gument; though "Reason," in strictness of speaking, should be confined to the latter. "Therefore,"

Ambiguity of "because,"

"therefore," "hence,”

&c.

consequently," &c., and also, "since," "because," and "why,” have like

wise a corresponding ambiguity.

The multitude of the words which bear this double meaning (and that, in all languages) greatly increases our liability to be misled by it; since thus the very means men resort to for ascertaining the sense of any expression, are infected with the very same ambiguity; e. g. if we enquire what is meant by a "Cause," we shall be told that it is that from which something "follows;" or, which is indicated by the words "therefore," 66 consequently," &c. all which expressions are as equivocal and uncertain in their signification as the original It is in vain to attempt ascertaining by the balance the true amount of any commodity, if false weights are placed in the opposite scale. Hence it is that so many writers, in investigating the Cause to which any fact or phenomenon is to be attributed, have assigned that which is not a Cause, but only a Proof that the fact is so; and have thus been led into an endless train of errors and perplexities.

one.

Several, however, of the words in question, though employed indiscriminately in both significations, seem (as was observed in the case of the word "Reason") in their primary and strict sense to be confined to one "4" in Greek, and "ergo," "* or "itaque," in Latin, seem originally and properly to denote the Sequence

* Most Logical writers seem not to be aware of this, as they gen erally, in Latin Treatises, employ "ergo" in the other sense. It is from the Greek gyo, i. e. " in fact."

and Effect from Cause; "&ga," and "igitur," that of conclusion from premises. The English word "accordingly," will generally be found to correspond with the Latin "itaque."

The interrogative "why" is employed to enquire, either, first, the “Reason," (or "Proof;") Ambiguity of "Why." secondly, the "Cause;" or thirdly, the "object proposed," or Final-Cause: e. g. first, Why are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? secondly, Why are the days shorter in winter than in summer? thirdly, Why are the works of a watch construct ed as they are? †

It is to be observed that the discovery of Causes belongs properly to the province of the Philosopher; that of "Reasons," strictly so called, (i. e. Arguments,) to that of the Rhetorician; and that, though each will have frequent occasion to assume the character of the other, it is most important that these two objects should not be confounded together.

$ 4.

Of Signs then there are some which, from a certain Effect or phenomenon, infer the "Cause" of it; and others which, in like manner, infer some "Condition" which is not the Cause. Of these last, one species is the Argument from Testimony; the premiss Testimony a being the existence of the Testimony, the kind of sign. Conclusion, the truth of what is attested; which is considered as a "Condition" of the Testimony having been

ἄρω.

"Aga having a signification of fitness or coincidence; whence

See the article WHY in the Appendix to the Treatise on Logic.

given; since it is evident that so far only as this is allowed, (i. e. so far only as it is allowed, that the Testimony would not have been given, had it not been true,) can this Argument have any force.

Testimony is of various kinds; but the distinction between them is so obvious, as well as the various circumstances which add to, or diminish the weight of, any Testimony, that it is not necessary to enter into any detailed discussion of the subject. It may be worth remarking, however, that one of the most important distinctions is between Testimony to matters of Fact, and to Doctrines or opinions in estimating the weight of the former, we look chiefly to the honesty of the witness, and his means of obtaining information; in the latter, his ability to judge is equally to be taken into consideration.

With respect however to the credibility of witnesses, it is evident that when many coincide in their testimony, (where no previous concert can have taken place,) the probability resulting from this concurrence does not rest on the supposed veracity of each considered separately, but on the improbability of such an agreement taking Concurrent place by chance. For though in such a case, testimony. each of the witnesses should be considered as unworthy of credit, and even much more likely to speak falsehood than truth, still the chances might be infinite against their all agreeing in the same falsehood.* This

"It deserves likewise to be attended to on this subject, that in a number of concurrent testimonies, (in cases wherein there could have been no previous concert,) there is a probability distinct from that which may be termed the sum of the probabilities resulting from the testimonies of the witnesses, a probability which would remain even though the witnesses were of such a character as to merit no faith at all. This probability arises purely from the concur

remark is applied by Dr. Campbell to the Argument from Testimony; but he might have extended it to other Arguments also, in which a similar calculation of chances will enable us to draw a Conclusion, sometimes even amounting to moral certainty, from a combination of data which singly would have had little or no weight; e. g. if any one out of a hundred men throw a stone which strikes a certain object,* there is but a slight probability, from that fact alone, that he aimed at that object; but if all the hundred threw stones which struck the same object, no one would doubt that they aimed at it. It is from such a combination of Argument that we infer the existence of an intelligent Creator from the marks of contrivance visible in the Universe, though many of these are such as, taken singly, might well be conceived undesigned and accidental; but that they should all be such, is morally impossible. Great care is requisite in setting forth clearly, especially in any popular discourse, Arguments of this nature; the generality of men being better qualified for understanding (to use Lord Bacon's words) "particulars, one by one," than for taking a comprehensive view of the whole; and therefore in a Galaxy of evidence, as it may be called, in which the brilliancy of no single star can be pointed out, the lustre of the combination is often lost on them. Hence it is, as was remarked in the Treatise on Fallacies, that the sophism of

rence itself. That such a concurrence should spring from chance, is as one to infinite; that is, in other words, morally impossible. If therefore concert be excluded, there remains no other cause but the reality of the fact." Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, c. v. b. i. Part 3. p. 125.

*If I recollect rightly, these are the words of Mr. Dugald Stewart

"Composition," as it is called, so frequently misleads men: it is not improbable, (in the above example,) that each of the stones, considered separately, may have been thrown at random: and therefore the same is concluded of all, considered in conjunction. Not that in such an instance as this, any one would reason so weakly; but that a still greater absurdity of the very same kind is involved in the rejection of the evidences of our religion, will be plain to any one who considers, not merely the individual force, but the number and variety of those evidences.*

What is meant by the chances

supposition.

And here it may be observed, that though the easiest and most popular way of practically refuting the Fallacy just mentioned (or indeed any against any Fallacy) is, by bringing forward a parallel case, where it leads to a manifest absurdity, a metaphysical objection may still be urged against many cases in which we thus reason from calculation of chances; an objection not often perhaps likely practically to influence any one, but which may afford the Sophist a triumph over those who are unable to find a solution, and which may furnish an excuse for the rejection of evidence which one is previously resolved not to admit. If it were answered then to those who maintain that the universe, which exhibits so many marks of design might be the work of non-intelligent causes, that no one would believe it possible for such a work as the Iliad, e. g. to be produced by a fortuitous shaking together of the letters of the alphabet, the Sophist might

* Mr. Davison in the introduction to his work on prophecy states strongly the cumulative force of a multitude of small particulars. See ch. iii. § 4. of this Treatise.