illustrate his mode of viewing it, and because the notions of an intelligent traveller, be they true or false, are valuable, in as much as he does not look from a common point of view with ourselves.

"The confederation was already on the verge of destruction, when it officially proclaimed its inability to conduct the government, and appealed to the constituent authority of the nation. If America ever approached (for however brief a time) that lofty pinnacle of glory to which the fancy of its inhabitants is wont to point, it was at the solemn moment at which the power of the nation abdicated, as it were, the empire of the land. All ages have furnished the spectacle of a people struggling with energy to win its independence; and the efforts of the Americans in throwing off the English yoke have been considerably exaggerated. Separated from their enemies by three thousand miles of ocean, and backed by a powerful ally, the success of the United States may be more justly attributed to their geographical position than to the valour of their armies or the patriotism of their citizens. It would be ridiculous to compare the American war to the wars of the French revolution, or the efforts of the Americans to those of the French, when they were attacked by the whole of Europe, without credit and without allies, yet capable of opposing a twentieth part of their population to the world, and of bearing the torch of revolution beyond their frontiers whilst they stifled its devouring flame within the bosom of their country. But it is a novelty in the history of society to see a great people turn a calm and scrutinising eye upon itself when apprised by the legislature that the wheels of government are stopped; to see it carefully examine the extent of the evil, and patiently wait for two whole years until a remedy was discovered, which it voluntarily adopted without having wrung a tear or a drop of blood from mankind. At the time when the inadequacy of the first constitution was discovered, America possessed the double advantage of that calm which had succeeded the effervescence of the revolution, and of those great men who had led the revolution to a successful issue. The assembly which accepted the task of composing the second constitution was small;* but George Washington was its president, and it contained the choicest talents and the noblest hearts which had ever appeared in the new world." "In examining the balance of power as established by the federal constitution; in remarking on the one hand the portion of sovereignty which has been reserved to the several states, and on the other the share of power which the Union has assumed, it is evident that the federal legislators entertained the clearest and most accurate notions on the nature of the centralisation of government. The United States form not only a republic, but a confederation; nevertheless the authority of the nation is more central than it was in several of the monarchies of Europe when the American constitution was formed."

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"The dependence of the executive power is one of the defects inherent in republican constitutions. The Americans have not been able to counteract the tendency which legislative assemblies have to get possession of the government, but they have rendered this propensity less irresistible. The salary of the president is fixed, at the time of his

"It consisted of fifty-five members; Washington, Madison, Hamilton, and the two Morrises were amongst the number."

entering upon office, for the whole period of his magistracy. The president is moreover provided with a suspensive veto, which allows him to oppose the passing of such laws as might destroy the portion of independence which the constitution awards him. The struggle between the president and the legislature must always be an unequal one, since the latter is certain of bearing down all resistance by persevering in its plans; but the suspensive veto forces it at least to reconsider the matter, and, if the motion be persisted in, it must then be backed by a majority of two-thirds of the whole house. The veto is, in fact, a sort of appeal to the people. The executive power, which, without this security, might have been secretly oppressed, adopts this means of pleading its cause and stating its motives. But if the legislature is certain of overpowering all resistance by persevering in its plans, I reply, that in the constitutions of all nations, of whatever kind they may be, a certain point exists at which the legislator is obliged to have recourse to the good sense and the virtue of his fellow-citizens."

