of the fuil powers with which we thereto conferred upon him, on the one side; and on the other side by D. Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, Honorary Councillor of State and of War to his Majesty the King of Spain, equally furnished with full powers by his sovereign-the tenor of which Convention is as follows:

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and lis Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, being desirous of entering into an arrangement with respect to the occupation and conquest of Portugal, according to the stipulations of the treaty signed this day, have appointed, viz. his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhime, the General of Division Michael Duroc, Grand Marshal of his Palace, Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, and his Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, Don Eugenio Izquierdo de RIbera y Lezaun, his Honorary Councillor of State and of War, who, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles:

1. A body of French Imperial troops, consisting of 25.000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, shall enter Spain, and march direct for Lisbon: they shall be joined by a body of 8600 Spanish infantry and 3000 cavalry, with 30 pieces of artillery.

II. At the same time a division of Spanish troops, consisting of 10,000 men, shall take possession of the province of Entre-Minho-Douria, and of the city of Oporto; and another division of 6000 men, also consisting of Spapish troops, shall take possession of Alentejo, and the kingdom of Algarves.

II. The French troops shall be subsisted and maintained by Spain, and their pay shall be provided by France during the time occupied by their march through Spain.

IV. The moment that the combined troops have entered Portugal, the government and administration of the provinces of Beira, Tras los Montes, and Portuguese Estre- madura (which are to remain in a state of sequestration) shall be vested in the General commanding the French troops; and the contributions imposed thereon shall accrue to the benefit of France. The provinces that are to form the kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of the Algarves, shall be administered and governed by the Generals commanding the Spanish divisions which shall enter the same; and the contributions imposed thereon shall accrue to the benefit of Spain.

V. The central body shall be under the orders of the commander of the French troops, to whom also the Spanish troops attached to that army shall pay obedience. Nevertheless, should the King of Spain or the Prince of Peace think fit to join the said body, the French troops, with the General commanding them, shall be subject to their order.

VI. Another body of 40,000 French troops shall be assembled at Bayonne by the 20th of November next, at the latest, to be ready to enter Spain for the purpose of proceeding to Portugal, in case the English should send reinforcements therein, or menace it with attack. This additional corps, however, shall not enter Spain until the two High Contracting Parties have come to an agreement un that point.

VII. The present Convention ahall be ratified, and the Ratifications exchanged at the same time with those of the treaty of this date.

Done at Fontainblean, 27th October, 1857.
(Signed) DUROC.

E. IZQUIERDO.

Our limits restrict us to a succint analysis of the contents of the following documents.

No. III. is Buonaparte's letter to Ferdinand, given already in Panorama, Vol. IV. p. 598.

The proposals made to Ferdinand (No. IV.) display the overbearing disposition of Buonaparte in glowing colours. "1. That the Emperor has irrevocably determined that the Bourbon Dynasty shall no longer reign in Spain.-2. That the King shall cede his rights to the crown both in his own mame and that of his sons, should he have any.-3. That should this point he agreed upon, the crown of Etruria shall be conferred upon him and his descendants, according to the terms of the Salique law.-4, That the Infant Don Carlos shall make a similar renunciation of his rights, and that he shall have a right to the succession to the crown of Etruria, in default of issue of the King.-5. That

the kingdom of Spain shall henceforth be possessed by one of the brothers of the Emperor.-6. That the Emperor guarantees its complete integrity, and that of all its colonies, without suffering a single village belonging to it to be separated from it.-7. That in like manuer he guarantees the preservation of religion, property, &c. &c.-8. That should his Majesty refuse those propositions, he shall remain without compensation, and his Imperial Majesty will carry them into execution by CONSENT or FORCE —9. That if his Majesty agrees, and demands the nfece of the Empe ror in marriage, this connection shall be immediately secured on the execution of the treaty.

These propositions, made by a man who had no right even of the most distant kind, to suggest them, were refused by Ferdinand; as appears from the same paper, dated Bayonne, April 27, 1808.

No. V. is the application of Don Cevallos to M. Champagny, for permission for Ferdinand to return to Spain. It urges the promises repeatedly made by Ferdinand to his people, and the danger of tumults during his absence.

No. VI. is a royal decree addressed to the supreme council of Castile by Ferdinand, inforing them of the demand made for the liberation of the Prince of Peace; but announcing Ferdinand's intention of continuing his detention.

No. VII. Letter of Ferdinand to his father, in which he reminds him how repeatedly he affirmed, that his abdication had been voluntary, and that if any one affirmed to the contrary he should not be believed. Ferdinand proposes if he must resign, to resign in due form,' at Madrid.

