But March, malignant, Vainly tries to mar The warmth diffused

In a steam-heated car ; Like those whose cheerful

Comfort none dispute Who travel in

The great Rock Island route.

The other verses are not so thrilling, but more instructive, as the true pronunciation of route is taught by varied rhymes on "confute," "suit," 'compute" (twice), "toot," (of the locomotive, in lieu of the vulgar scream,) "shoot," and "brute," (in connection with doggerel.") Critically speaking, the poet labored in veiling the hotel bills under the words "exchanging wealth for blessed health," and consequently made this faulty rhyme

WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY has had a twofold interest ever since college days, as its latest editor, Noah Porter, was a division master in the senior class before his elevation to the presidency of Yale. In fact, the book has been a Yale book for many years, and the editor speaks mildly when he commends the former college librarian, Prof. F. B. Dexter, for his conscientious labors, which so greatly enrich the recent editions. The difference between Webster and Worcester, in a practical point of view, is that in the former one can find what is wanted with less prior

knowledge, and this simplifying of a reference book is a fair illustration of the results of college teaching, otherwise familiar to all the bar as well in Chief Justice Waite, as in the luminous paragraphs of Woolsey's International Law, and Hadley's Introduction to Roman Law. The size of the dictionary may have had something to do with Mr. Evarts' ponderous sentences, as Ik Marvel and other contemporaries are not so distinguished. The new edition fully carries out the thought of furnishing a ready answer to many an off-hand doubt, in the Pronouncing Gazetteer, as well as the Pronouncing Biographical Dictionary, with its dates of birth and death of distinguished men and women.

PHILADELPHIA LAWYERS have reached that acme of renown, that they return silk umbrellas; and this, without saying that their chairs in the Law Library are marked by each man laying his umbrella across the seat, during his necessary absence Court business.

JOHN B. Uнle.

on

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ORDER. Before the adjournment of the Supreme Court of the United States for the holiday recess, the Chief Justice announced the following order :

There having been a Chief Justice of this Court appointed since the adjournment of the last term, it is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of said Court among the circuits, agreeably to the Act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz: for the 1st Circuit, Horace Gray, Associate Justice; for the 2d Circuit, Samuel Blatchford, Associate Justice; for the 3d Circuit, Joseph P. Bradley, Associate Justice;

for the 4th Circuit, Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice; for the 5th Circuit, Lucius Q. C. Lamar, Associate Justice; for the 6th Circuit, Stanley Matthews, Associate Justice for the 7th Circuit, John M. Harlan, Associate Justice; for the 8th Circuit, Samuel F. Miller, Associate Justice; for the 9th Circuit, Stephen J. Field, Associate Justice.

JUDICIAL ROBES.-At the opening of the present term of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on the first Monday of January, the members of the Court appeared for the first time in black silk robes or gowns, similar to those worn by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the New York Court of Appeals. This action was taken in response to

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movement inaugurated several years ago by the Law Association of Philadelphia, who petitioned the Court to adopt a distinctive judicial dress. The change has been received with favor by both the bar and the public, and adds materially to the already dignified appearance of the distinguished tribunal.

Upon the same day Hon. EDWARD M. PAXSON, the senior Justice, succeeded to the office of Chief Justice, the term of Chief Justice Gordon having expired. Two new Justices, Hon. J. BREWSTER MCCOLLUM, of Susquehanna County, and Hon. JAMES T. MITCHELL, of Philadelphia, also took their seats as members of the Court. Justice MITCHELL was for many years editor of THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.

JAMES C. SEllers.

CASE OF THE TRUSTEES OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.-The republication of 2 Parsons' Select Equity Cases (Penna.) induces me to mention a fact in relation to the case of the Trustees of the Bank of the United States,

reported on page *110, which should be noted in the margin of that book.

