The foregoing theory must have fatigued the reader with much dry reasoning: but his labour will not be fruitlefs; because from that theory are derived many useful rules in criticism, which fhall be mentioned in their proper places. One fpecimen fhall be our prefent entertainment. Events that surprise by being unexpected, and yet are natural, enliven greatly an epic poem: but in fuch a poem, if it pretend to copy human manners and actions, no improbable incident ought to be ad- mitted; that is, no incident contrary to the order and course of nature. A chain of imagined incidents linked together according to the order of nature, finds eafy admittance into the mind; and a lively narrative of such incidents, occafions complete images, or in other words ideal prefence: but our judgement revolts against an improbable incident; and if we once begin to doubt of its reality, farewell relish and concern-an unhappy effect; for it will require more than an ordinary effort, to restore the waking dream, and to make the reader conceive even the more probable incidents as paffing in his prefence.

I never was an admirer of machinery in an epic poem, and I now find my taste juftified by reason ;

melior artifex traditur: in ebore vero longe citra æmulum, vel fi nihil nifi Minervam Athenis, aut Olympium in Elide Jovem feciffet, cujus pulchritudo adjeciffe aliquid etiam receptæ religioni videtur; adeo majeftas operis Deum æquavit. Quintilian, lib. 12. cap. 10. § 1.

the

the foregoing argument concluding ftill more strongly against imaginary beings, than against improbable facts: fictions of that nature may amuse by their novelty and fingularity; but they never move the sympathetic paffions, because they cannot impose on the mind any perception of reality. I appeal to the discerning reader, whether that obfervation be not applicable to the machinery of Taffo and of Voltaire: fuch machinery is not only in itself cold and uninteresting, but gives an air of fiction to the whole compofition. A burlefque poem, fuch as the Lutrin or the Difpenfary, may employ machinery with fuccefs; for these poems, tho' they affume the air of history, give entertainment chiefly by their pleasant and ludicrous pictures, to which machinery contributes it is not the aim of fuch a poem, to raise our sympathy; and for that reason, a strict imitation of nature is not required. A poem profeffedly ludicrous, may employ machinery to great advantage; and the more extravagant the better.

Having affigned the means by which fiction commands our paffions; what only remains for accomplishing our prefent task, is to affign the final caufe. I have already mentioned, that fiction, by means of language, has the command of our fympathy for the good of others. By the fame means, our fympathy may also be raised for our own good. In the fourth fection of the prefent chapter, it is obferved, that examples both of virtue and of vice

raise virtuous emotions; which becoming ftronger by exercise, tend to make us virtuous by habit as well as by principle. I now further obferve, that examples confined to real events are not fo frequent as without other means to produce a habit of virtue if they be, they are not recorded by hiftorians. It therefore fhows great wisdom, to form us in fuch a manner, as to be fufceptible of the fame improvement from fable that we receive from genuine history. By that contrivance, examples to improve us in virtue may be multiplied without end no other fort of difcipline contributes more to make virtue habitual, and no other fort is fo agreeable in the application. I add another final cause with thorough fatisfaction; because it shows, that the author of our nature is not lefs kindly provident for the happinefs of his creatures, than for the regularity of their conduct: the power that fiction hath over the mind affords an endless variety of refined amufements, always at hand to employ a vacant hour: fuch amusements are a fine refource in folitude; and by chearing and sweetening the mind, contribute mightily to social happinefs.

PART

PART II.

Emotions and Paffions as pleasant and painful, agreeable and difagreeable. Modifications of thefe Qualities.

T will naturally occur at firft, that a difcourfe

upon the paffions ought to commence with explaining the qualities now mentioned: but upon trial, I found that this explanation could not be made diftinctly, till the difference should first be afcertained between an emotion and a paffion, and their caufes unfolded.

Great obscurity may be obferved among writers with regard to the prefent point: particularly no care is taken to distinguish agreeable from pleafant, difagreeable from painful; or rather thefe terms are deemed fynonymous. This is an error not at all venial in the fcience of ethics; as inftances can and fhall be given, of painful paffions that are agreeable, and of pleasant paffions that are difagreeable. These terms, it is true, are used indifferently in familiar converfation, and in compofitions for amusement; but more accuracy is required from those who profefs to explain the paffions. In writing upon the critical art, I would avoid every refinement that may feem more curious than

ufeful:

useful but the proper meaning of the terms under confideration must be ascertained, in order to understand the paffions, and fome of their effects that are intimately connected with criticism.

I shall endeavour to explain these terms by familiar examples. Viewing a fine garden, I perceive it to be beautiful or agreeable; and I confider the beauty or agreeableness as belonging to the object, or as one of its qualities. When I turn my attention from the garden to what paffes in my mind, I am confcious of a pleasant emotion, of which the garden is the caufe: the pleasure here is felt, as a quality, not of the garden, but of the emotion produced by it. I give an oppofite example. A rotten carcass is difagreeable, and raises in the spectator a painful emotion: the difagreeableness is a quality of the object; the pain is a quality of the emotion produced by it. In a word, agreeable and disagreeable are qualities of the objects we perceive; pleasant and painful are qualities of the emotions we feel: the former qualities are perceived as adhering to objects; the latter are felt as exifting within us.

But a paffion or emotion, befide being felt, is frequently made an object of thought or reflection: we examine it; we enquire into its nature, its cause, and its effects. In that view, like other objects, it is either agreeable or disagreeable. Hence clearly appear the different fignifications of the terms under confideration, as applied to paf