in a particular parish, belonging to
certain freemen. It appeared that
such chamberlains were sworn in
yearly, and had no salary. Their
duties were to receive certain sums
for agistment and other use of the
land for races, &c., and to drain
and keep it in order out of such
funds. They were to account for
any surplus to two aldermen of a
corporation, and to pay over any
balance in hand to their successors
in office :-Held, that such a
chamberlain was not a servant or
person employed in that capacity
within the embezzlement act, 7 &
8 G. 4. c. 29. s. 47. Williams v.
Stott, T. 1833.
688
Where, in a declaration for slander,
an inuendo ascribes to certain
words a particular meaning, which
cannot be supported in evidence,
the inuendo, if well pleaded in
form, cannot be repudiated by the
plaintiff so as to let him in to
prove the words to have another
meaning. S. C.
Quare, if the verbally imputing
fraudulent embezzlement to such
a chamberlain be actionable? S. C.
Country bankers entered into bood
conditioned to secure town bankers
from loss by paying bills, &c. for
the former, the condition expressly
stipulating that all the monies to
be ultimately recoverable on the
bond should not exceed 1000L.—
Held, that a 51. stamp was suffi
cient, 55 G. 3. c. 184. sched. tit.
Bond. Loyd and others v. Heath-
cote and others, 1833.
At a meeting of the parties to a deed
of settlement on a marriage, the
father of the intended husband,
who was the only conveying party,
executed and delivered the deed.
Just after, and before any other
person had executed, the father of
the intended wife objected to a
clause giving a power of revoca
tion; upon which the father of the
husband immediately agreed that
it should be struck out; that was
accordingly done, the conveying
party re-executed, and the others
executed-Held, that no fresh
stamp was rendered necessary by
the alteration, the deed being only
in fieri when it took place. Jones
v. Jones, T. 1833.
52 H. 3. c. 4. (Excessive charge for
distress.)
Several persons signed an agreement
to pay their portion of costs in-
curred in defending particular
suits, rateably according to the
sums subscribed by each, and set
opposite their respective names.
The words of the agreement when
counted with each sum and signa-
ture, as far as and including that
of the defendant, amounted to less
than 1080 words; the result was
similar on counting the words of the
agreement with the signatures but34 & 35 H. 8. c. 5. (Will.)
without the sums; but on adding all 34 & 35 H. 8. c. 4. (Bankrupt.)
the signatures and all the sums to
the words in the body of the agree-13 Eliz. c. 7. (Bankrupt.) 713,746,
ment, it proved to contain more
13 Edw. 1. West. Sec. c. 2. (Reple-
vin.)
107
1 R. 2. c. 12. (Debt for escape.) 361
32 H. 8. c. 1.` (Will.).
than 1080 words :-Held, that it 18 Eliz. c. 3. s. 2. (Bastardy.) 826
32 G. 3. c. 28. (Sheriff's officer.) 242
36 G. 3. c. 52. (Legacy Duty.)
39 G. 3. c. 85. (Embezzlement.)
39 & 40 G. 3. c. iv. (London Court
of Requests.)
41 G. 3. (U. K.) c. 109. (Inclosure
act.)
42 G. 3. c. 99. s. 2. (Legacy Duty.)
17, et seq. 859
(Arrest for
43 G. 3. c. 46. s. 3.
more than recovered.)
43 G. 3. c. 99. (Assessed Taxes.) 91
44 G. 3. c. 98. (Legacy Duty.) 10,859
45 G. 3. c. 28 (misprinted 38.) (Le-
gacy Duty.)
14, et seq.
46 G. 3. c. 65. (Bankruptcy.) 731
46 G. 3. c. lxxxvii. (Southwark Court
of Requests.)
151 n.
47 G. 3. c. xxxvi. (Tipton Court of
Requests)
47 G. 3. Sess. 1. c. civ. (Blackheath,
&c. Court of Requests.) 151 n.
48 G. 3. c. 1. (Paymaster of Exche-
quer Bills.)
48 G. 3. c. 149. (Legacy Duty.)
21, et seq.
49 G. 3. c. 88. s. 3. (Bastardy.) 824 n.
55 G. 3. c. 184. Sched. Part 1. tit.
Agreement. (Stamp.)
Bond. (Stamp Act.)
60 G. 3. c. 9. (Extent to Editor of
Paper.)
s. 12. (Attorney's 1 G. 4. c. 119. (Insolvent Act.) 339
2 G. 4. c. 39. (Distringas.) 163
3 G. 4. c. 46. (Forfeited Recogni-
7 & 8 G. 4. c. 29. s. 47. (Embezzle-
ment.)
7 & 8 G. 4. c. 31. (Hundredors.) 869
9 G. 4. c. 14. (Statute of Limita-
tions.)
