while silent upon preventive measures, such as were adopted by the Constitution of 1791, he pleads often and warmly for the remedial measure which goes to the root of the whole mischief: for that multiplication of small proprietors, with the consequent extinction of 'beggary,' which was, in fact, one of the main social consequences of the Revolution. In view of these facts, it is hard to believe that his influence counted for anything in the establishment of this 'régime censitaire' which disappears and then reappears, only to disappear once more, in the kaleidoscope of revolutionary Constitutions. It is almost certain that he himself would have regarded it, as well as the system of indirect election which served to buttress it, with disapproval and contempt. It is a different story with the other main principle of this Constitution: the sharp line which it draws between the Legislative and the Executive powers, and the elaborate series of checks which it imposes upon the latter. This, for good or for ill, is in entire accordance with the principles of Rousseau. That the Executive, especially when in the hands of a monarch, must be jealously watched is a cardinal doctrine of the Contrat social. It is a doctrine asserted with still greater emphasis in the practical writings which followed. It may well be, however, that the men of '89 were also influenced, in this matter, by the example of the English Constitution and that of the United States. It is certain that their hand was forced by the special difficulties which their own country had inherited from the past: by the practical necessity of controlling a king whom they were unable to get rid of, but equally unable to trust-in short, as Burke said, of 'deposing him by halves.' There is something to be said for the contention that the series of measures known as the Civil Constitution of the Clergy represents a desire to realise-it must be admitted, however, in a very distorted form-the principles proclaimed in Rousseau's chapter on 'Civil Religion.' But it is far more probable that, at least in the main, they were prompted by honest indignation at the existing abuses of the French Church and the wish, peculiarly strong in the Jansenists who took the leading part in framing this unhappy code, to bring it back to the simplicity and purity of the apostolic age. we overlook the possible influence of Voltaire who, before Rousseau and far more persistently than Rousseau, had preached the mission of the Curé as a kind of moral policeman-an ideal which clearly counted for much in the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. Nor must B. The Constitution of 1793, debated during the height of the conflict between Jacobins and Girondins and carried immediately after the fall of the latter, was never put in force. It was from the first suspended, probably of necessity, until the proclamation of peace'; and long before that moment came, indeed before the end of the Convention itself, it was set aside in favour of the reactionary instrument known as the Constitution of the year III. It is the most democratic constitution that either France, or any other large State of Europe, has ever known. It is prefaced, like its predecessor, by a Declaration of Rights, in which the sovereignty of the people, with an added edge against the dreaded policy of Federalism, was defiantly proclaimed-The sovereignty belongs of right to the people; the sovereign people is the whole body of French citizens'—and the 'sacred right of insurrection' no less defiantly asserted. It contains a clause, over which the Convention displayed a deplorable though, under the circumstances, a very natural vacillation, asserting the unlimited liberty of worship'; and another, largely due to Robespierre, proclaiming the duty of Society to provide for the subsistence of unfortunate citizens either by procuring them work'-the famous droit au travail of 1848-'or by securing them the means of existence.' All these provisions-with a peremptory exception for the 'right of insurrection'—may be held, not unjustly, to represent the influence of Rousseau; and there is one phrase that which asserts all hereditary offices to be absurd and tyrannical'-where we seem to catch a direct echo of the Contrat social. Otherwise, there is little or nothing that was not, substantially at least, in the earlier Declaration; nothing, therefore, to show that the influence of Rousseau had either materially strengthened or materially weakened in the interval. With the Constitution itself, so far as it is possible to pronounce on so tangled a question, it is a different matter. Itself elected by universal suffrage-the decree enjoining this was passed by the Legislative Assembly immediately after the events of the 10th of August 1792-the Convention at once swept away the old property qualification and established universal suffrage, by direct voting, for parliamentary elections, which were henceforth to be annual. The principle of a Plébiscite or Referendum, to