No. VIII. is already given in Panorama, Vol. IV. p. 600. No. IX. Letter from Ferdinand to his father, vindicating his conduct, political, filial, and moral. Complaining of detention at Bayonne, and repeating the offer of resignation when arrived in Spain.

No. X. Ferdinand to his father. Complains of having been "insulted in the presence of his venerable mother, and of the Emperor, by appellations the most humiliating:" whence we infer the certainty of those conver, sations on the subject of his illegitimacy, to which we had not ventured to give credit; thinking them too far out of nature to be true.

No. XI. Note from M. Champagny to Don Cevallos, informing him that as Ferdinand was not acknowledged king by Buonaparte, the couriers he sent off from Bayonne were not entitled to national protection.-The letters sent, having been taken from the person of the courier, should be forwarded by the post.

No. XII. Don Cevallos's letter to Joseph Buonaparté, stating his resignation; and that Spain is almost unanimously opposed to recognize Joseph as king.

An APPENDIX contains a history of the manner in which Murat obtained from the Junta an order for the delivery of the Prince of Peace. To say that Murat employed threats and terror, is compressing the whole of this Appendix into one word.

Since this paper of Don Pedro Cevallos was published, Don J. M. J. Navarro, who was the messenger entrusted with a verbal commission from Ferdinand to the Junta at Madrid, has further explained, that he left Bayonne at six in the morning, April 23, arrived at Madrid, taking circuitous routes, at nightfall, April 29. Was engaged in delivering and expatiating on his message, and its import, the whole night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th,

"In which his highness the Infanta, Don Antonio, desired that I should assist in the sitting held on it, consisting of most of the members of the Supreme Junta, of all the presidents of the tribunals, and of two ministers from cach, with the twofold object of informing all of my commission, and learning the news of the day, and other business that might be discussed, in order that I might inform his Majesty of the whole at Bayonne, where I returned on the evening of the 6th May.""

He also informs us, that Ferdinand had resolved, at that time, not to offend the French, lest

"Serious consequences should result to the King, the Infant, and as many Spaniards as accompanied his Majesty."

And that the arch mover in these treasons had said,

"That he was not so stupid as to neglect an opportunity so favourable as that which presented itself, having a formida ble army in the heart of Spain, its fortresses and principal points occupied, nothing to fear from the North, and the persons of the King and the Infantado, Don Carlos, in his perver, advantages to great to expect they should offer themselves at a future time."

A letter from Buonaparte to Ferdinand explaining that he has no right to the crown but through his mother, inserted among others already referred to, does not appear, through delicacy, no doubt, among the documents of Don Cevallos: but the tenor of his publication goes strongly to prove its authenticity.

the

THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN.

We are very desirous of communicating some ideas on the present state of the French army, with which is King Joseph in person. But being unwilling to resort to conjecture, we have extracted what information may be thought to bear on this point, from the events of the last war between the French and Spaniards in 1793, 4, 5. By being advanced to the bank of the Ebro, the present line of the French has many advantages; inasmuch as it may obtain provisions from a greater extent of Country: but, in a military point of view, it is, in our opinion, a bad position; as its extremities are too distant from its centre: and as they must be maintained in force, or they may be turned, to a certainty. A fleet on the coast may land a truly formidable enemy in the rear of this encampment, on its right; while its left may be gradually closed in, and contracted, so that even its retreat may be endangered. The inability of the French to possess themselves of Saragossa is fatal to this army.

The wings have each one opening, through which to escape; if they divide, each may be beaten, separately. If the whole army continues in its position, the loss of a convoy will be more than hazardous to it. To enable it to move forward will require, at least 100,000 fresh troops. We are, on the whole, of opinion, that no general action will be risqued by the Spaniards. There is no necessity for it. The French flanks will be the scenes of action: and the most persevering will conquer. If the French cannot beat off the Spaniards, they must decamp.

The anxiety of the public mind is so great, that we hope the following information relative to the mode of warfare, and the consequences of it, as absolutely imposed by the nature of the country adjacent to the Pyrennees, will be acceptable to our readers.

LOCAL PARTICULARITIES.

From Bayonne to Pampeluna, the high road is good, and especially on the Spanish side from Irun to Painpeluna. Waggons and carts may pass in these parts during summer, but, in winter, mules themselves cannot at all times perform the journey.

and offers plentiful pastures to their very sum mits. From the southern peak, the third range declines to the level of the peak of Ania (called by the Biscayans, Ahugna: by the Spaniards, Cenia-Larra). This peak is in height 2560 yards. The fourth range declines to the level of the mountain of Hory, the height of which is 2062 yards. The fifth range may be taken at the level of Orsansurietta, which is in height 1602 yards. The level of the mountain of Haussa, above the valley of Baztan, which is 1334 yards in height, forins the sixth level; that of la Rhune, above St. Jean de Luz, which is 924 yards high, forms the seventh; that of the mountain of Aizquibel, on the border of the sea, but rising above its surface 556 yards, forms the eighth and last in this series of steps. This mountain declines ra pidly to the very edge of the sea.