After the argument for the appellants (the trustees under the first assignment) was closed, the Court volunteered the statement that the rule, now stated in the sixth and seventh clauses of the syllabus, was incorrect, and the rule in Pennsylvania uniformly held to be otherwise. The other side did not argue the point after this intimation, in which all the Judges took part and expressed their views. Ultimately, the decree was drawn up, reversing the decision on this point. There was really but one point, for, as to the other points, they were settled by consent, and the decree will show this. The error of the Court arose from not observing what the Courts they relied on did, and interpreting their language accordingly. No Court before, probably, ever refused to permit a creditor to be paid on the security he held, when that had been turned into money which must be distributed, because he happened to hold another security. The authorities in Pennsylvania are more numerous than elsewhere, but perfectly consistent. The effect of the opposite rule would be to diminish the capacity of obtaining payment by increasing the securities held. If the decree in Lanoy v. Athol, 2 Atk. 444, which is cited by the Judge, page 145, is looked at, the meaning of Lord Hardwicke's reported judgment becomes very plain, and the exact reverse of what it was supposed to be. The property is ordered to be sold, and the proceeds paid to the creditor, irrespective of other securities. Then, it adds, if such sale be insufficient to answer the 60001. and interest, then the plaintiff is to stand in the place of the defendant. That is, the holder of the principal security, cut out from par

ticipation by the older security, is to have the benefit of any other security the holder of the elder one had after the elder was satisfied. The citation from 1 Johns. Ch. R. is incorrect. There is nothing there on the subject. Probably 4 Johns. Ch. R. 17 and 132 was intended. In the former, the demand was refused. In the latter, the point decided was that there was a right of subrogation after the debt was paid. The dictum on page 132 is to the point, but singularly misunderstood. The case in 17 Vesey really means no more than that, when the funds are ready, the Court will compel a creditor to accept payment out of the one that should be thus applied.

As I have known persons to be misled by this case, the reversal of which does not appear in the books, I thought you might be willing to let the profession know this fact.

R. C. MCMURTRIE.

January 3d, 1889.

A MANUAL ON the Law of WILLS as determined by the leading Courts of England and the United States, by Charles Fisk Beach, Jr., of the New York Bar, Editor of the American Probate Reports; assisted by Edwin A. Pratt, of the Louisville Bar. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Co., 1888.

Personally we do not like the " get up" of what is called the " pony" series. It may be the result of old foginess, but we confess to a decided liking for a page of fair preparation, good-sized type, and a reasonably broad margin; still we know that such matters belong rather to the realm of taste, and that many people whose judgments are worth quite as much as our own may have a very different opinion. Apart from its appearance,

we like the little book before us very much, and could wish to see its contents translated to a larger page. The book is not, and does not profess, to be a treatise, but it gives the law upon the topics embraced within its range in a clear, succinct, and satisfactory manner. The arrangement is very good indeed, the citations are numerous and not overloading, and the writer has, by no means, neglected the statutory law of the different States.

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF RECEIVERS, with particular reference to the application of that law to Railway Corporations, but including in detail a complete consideration of the whole subject, by Charles Fisk Beach, Jr. New York: L. K. Strouse & Co., 1888.

It is perhaps a little late to speak of a book which has already received such favorable notice from those so well qualified to sit in judgment, comprising not only editors, but active lawyers, whose estimation of a book is based very largely upon its practical value. An examination of the book affords us no reason to dissent from the opinion of those who have gone before us; diving into it in different places to observe the treatment of different topics, endeavoring, as it were, to catch the author unawares, we are met with clear statement of the law, abundant illustration, and evidences of attention to the latest phases of the particular subject about which we are inquiring. For example, see the subject "Leave to Sue a Receiver," §§ 652–662-more cannot reasonably be asked.

On the whole, Beach on Receivers seems to us a very good book, one which we are glad to have on our shelves, and which we expect to find very useful indeed.

HENRY BUDd.

FORENSIC ORATORY.-A story is now published of Gambetta, that he broke down in one of his early, if not his first, case before a bench of judges. He had committed his speech to memory. His generous and able opponent, seeing his confusion, moved the Court to postpone the trial till his young brother could present his

case.

If

On quitting the court-room an old lawyer, who had watched him narrowly, asked him to come with him, that he had a word to say to him. "You have oratorical talent; you can become an orator, if you will; all you want is to know how to go to work; and that I can tell you. It will never do for you to have your speeches by heart. Such speeches have no effect, even when well delivered. you mean to persuade men of the correctness of your views, and thus win your case, you must speak naturally, in your own words, in plain, every-day language, and without any straining after effect. You must only look to facts and the arguments in the law. Never mind the words; they will take care of themselves; see to it that you have your facts, arguments, points of law, evidence, well in hand, and the rest will follow of itself. Spontaneous

natural utterances have an immediate effect; they please, inform, persuade, instruct, convince; while polished, finely worded sentences have no other effect than to draw the attention of the audience to the speaker, not to the subject.