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"Hitherto no citizen has shown any disposition to expose his honour and his life in order to become the president of the United States; because the power of that office is temporary, limited, and subordinate. The prize of fortune must be great to encourage adventurers in so desperate a game. No candidate has as yet been able to arouse the dangerous enthusiasm or the passionate sympathies of the people in his favour: for the very simple reason, that when he is at the head of the government he has but little power, but little wealth, and but little glory to share amongst his friends; and his influence in the state is too small for the success or the ruin of a faction to depend upon the elevation of an individual to power." * "The Americans have admitted that the head of the executive power, who has to bear the whole responsibility of the duties he is called upon to fulfil, ought to be empowered to choose his own agents, and to remove them at pleasure: the legislative bodies watch the conduct of the president more than they direct it. The consequence of this arrangement is, that at every new election the fate of all the federal public officers is in suspense. Mr. Quincy Adams, on his entry into office, discharged the majority of the individuals who had been appointed by his predecessor: and I am not aware that General Jackson allowed a single removeable functionary employed in the federal service to retain his place beyond the first year which succeeded his election. It is sometimes made a subject of complaint, that in the constitutional monarchies of Europe the fate of the humbler servants of an administration depends upon that of the ministers. But in elective governments this evil is far greater. In a constitutional monarchy successive ministries are rapidly formed; but as the principal representative of the executive power does not change, the spirit of innovation is kept within bounds; the changes which take place are in the details rather than in the principles of the administrative system: but to substitute one system for another, as is done in America every four years by law, is to cause a sort of revolution. As to the misfortunes which may fall upon individuals in consequence of this state of things, it must be allowed that the uncertain situation of the public officers is less fraught with evil consequences in America than elsewhere. It is so easy to acquire an independent position in the United States, that the public officer who loses his place may be deprived of the comforts of life, but not of the means of subsistence."

"Whatever the prerogatives of the executive power may be, the period which immediately precedes an election, and the moment of its duration, must always be considered as a national crisis, which is perilous in pro

portion to the internal embarrassments and the external dangers of the country. Few of the nations of Europe could escape the calamities of anarchy or of conquest, every time they might have to elect a new sovereign. In America society is so constituted that it can stand without assistance upon its own basis; nothing is to be feared from the pressure of external dangers; and the election of the president is a cause of agitation, but not of ruin." "It is impossible to consider the ordinary course of affairs in the United States without perceiving that the desire of being re-elected is the chief aim of the president; that his whole administration, and even his most indifferent measures, tend to this object; and that, as the crisis approaches, his personal interest takes the place of his interest in the public good. The principle of re-eligibility renders the corrupt influence of elective governments still more extensive and pernicious.

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"If ineligible a second time, the president would be far from independent of the people, for his responsibility would not be lessened; but the favour of the people would not be so necessary to him as to induce him to court it by humouring its desires. If re-eligible, (and this is more especially true at the present day, when political morality is relaxed, and when great men are rare,) the president of the United States becomes an easy tool in the hands of the majority. He adopts its likings and its animosities, he hastens to anticipate its wishes, he forestalls its complaints, he yields to its idlest cravings, and instead of guiding it, as the legislature intended that he should do, he is ever ready to follow its bidding. Thus, in order not to deprive the state of the talents of an individual, those talents have been rendered almost useless; and to reserve an expedient for extraordinary perils, the country has been exposed to daily dangers." "When the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States advances on the steps of the tribunal, and simply says, 'the state of New York versus the state of Ohio,' it is impossible not to feel that the court which he addresses is no ordinary body; and when it is recollected that one of these parties represents one million, and the other two millions of men, one is struck by the responsibility of the seven judges whose decision is about to satisfy or disappoint so large a number of their fellow-citizens.

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"The peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of the Union are vested in the hands of the seven judges. Without their active co-operation the constitution would be a dead letter; the executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the legislative powers; the legislature demands their protection from the designs of the executive; they defend the Union from the disobedience of the states, the states from the exaggerated claims of the Union, the public interest against the interests of private citizens, and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting innovations of democracy. Their power is enormous, but it is clothed in the authority of public opinion. They are the all-powerful guardians of a people which respects law; but they would be impotent against popular neglect or popular contempt. The force of public opinion is the most intractable of agents, because its exact limits cannot be defined: and it is not less dangerous to exceed, than to remain below, the boundary prescribed."

"All commodities and ideas circulate throughout the Union as freely as in a country inhabited by one people. Nothing checks the spirit of enterprise. The government avails itself of the assistance of all who have talents or knowledge to serve it. Within the frontiers of the Union the profoundest peace prevails, as within the heart of some great

empire; abroad, it ranks with the most powerful nations of the earth; two thousand miles of coast are open to the commerce of the world; and as it possesses the keys of the globe, its flag is respected in the most remote seas. The Union is as happy and as free as a small people, and as glorious and as strong as a great nation."