There are many passages, called by the French cols (necks); by the Spaniards puertos (openings). Reckoning froin Bareges to the Atlantic, they are more than sixty: but they are rugged, intricate, and hardly practicable for laden beasts. All however are not of this description. Mules, though heavily laden, pass in some places: but the winds and the snows frequently block up these ways effectually. In proportion as they decline towards the sea, these mountains offer more easy passages between them. Almost all the vallies between the mountains have plains, as well as defiles: and this is altogether in favour of whoever defends the country, for if he be inferior in number to his enemy, he awaits him in the defiles: if he be superior in number, he fights him in the plain.

The heat of the sun is so great in some of the vallies, that unusual exertion has been known to prove immediately fatal to officers, and also to troops. Fogs render somne parts of these mountains almost invisible, and uninhabitable, at all times of the year. In other parts they appear occasionally.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

two miles. On the ordinary roads among the mountains, the army marched about a mile and a half in an hour. There is but one route practicable for artillery; this is from St. Jean Pied du Port to Pampeluna.

In this war neither men nor money were spared: the losses of their enemy were enumerated; those of the French were not beheld. The wings of victory were clotted with gore. The kind of warfare carried on amidst the mountains neither demanded, nor admitted, of extensive military evolutions: the soldiers were taught to handle their arms with dexterity; to take aim correctly; and to advance with agility; these were thought to be exercises sufficient for a war of posts and mountains. The grenadiers were at first employed as light troops: but finding them exposed to be cut off in detail by skirmishes and ambushes, they were ordered to join their corps. At the peace few real grenadiers remained.

Notwithstanding the success attending certain irruptions of the French, they were obliged to retreat from positions so inhospitable as those they were forced to occupy. The roads became more and more impracticable; the carriages were completely ruined; the soldiers were enfeebled by want of food, which frequently occurred, and by the corrosive water of the mountain streams. Naked and miserable, they flocked in crowds to the hospital. From the same causes, and in the same places, a French army, commanded by the Duc de Valois, afterwards Francis I, was almost annihilated in 1512.

FOOD. PRODUCTIONS. The western Pyrennees are surrounded by an unproductive country. 20,000 rations per day soon exhausted it. The maize grown hereabouts, is not fit subsistence for an army, There are considerable intervals between the

fertile districts. Seldom could stores for the certain consumption of a few days be obtained. Amidst the sterile mountains, where scarcely any inhabitants could be found, the army demanded 800 quintals of grain daily. The produce of requisitions diminished daily notwithstanding every effort of the contractors, aided by threats and proclamations. At one time the delivery of bread ceased entirely : instead of it were delivered six ounces of rice, two ounces of pulse, one-sixth part of a French pint of brandy, one-twentieth part of a French pint of vinegar. Supplies had been drawn from Biscay and Alava, but it was supposed that these provinces were so far exhausted, that want of provisions alone would have forced the French to retreat, had not a pacification been concluded. A separate department of the army was obliged to be formed, to erect ovens, &c. for cooking provisions in these desert mountains. Animal food was well supplied; there were 80,000 beeves. Salt in plenty.Oxen were employed for draught, and with the horses made 15,000 cattle.

DISEASES.

Scarcely had the French taken up their winter quarters, when an epidemic disease, occasioned by the crowded state of the hospitals, broke out among them. The most experienced medical men considered it as the true hospital fever of Pringle. This destruc tive scourge swept off multitudes of men;' all the roads were covered with open carts, passing amidst regions of snow, laden with soldiers, lately fierce and active, now speechless and dying. These trains of sick were often sent along a line of more than a hundred leagues. Twenty hospitals were filled in a single day. The father scarcely dared to witness the last agonies of his son: he spread into his family the contagion that he had imbibed. The towns, the villages were depopulated. The wretches, who at their last gasp laid along the roads, in vain implored assistance; or, if they could reach a habitation, hospitality was refused them, lest they should introduce infection: they died in solitude: cast out. In the course of three months at least thirty thousand persons in the army and in the country around it, fell victims to this epidemic. Famine added its horrors. In the towns near the army the inhabitants had no other nourishment than potatoes. In the army the dis ribution of bread was exhausted, rice was supplied as a substitute, a food by far too insufficient for men exposed to violent fatigue.

