Again, a wall or pillar that declines from the perpendicular, produceth a painful feeling, as of a tottering and falling within the mind and a feeling somewhat fimilar is produced by a tall pillar that ftands fo ticklifh as to look like falling *. A column with a bafe looks more firm and stable than upon the naked ground; and for that reafon is more agreeable and tho' the cylinder is a more beautiful figure, yet the cube for a bafe is preferred; its angles being extended to a greater distance from the centre than the circumference of a cylinder. This excludes not a different reafon, that the bafe, the fhaft, and the capital, of a pillar, ought, for the fake of variety, to differ from each other: if the fhaft be round, the base and capital ought to be fquare.

A constrained posture, uneafy to the man himfelf, is difagreeable to the fpectator; whence a rule in painting, that the drapery ought not to adhere to the body, but hang loose, that the figures may appear eafy and free in their movements. The constrained posture of a French dancing-master in one of Hogarth's pieces, is for that reafon disagreeable; and it is also ridiculous, becaufe the constraint is affumed as a grace.

* Sunt enim Tempe faltus tranfitu difficilis: nam præter anguftias per quinque millia, quâ exiguum jumento onufto iter eft, rupes utrinque ita abfciffæ funt, ut defpici vix fine vertigine quadam fimul oculorum animique pofuit. Titus Livius, lib. 44. fett. 6.

The foregoing obfervation is not confined to emotions or feelings raised by still life: it holds alfo in what are raised by the qualities, actions, and paffions, of a fenfible being. Love infpired by a fine woman, affumes her qualities: it is fublime, foft, tender, fevere, or gay, according to its cause. This is ftill more remarkable in emotions raifed by human actions: it hath already been remarked *, that any signal instance of gratitude, befide procuring efteem for the author, raiseth in the spectator a vague emotion of gratitude, which difpofeth him to be grateful; and I now further remark, that this vague emotion hath a strong refemblance to its caufe, namely, the paffion that produced the grateful action: courage exerted inspires the reader as well as the spectator with a like emotion of courage, a juft action fortifies our love of justice, and a generous action rouses our generofity. In fhort, with refpect to all virtuous actions, it will be found by induction, that they lead us to imitation by infpiring emotions refembling the paffions that produced thefe actions. And hence the advantage of choice books and choice company.

Grief as well as joy are infectious: the emotions they raise in a fpectator resemble them perfectly. Fear is equally infectious: and hence in an army, a few taking fright, even without caufe,

* Part 1. of this chapter, fect. 4.

fpread

fpread the infection till it becomes an univerfal panic. Pity is fimilar to its cause: a parting scene between lovers or friends, produceth in the fpectator a fort of pity, which is tender like the diftrefs the anguish of remorfe, produceth pity of a harsh kind; and if the remorse be extreme, the pity hath a mixture of horror. Anger I think is fingular; for even where it is moderate, and caufeth no disgust, it difpofes not the fpectator to anger in any degree *. Covetoufness, cruelty, treachery, and other vicious paffions, are fo far from raising any emotion similar to themselves, to incite a fpectator to imitation, that they have an oppofite effect: they raise abhorrence, and fortify the spectator in his averfion to fuch actions. When anger is immoderate, it cannot fail to produce the fame effect.

PART VII.

Final Caufes of the more frequent Emotions and Paffions.

T is a law in our nature, that we never act but

by the impulse of defire; which in other words is faying, that paffion, by the defire included in

• Ariftotle, Poet. cap. 18. § 3. fays, that anger raifeth in the fpectator a similar emotion of anger.

it, is what determines the will. Hence in the conduct of life, it is of the utmost importance, that our paffions be directed to proper objects, tend to just and rational ends, and with relation to each other be duly balanced. The beauty of contrivance, so confpicuous in the human frame, is not confined to the rational part of our nature, but is visible over the whole. Concerning the paffions in particular, however irregular, headstrong, and perverse, in a flight view, they may appear, I hope to demonftrate, that they are by nature modelled and tempered with perfect wifdom, for the good of fociety as well as for private good. The fubject, treated at large, would be too extensive for the present work: all there is room for are a few general obfervations upon the fenfitive part of our nature, without regarding that strange irregularity of paffion discovered in fome individuals. Such topical irregularities, if I may ufe the term, cannot fairly be held an objection to the present theory: we are frequently, it is true, misled by inordinate paffion; but we are also, and perhaps no lefs frequently, misled by wrong judgement.

In order to fulfil my engagement, it must be premised, that an agreeable caufe produceth always a pleasant emotion; and a disagreeable cause, a painful emotion. This is a general law of nature, which admits not a fingle exception: agreeableness in the cause, is indeed fo effentially con

nected

nected with pleasure in the emotion, its effect, that an agreeable cause cannot be better defined, than by its power of producing a pleasant emotion and difagreeablenefs in the cause, has the fame neceffary connection with pain in the emotion produced by it.

From this preliminary it appears, that in order to know for what end an emotion is made pleasant or painful, we must begin with inquiring for what end its caufe is made agreeable or disagreeable. And with respect to inanimate objects, confidered as the causes of emotions, many of them are made agreeable in order to promote our happiness; and it proves invincibly the benignity of the Deity, that we are placed in the midst of objects for the moft part agreeable. But that is not all: the bulk of fuch objects, being of real use in life, are made agreeable in order to excite our induftry; witness a large tree, a well-dreffed fallow, a rich field of grain, and others that may be named without end. On the other hand, it is not easy to specify a disagreeable object that is not at the fame time hurtful: fome things are made difagreeable, fuch as a rotten carcafe, because they are noxious: others, a dirty marfh, for example, or a barren heath, are made difagreeable in order, as above, to excite our industry. And with respect to the few things that are neither agreeable nor difagreeable, it will be made evident, that their being left indifferent is not a work of chance