that is apt to arise in a sinner's breast. That which puts the first stop to his career is the weight of bis misfortunes; by which when his heart begins to be mollified and subdued, it is then that he is in a fit temper to look up to the cause from whence they come. This may serve to shew, that the being moved by those worldly inconveniencies which come from God, is not always an act of faith, and consequently that the objection comes thus far short of the argument. But I must observe, secondly, that it is in truth nothing to the purpose. For the question is not whether the being moved by the judgments of God be an act of faith, or not an act of faith; but how they operate. The end which God proposes in afflicting us, is to bring us to repentance. Well; how do afflictions answer this end? Why plainly no otherwise than as they are a bridle to our passions. And thus David speaks from his own experience. Before I was troubled, says he, I went wrong; but now have I kept thy word. And why? It follows soon after, I thought on my ways, and I turned my feet unto thy testimonies. This, I say, is the effect of the inconveniencies of this world, they dispose us to sober thoughts and serious consideration, which the hurry of our passions, whilst they reign without controul, will by no means allow. Either shew then that they can have no such effect when applied by the hand of the magistrate; or no longer pretend, that, when he does apply them,

he makes use of a means improper for the end or true religion.

There are these differences, indeed, to be observed between these two cases, viz. first, that when an offender falls under the penalties of human laws, he knows the worst of it, which perhaps he may set at a lower rate than the gratification of his lusts. The punishment may be either small in itself, or being, as to its duration, confined to some determinate period, may administer hopes which will serve to keep the passions alive, and so prevent those good effects which would otherwise ensue. But to the chastisements of God we can ascertain neither measure nor end; for who knoweth the power of his wrath? Who can tell how miserable he may think fit to make wicked men, even though we look no farther than the present state of things? Again; secondly, the magistrate can judge only of the outward appearance, but God searcheth the heart and reins; the one, therefore, must be satisfied with the mere forbearance of the outward act, whilst the other requires inward purity and sincerity. But these differences will not go so far as to shew that the application of worldly motives is proper in the hand of God, and not so in the hand of man; but only that such motives when considered by the sinner as made use of by God, will work an inward reformation more certainly, than when they are applied by the civil magistrate. He who looks upon himself as

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under the chastisement of God, and wishes for deliverance, must bring himself to a sincere repentance, because nothing less will be sufficient: whereas he who would avoid civil penalties, may be a sinner in his heart, if so be he takes care to avoid those actions which the law punishes. But it is to be considered that the mere forbearance of the outward act, though in itself it is not true virtue, is yet a very good step towards it; and that even the judgments of God can operate no other way, than by suppressing the outward act, upon those who discern not the hand of his Providence, which (as I just now observed) is the case of most sinners, especially till they have made some advances in the work of reformation. The licentious liver, who is punished with the loss of his estate, whilst he considers it only as a common accident, is wrought upon no otherwise than as hereby that fuel is withdrawn, which ministred to the inflaming his lusts and appetites. Now if this contributes any thing towards the begetting inward purity; I can thus far see no difference, whether it be done by the hand of God or by the hand of man. How light some men make of the mere forbearance of the outward act I am not insensible. But when I consider how certain and necessary a tendency the indulgence of one's self in wicked practices has to corrupt the mind, and bring on an habitual disposition to evil; I cannot but think that it would be the greatest security in

the world to sobriety and good manners, if there could be a law, that just so much as a man consumes in luxury and intemperance, just so much he should be obliged to pay yearly into the public treasury.

I have instanced chiefly in the case of punishment, because (as a very judicious* writer has well' observed) the annexing positive rewards to good actions is a case which rarely happens, and the very attempt to do it would for the most part be ridiculous. The magistrate encourages sobriety, by punishing drunkenness; religion and piety, by punishing irreligion and profaneness; obedience to his laws, by punishing disobedience. But yet, to consider the efficacy of rewards will not be altogether improper, because though it is not usual for the ma. gistrate to ascertain rewards to good actions by any positive law; yet he very frequently does that which amounts to as much, i. e. he bestows posts of honour and profit to some particular subjects so or so qualified, with regard to religion: this, I say, though it doth not strictly come under the notion of a reward given for the sake, and on the account of such qualifications (it being only the assigning such posts to those persons who are supposed to be best qualified to fill them, and who upon other accounts have deserved well of their country;) yet it will ordinarily have the same effect, and therefore may be considered as such. There is

* Dean Sherlock's Considerations, p. 28.

then this difference between temporal rewards when propounded by God, and when propounded by man, viz. that in the former case they have a direct tendency to beget the love of God, i. e. true religion, which in the latter it must be confessed they have not. For when God promises temporal good things to encourage us to obedience; we are hereby led to consider him as our benefactor, and are taught to love him because he hath made it for our interest to serve him. But when temporal good things are propounded by men, as a reward to religion; we then consider men as our friends, and we many times think it enough to please them, whom, by the mere shadow of religion, we can easily deceive, even though we do not please God, who is not to be imposed upon by outward appearances. But still they have the same remɔte, indirect tendency to promote true religion, that punishments have. For men are no more willing to be debarred of present good than they are to endure present evil; and therefore the one must be a proper means to restrain those passions, which would, if left to themselves, lead us from our duty, and to awaken our consideration, as well as the other.

From the practical duties of religion which I have hitherto principally had in my view, let us now proceed to the speculative; to which, it is easy to see, that the general principles upon which I build may readily be applied. For nothing is