Would have mourn'd longer) married with mine uncle, My father's brother; but no more like my father, Oh, most wicked speed, to poft But break, my heart, for I must hold my tongue. Act 1. fc. 3. The power of paffion to falfify the computation of time is remarkable in this inftance; because time, which hath an accurate measure, is lefs obfequious to our defires and wishes, than objects which have no precise standard of lefs or more. Good news are greedily fwallowed upon very flender evidence: our wishes magnify the probability of the event, as well as the veracity of the relater; and we believe as certain, what at best is doubtful: Quel, che l'huom vede, amor li fa invisible E l'invifibil fa veder amore. Questo creduto fu, che 'l mifer fuole Dar facile credenza a' quel, che vuole, Orland. Furiof. cant. 1. ft. 56. For the fame reason, bad news gain alfo credit upon the slightest evidence: fear, if once alarm ed, ed, has the fame effect with hope, to magnify every circumstance that tends to conviction. Shakefpear, who fhows more knowledge of human nature than any of our philofophers, hath in his Cymbeline *reprefented this bias of the mind; for he makes the person who alone was affected with the bad news, yield to evidence that did not convince any of his companions. And Othello + is convinced of his wife's infidelity from circumstances too flight to move any perfon lefs interested. If the news intereft us in fo low a degree as to give place to reason, the effect will not be altoge ther the fame: judging of the probability or improbability of the story, the mind settles in a rational conviction either that it is true or not. But even in that cafe, the mind is not allow'd to reft in that degree of conviction which is produced by rational evidence: if the news be in any degree favourable, our belief is raised by hope to an improper height; and if unfavourable, by fear. This obfervation holds equally with respect to future events: if a future event be either much wifhed or dreaded, the mind never fails to augment the probability beyond truth. That eafiness of belief with respect to wonders and prodigies, even the moft abfurd and ridiculous, is a ftrange phenomenon; because nothing * A&t 2. fc. 6. † Act 3. fc. 8. L 2 can can be more evident than the following propofition, That the more fingular any event is, the more evidence is required to produce belief: a familiar event daily occurring, being in itself extremely probable, finds ready credit, and therefore is vouched by the slightest evidence; but to overcome the improbability of a strange and rare event, contrary to the course of nature, the very strongest evidence is required. It is certain, however, that wonders and prodigies are swallowed by the vulgar, upon evidence that would not be fufficient to ascertain the most familiar occurrence. It has been reckoned difficult to explain that irregular bias of mind; but we are now made acquainted with the influence of paffion upon opinion and belief: a ftory of ghofts or fairies, told with an air of gravity and truth, raiseth an emotion of wonder, and perhaps of dread; and thefe emotions impofing upon a weak mind, imprefs upon it a thorough conviction contrary to reason. Opinion and belief are influenced by propensity as well as by paffion. An innate propenfity is all we have to convince us, that the operations of nature are uniform: influenced by that propenfity, we often rafhly think, that good or bad weather will never have an end; and in natural philosophy, writers, influenced by the fame propenfity, ftretch commonly their analogical reasonings beyond just bounds. Opinion and belief are influenced by affection as as well as by propenfity. The noted ftory of a fine lady and a curate viewing the moon through a telescope, is a pleasant illustration: I perceive, fays the lady, two shadows inclining to each other; they are certainly two happy lovers: Not at all, replies the curate, they are two fteeples of a cathedral. APPENDIX to Part V. Methods that Nature hath afforded for compu ting Time and Space. His fubject is introduced, because it affords TH feveral curious examples of the influence of paffion to bias the mind in its conceptions and opinions; a leffon that cannot be too frequently inculcated, as there is not perhaps another bias in human nature that hath an influence fo univerfal to make us wander from truth as well as from juftice. I begin with time; and the question is, What was the measure of time before artificial measures were invented; and what is the measure.at prefent when these are not at hand? I fpeak not of months and days, which are computed by the moon and fun; but of hours, or in general of the time that paffes between any two occurrences when there is not access to the fun. The only natural measure, is the fucceffion of our thoughts; for we always judge the time to be long or fhort, in proportion to the number of perceptions and ideas that have paffed during that interval. This measure is indeed far from being accurate; because in a quick and in a flow fucceffion, it must evidently produce different computations of the fame time but however inaccurate, it is the only measure by which we naturally calculate time; and that measure is applied on all occafions, without regard to any cafual variation in the rate of fucceffion. That measure would however be tolerable, did it labour under no other imperfection befide that mentioned but in many inftances it is much more fallacious; in order to explain which diftinctly, fan analysis will be neceffary. Time is computed at two different periods; one while it is paffing, another after it is past: these computations shall be confidered feparately, with the errors to which each of them is liable. Beginning with computation of time while it is paffing, it is a common and trite obfervation, That to lovers abfence' appears immeasurably long, every minute an hour, and every day a year: the fame computation is made in every cafe where we long for a diftant event; as where one is in expectation of good news, or where a profligate heir watches for the death of an old rich mifer. Oppofite to these are inftances not fewer |