to execution, such a procedure would determine our liberty, and leave us no room for the exercise of our faith and ingenuity; for then the rewards and punishments of providence would be so sensibly and continually present with us, and so urgently press upon our hopes and fears, that it would be impossible for us not to believe in God, and next to impossible not to obey him; and being thus forced to believe and obey, what excellency would there be in our piety and virtue? What charity is it for a miser to lend his money upon assurance of twenty per cent.? or what loyalty for a traitor to discover his conspirators within sight of a rack? And just as little virtue would there be in any of our good works, were there an exact equality