We might with great pleasure and advantage to our readers extend these extracts, but they have already run to an alarming length, and we have yet another volume before us. Upon many minute points we might except to the author's views, and perhaps discover inaccuracies of information, but we prefer to let him speak for himself and be judged by the reader. The inadequacy of the Union to great emergencies, and the monopoly by each state of the affections of its citizens, in contradistinction from the national government, are, we think, too broadly stated in a subsequent page of the work. At the north, we are perfectly certain that the idea of state rights and state sovereignty are not doctrines of very definite shape or colour. Local attachments may be strong, but the pride of country is not provincial but American. In another part of the United States different views have obtained, whose origin, history, cause, and consequences, could be traced more easily than agreeably. We shall not essay the labour here, but we protest against their imputation to any but their lawful parents.

As the laws and institutions of the country form the first subjects of discussion with M. de Tocqueville, so the influence of the popular sovereignty, and its tendencies in remodeling, sustaining, or altering them, are considered in his second volume. Hitherto we have been aided in our extracts by the excellent translation of Mr. Reeve, but the sequel of that gentleman's labours has not yet reached us, if, indeed, it has appeared in London. In this part of his work, M. de Tocqueville, having a freer field for speculation, generalises more boldly, and now and then mistakes an hypothesis for a fact. Occasionally, too, he pushes a fact into the very outermost regions of absurdity. Take, for instance, the following sketch :--

"Opinion, invisible and intangible as it is, laughs at despotic power. In our day the most absolute prince in Europe cannot hinder the circulation of ideas hostile to his authority, not merely in his dominions, but in his very court. Not so in America: while the majority is uncertain, people talk-the moment it pronounces its decree, every one is mute: friends and enemies alike attend the car of the victor. The reason is obvious, for no monarch can at once grasp all the powers of society and overcome every obstacle to his government: these are the prerogatives of a majority, clothed equally with the right of making the laws, and the power of executing them."

Not a very clear reason in its terms, nor a very satisfactory one in its logic. But to proceed.

It

"I am not acquainted with any country in which, as a general observation, there exists less moral independence or less real freedom of discussion than in America. Under the constitutional governments of Europe every possible theory in religion and politics may be openly promulgated, and, consequently, communicated to the adjoining states. cannot be otherwise; for there is not a nation in Europe so enslaved to a single power, that the man who enters it for the purpose of publishing the truth will not find a sufficient guarantee against the effects of his independence."

What would M. de Tocqueville think of Poland? We question much if he could save his head if he undertook to publish the "Démocratie" in Warsaw. What is his opinion of the recent law against the press in France? Or of the seizure of the English newspapers at Calais the other day?

"In America the majority describes a formidable circle around thought. Within its boundaries the press is free, but wo to him who ventures to overleap them! Not that he is in danger of an auto da fe, but he is exposed to manifold contempt and daily persecution. He has closed the avenue to political distinction by offending the power which keeps the key of it. Every hope is denied to him,-even that of glory. Before he published his opinions he, perchance, had supporters; when his sentiments are known, they appear no more. Those who censure him, do so loudly; while those who concur with him, lacking his courage, desert him and hold their peace. He yields at last, overcome by reiterated effort, and buries himself in silence, as if remorseful at having told the truth."

In all this, and much more of the same sort, no American will recognise a fair picture of his country. If he did, it should be his country no longer. He should emigrate to the dominions of Mohammed Pacha or the Czar. What does the author mean? If he intends to say that parties are proscriptive, and that the minority does not share in the benefits of the contest, we agree with him. If he means that after the important change in the principles upon which the federal government was administered, a great deal of very undeserved obloquy was heaped upon the federalists, we again agree with him. If he means to say that no man who openly avows the principles of despotic rule, who professes himself, in the newspapers, an enemy to equal rights and laws made for the many, can be elected by the many to office, we still agree with him. But if we are called upon to believe, that because a host of crude and visionary schemes of government, speculations upon the social compact, and new-fangled Utopian experiments, are not daily issued from the press and discussed in the market-place, therefore men's mouths are sealed, we do not agree with him. Cannot a reason that lies at the door, if it be a good one, serve as fair a turn as one sought for in a well? Does not the learned author see, that in a busy country like this, we are too much