be set in motion by any ten Primary Assemblies (which, however, had to lie in ten different Departments), was accepted for all future laws, with a time limit (one month after the passing of the law in question) for its application. And among such 'laws '-with this, however, the influence of Rousseau had obviously nothing to do-was expressly numbered the declaration of war. Finally, each Department was required to nominate one candidate for the body of Executive Ministers, the Legislative having the right of final selection. Most, if not all, of these measures may, no doubt, be said to have lain in the necessities of the political situation. But, with the one exception indicated, they are so clearly in accordance with the principles laid down in the Contrat social that it would be unreasonable not to find a place for Rousseau, side by side with Robespierre and the 10th of August, among their sponsors. When all allowance has been made for the crudeness of some of these provisions, it is impossible not to regret that this bold experiment was never put to the test of practice. The two remaining Constitutions, that of the Directory and that of the Consulate, need not detain us long. C. The first of these, the Constitution of the year III (1795), was frankly-though, it may be, not intentionally-reactionary. The property qualification (with certain shadowy relaxations) and election at two degrees (admission to the second of which fell only to the well-to-do) was summarily restored. A second Chamber, the Council of Ancients, was for the first time introduced, with power to reject any law proposed by the other Chamber, the Council of Five Hundred, though without the right of initiating any legislation itself; both Chambers rested on the same elective franchise. The supreme executive power was vested in five persons, the Directory, appointed by the Council of Ancients from a list prepared by the Five Hundred. Its powers, in some directions, were strangely limited. This, however, did not prevent it from terrorising the two Councils-it is true, by means avowedly revolutionary at the revolution of Fructidor (Sept. 1797) and forcing them to cancel the elections of more than half the total number of Departments. This revolution was forced through by Augereau, lieutenant of Bonaparte, then just at the victorious end of his campaign in Italy; and behind the lieutenant it is not hard to discern the figure of the General. It is manifest that in all this there can be no question of the influence of Rousseau. D. Constitution of the year VIII (1799). If the Directory system was plainly reactionary, that of the Consulate-it would be more true to say, that of the First Consul-was a calculated fraud. The right of nominating members of the Legislative Body was in name restored to the whole body of citizens; but the only part they actually took in the election was to prepare long lists of eligibles,' successively reduced in number (to 1 of the whole body as furnished by universal suffrage) until the final appointment was made, from this paltry fraction, by the Senate. Thus at one stroke the suffrage was slily transferred from the people to the Senate a body appointed-and salaried-by the First Consul, and sharing with him and the Conseil d'État the whole effective power of the State. Nor was this all. Deprived, in the manner related, of all representative authority, the Legislative Body was also reduced to an assemblage of mutes. Its sole function was to vote on laws proposed to it by the Conseil d'État and debated before it successively by deputies of the Conseil and by those of a so-called popular body, the Tribunate. It is in the latter body that the sole trace, and that a spurious one, of Rousseau's influence may be detected. The Tribunate, as might have been foreseen, speedily made itself odious to the First Consul by the criticisms which it was in duty bound to offer: it was first purged, then summarily abolished (1807). The real power was, and was from the first intended to be, in the hands of Napoleon, as First Consul, as Consul for life, and eventually as Emperor (1804). And, if he invoked occasional Plébiscites, to give his power a semblance of popular sanction, this was as much a fraud as the rest of his hybrid constitution. No man would have seen through it more clearly than Rousseau; and no man would have condemned it more roundly. It is only fair to say that all the main features of this Constitution, with one exception, are to be found in the original draft prepared by Sieyes. That one exception, however, is all-important. In the draft of Sieyes, the Executive was left as much a phantom as all the rest. The whole thing was a piece of artificial mechanism, with no life, no movement, in any part of it. What Napoleon did was to leave the Legislative as weak as ever, but to thrust in an allpowerful Executive on the top of it: in other words, to turn a paper scheme of checks and counter-checks into an unlimited despotism. TABLE DES LIVRES ET DES CHAPITRES |