Works of Thomas Hill Green: Philosophical works |
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Common terms and phrases
abstract idea according to Hume according to Locke action actual admit answer antecedent appear aqua regia become Berkeley body called cause and effect ception chap co-existence colour complex idea conception consciousness consists constitute contradiction derived desire determined distinction distinguished experience extension external fact faint fiction given Hume's idea of sensation idea of substance identity imagination implies impres impression inference infinite divisibility knowledge liveliness Locke's doctrine matter means merely mind moral motive nature ness nominal essence notion original pain paragraph particular passage passion perceived perception philosophy pleasure possible present sensation pression primary qualities principle Principles of Psychology produce proposition question real essence real existence reality reference regard rela relations of ideas represent resemblance result sciousness sense sensible sequence sequent simple idea sion space speak Spencer substratum succession of feelings supposed supposition Theism theory thing thinking thought tion true truth vivid aggregate
Popular passages
Page 168 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 'at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 293 - The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind ; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.
Page 257 - As to the first question, we may observe that what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.
Page 107 - The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
Page 32 - When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.
Page 136 - The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series — the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author.
Page 346 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Page 31 - ... ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things : but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their signification are general.
Page 62 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one: each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.
Page 27 - I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result ; which therefore we call