The diseases were intermittent and putrid fevers, catarrhs, fluxions on the breast, rheumatisms, and the itch, which is very common among the Spaniards in these parts. The twenty hospitals contained from 4,000 to 5,000 sick. The hospital reports marked every ten days 11, or 1200 deaths: besides those who died on the roads, in private houses, or unregistered in the hospitals. The medical men (about 1500) also died more than half of them in the same space of time: and of the attendants almost or altogether every one. If the houses allotted to convalescent patients be included, the number of hospitals was fifty-five, on a line of an hundred leagues.

TRANSPORT SERVICE.

The number of drivers, &c. was 3204; horses or mules 5350. The number ought to have been at least, 25,000 horses: besides those that died, the remainder was so harrassed, worn out and miserable, that little service was derived from them. Often the allowances to these cattle were reduced to 5lbs. of hay and sometimes this allowance was stopped; such scarcity of forage was experienced in this indispensable department of the army. When all that was at hand was consumed, the increased distance from whence the consumption was to be supplied diminished the advantage to a trifle. Of 5,000 draught horses, 3,000 perished in a single quarte: of a

CAUSES OF SPANISH DISASTERS.

A great and leading cause of the reverses sustained by the Spaniards, was, the want of morals. Their stations and camps were filled with a multitude of loose women, who perpetrated the most scandalous excesses among the soldiery, and especially among the officers. These officers also, not contented with such disorders, were frequently absent in search of variety. The soldiers followed the example of their superiors; hence being void of emulation, and unattended to in their sufferings, they did not maintain in battle that energy, that discipline, and that steadiness, which accompanies a strong sense of honour.

THE BASQUE HUNTERS.

The Basque hunters are almost without exception tall men, singularly vigorous and agile. Born among the mountains, they inherit a boundless passion for independence, and their daily contests with the Spaniards about the limits of their respective territories, had rouzed in them an implacable hatred to that nation their lofty walk, indefatigable valour, complete knowledge of every track and passage in the mountains, their language, little understood, their barbarous shouts, and even their uncouth habiliments, infinitely diversified, all contributed to render them the terror of the Spaniards.

It was remarked by the French that the Spaniards had too few troops to defend effectually the extent they were bound to do, whereby their position though well chosen, and naturally strong, became weak. They also thought too much of sacrificing a little ground to the enemy: they might have abandoned the country even up to Pampeluna, without real loss, as it is little better than a desert. Their redoubts and batteries were usually placed on the tops of the highest mountains: whereby their fire when directed at distant objects was very uncertain; and when wanted to be effective near at hand, was useless.

STATION ON THE EBRO.

Miranda on the Ebro was esteemed a place of consequence by the French, because it has a bridge over the river: and because it gave them the choice of means for the attack of Pampeluna, which they meditated.

But, would they have been able to attack

"

All villages, the inhabitants of which had fled, were usually plundered: no injunctions to the contrary were obeyed by the French.

THE VALLEY OF BAZTAN.

In the Pyrenuees, by which one columa of French troops penetrated into Spain, is a land of enchantment amidst these regions of rocks. The earth is fertile, clad in the most lively verdure, watered by limpid streams, covered with grain and fruit trees, the houses and villages almost touch each other: the whole valley appears to be the asylum of happiness. It is about six leagues in length: but of very unequal width: in some places not twenty yards in others three or four leagues. It contained fourteen very pretty villages, with handsome houses; many of them inhabited by individuals who had acquired wealth in Mexico, and who took a pleasure in adorning the land of their nativity. The whole population might be 7,000 persons. The corn it produced was about three months vine is not cultivated: the riches of the dissupply maize about seven months! The trict consist in fruits: among them apples for cyder; pulse, and especially cattle, which graze neighbouring hills. The wool is not equal on the succulent pastures that clothe the in fineness and beauty to that of the breeds in the interior of Spain. Annual produce about 8,000 quintals of corn, and 15,000 of maize.

BISCAY.

Biscay, in 1787, contained 114,863 inhabitants. It is a fertile and hilly country. It contains mines of iron and lead. Excellent ports line the coast. The city of Bilboa is happily placed to receive the productions of foreign parts, and to favour their distribution in the interior. It has acquired a high degree of splendour. It is embellished with magnificent edifices, and public walks extremely pleasant. The number of its inhabitants exceeds 14,000. There is no other place in the province that could resist a coup-de-main.

ALAVA.

Alava, in 1787, contained 70,710 inhabi tants. It is an open country. Agriculture, the true source of wealth, is more flourishing than in Guipuzcoa,' and Biscay. It has not the same advantages for circulation; bu perhaps more of general ease of condition among its population. This may account for the smaller number of its inhabitants. The city of Vittoria, the most considerable town of the country, is situated in the midst of a charming valley. It vends many works in iron and serves as a staple for the wool trade carried on with France from Castile.