445, 450
9 G. 4. c. 15. (Amendment.) 364
11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4. c. 70. s. 21. (Ren-
dering at County Gaol.) 231
11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4. c. 73. s. 3. (Ex-
tent against Editor of Paper.) 823
1 W. 4. c. 7. (Speedy Execution.)
104, 148
1 W. 4. c. 22. (Costs of Witnesses.)
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SUBPOENA.
See WITNESSES.
SUBSCRIBING WITNESS.
See EVIDENCE.
SUGGESTION OF BREACHES
Under 8 & 9 W. 3. c. 11. s. 8.
Where, in debt on bond, the plaintiff
has suggested breaches on the
roll, pursuant to 8 & 9 IV. 3. e.
11. s. 8., the court, after plea of
non est factum pleaded, refused a
rule to shew cause why some of
them should not be struck out, or
judgment by default suffered on
them with entry of nominal da-
mages; for by that statute the
plaintiff may suggest breaches on
every part of the condition, and
the jury may inquire of the truth
of them, and the defendant had
another course, viz. by pleading
performance of the condition and
suffering judgment by default on
the replication. Canterbury, Arch-
bishop of, v. Robertson, E. 1833.
SUPERSEDEAS.
See PRACTICE.
Action against a surety on a bond
given by a collector of assessed
taxes and the defendant as his
surety:-Held on demurrer, that
it is no defence to plead that the
commissioners and receiver-gene-
ral had not complied with certain
directory parts of the statutes re-
lating to assessed taxes, which lay
down methods for obtaining pay-
ments from collectors. Wilks and
another v. Heeley, M. 1832.
In order to take advantage of the
proviso in 43 G. 3. c. 99. s. 13.,
that no bond shall be put in suit
against a surety for a collector for
any deficiency other than shall re-
fer the plaintiff to prove his other
demand in reply, so as to overtop
the cross-demand set up by the
defendant. Williams v. Davies,
H. 1833.
383
Proceedings by assignees of a bank-
rupt against the sheriff, for the
value of goods of the bankrupt
improperly sold by him under an
execution will not be stayed, unless
the plaintiffs agree as to the amount
to be recovered. Gibson and ano-
ther v. Humphrey and another, E.
1833.
588
The plaintiff pawned a watch, and
afterwards gave defendant the du-
plicate to get it out of pledge. De-
fendant took it out accordingly on
paying the advance and interest.
Plaintiff's agent claimed the watch
from defendant, saying, plaintiff
would of course pay what had
been advanced to redeem it. The
defendant said he had not got the
watch, and would not tell who had.
Held, that that was evidence of a
conversion to sustain a verdict for
the plaintiff in trover, and that the
plaintiff was not bound to tender
the defendant the sum paid on ac-
count of the watch, as the defend-
ant had not got it ready to deliver
to him in return. Jones v. Cliffe,
The buyer of a horse on a warranty
of soundness can only recover for
breach of it in an action for da-
mages, and unless both parties
agreed to rescind, or unless in the
original contract it was stipulated
to be rescinded if any breach of it
took place; the buyer cannot sue
the seller for money had and re-
ceived as for a failure of the original
consideration, therefore he has not
reasonable or probable cause for
holding him to bail within 43 G. 3.
c. 46. s. 3. Gompertz v. Denton,
M. 1832.
The course of an ancient footway,
leading from one highway to ano-
ther, was over some old inclosures,
and from thence across a few yards
of waste land into the highway;
the commissioners, under a local
act for inclosing the waste, allotted
to the plaintiff that part of it over
which the way ran; the act did
not empower them to stop up or
set out ways over old inclosures,
and their award did not mention
the way in question, or set out any
new way in lieu of it. Held, that
s. 11 of the general inclosure act,
41 G. 3. (U. K.) c. 109. did not
operate to extinguish the old way.
Thackrah v. Seymour, M. 1832. 87
Where one seised in fee of premises,
and of the soil over which a way
not of necessity has been used by
the occupier of them, grants those
premises, with all ways, roads, &c.
And see Doe d. Meyrick v. Meyrick,
tit. WILL.
WATCHMAN.
See CONSTABle.
Matter purporting to be a will of
lands, but unexecuted, was written
on the two first sides of a sheet of
paper, on the third side of which a
codicil, entitled "Codicil," and re-
ferring to the foregoing will, was
afterwards written, and was duly
signed and attested. Held, that
that due execution gave effect to
the will, and conferred on it va-
lidity to pass lands. Doe dem.
Williams v. Erans, M. 1832. 56
A will subscribed by three witnesses
in testator's presence, and at his
request, is duly executed, so as to
pass real property, though the
testator did not sign it in the pre-
sence of any of them, and only
two saw his signature. Johnson
v. Johnson, M. 1832.
73
A reversioner expectant on the deter-
mination of a term of years created
on mortgaging premises for 1200%.
devised the same by will duly exe-
cuted and attested; by subsequent
deed he agreed with A. that A.
should pay off the old mortgage,
and take an assignment of the sub-
sisting term to secure the 12001.
and a further loan of 18001. The
12007. was paid off first, and the
term was in the meantime to be
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