"Just state the case in plain language to me, as if you were telling a friend. Speak as if I knew nothing at all about it, and give me a clear statement of the points at issue. Juries want eloquence, because they don't understand law; judges want argument, because this saves them

trouble. Then, when you have stated all your arguments, when you have brought all your facts and figures to bear, you may close by appealing to the emotions, to the sense of honor, of justice, of right, of your auditors."

The young advocate had the good sense to act on the advice, and won; which, by the way, is the old story that is acted out by all successful advocates. As remarked by a Phila delphia lawyer, some years ago, in commenting on the efforts of younger men, "You are not worth anything till you are knocked down and gored a few times."

PROF. W. K. TOWNSEND, of the Yale Law School, has been selected for the corporation counsel of New Haven, Conn. The Journal and Courier remarks: "Professor Townsend justly ranks as one of the ablest and brightest of New Haven's legal fraternity, which includes a large number of able counsellors and brilliant lawyers. His position as one of the leading professors of Yale Law School does him additional honor. As senior member of the firm of Townsend & Watrous he is engaged upon one side or the other of many of the important law cases which come before our courts and the courts of Hartford. Public opinion is that the city's affairs will be safely and wisely administered in his hands. As a Republican, he has been a bright and earnest worker in our city, and socially he has a high position. From eminent Democratic sources he also receives praise, both as a man and a lawyer. He has led forlorn hopes, politically speaking, hitherto, when there was no hope of reward, and his appointment is therefore recognized all the more as a deserved honor."

THE EQUITY COURT OF CRIMINAL JurisprudencE.-The Constitution of the United States contains the following provision: "The President . . . shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." (Const. U. S. Art. 2, sec. 2.)

The Constitutions of the several States contain similar provisions, of which that of Illinois may serve as an example: "The Governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offences, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law, relative to the manner of applying therefor." (Const. 1870, Art. 5, sec. 13.)

Under this provision the following statute was enacted, and has been in force since July 1, 1879: "Section 1. Hereafter all applications for reprieves, commutations and pardons, shall be made by petition in writing to the Governor, signed by the party under conviction, or other persons in his behalf, which petition shall contain a brief history of the case, and the reasons why such pardon should be granted; and shall also be accompanied by a statement in writing, made by the judge and prosecuting attorney of the Court, in which the conviction was had. stating the opinion of said judge and prosecuting attorney in regard to the same; or satisfactory reasons shall be given to the Governor why such statements of the judge and prosecuting attorney, or either of them, do not accompany such petition and it shall be the duty of such judge and prosecuting attorney to give such opinion whenever such petition shall be presented to them." Section 2 provides for notice of the proposed application.

In some of the States a Board of

Pardons has been created. For the purposes of this article there would be little, if any, utility in setting forth the particular provisions of the other State Constitutions and statutes relating to the subject of pardons, commutations, and reprieves. Those of Illinois will suffice.

The great and august power of pardon has not received from the public the attention it justly deserves. It has too frequently been exercised in an irregular, undignified, and sentimental manner, and regarded as a disagreeable adjunct to the executive office. But in very truth the pardoning power is the crowning merit of American criminal jurisprudence. It surmounts an austere system of prohibitions and penalties, which every one is conclusively presumed to know, without regard to the fact of actual knowledge, or actual ignorance, with a benign and far-reaching power to temper justice with mercy, according to the circumstances of the particular case. This power is

to the criminal law what the Court of Equity is to the common law. The theory of the common law is that no wron shall be without a remedy; but experience has demonstrated that there are thousands of cases for which it provides none that are efficient. The Court of Equity was established to give adequate relief in such cases, and especially in cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, particularly where injustice would otherwise be perpetrated under the forms of law. In such cases the Equity Court will arrest the course of the strict law, and deal with the parties and the subject matter of the case, "as good conscience may require."

By the endowment of the pardoning power, the chief executive is made the chief magistrate of the government. That power makes him the