halting voice of compromise for all that, and availed little until the Press again took up the task of teaching Americans the almost obvious duty of Union and not Confederacy, of a Democracy stretching over a continent, and not merely to the accidental confines of an English colony, which had burst its political but not its geographical fetters. All this is due to the example of Alexander Hamilton and the pamphlet writers of the Revolution. Hamilton saw the danger to the proposed Constitution and turned to Jay and Madison and Duer for help in appealing to the public reason, with grand success. Jay was then Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the dissolving Confederation. The first number of The Federalist appeared in the issue of the "Independent Journal," issued in New York City, on the twenty-seventh of October, 1787, and was written by Hamilton. The first separate edition, in pamphlet form, appears to have been published the following January, but it contained only the portion which had been written up to that time. As to the subsequent editions and all the interesting details of the authorship and editorial labor, there is no more interesting account than that contained in the preface to John C. Hamilton's edition of The Federalist, published at Philadelphia, in 1864. From it the following is extracted: Jay was the author of five numbers, which were— Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence. No. 64. A Further view of the Constitution of the Senate, in regard to the Power of Making Treaties. These subjects are such as would naturally be taken up by one who had had so much to do with foreign nations, and who was in love with none of them. His burden of warning was— "Let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade, or compel them to depart." J. B. U. PREFERENCES. The decision in White v. Cotzhausen, in the S. C. of the United States, and the commentary in the American Law Register of June, 1889, at p. 371, omits all reference to the great principle that was disregarded in that decision and must be in all of the class. As to the decision it is really nothing but a recognition of a decision of the S. C. of the State where the deed was made and which was binding on the Court. As a ruling of the S. C. of the U. S. it amounts to nothing. is a little surprising that so very important and so very practical a rule as the one involved should have been passed over without, I believe, a remark. But it The point decided was, that a transfer of property is prohibited by the statute of Illinois, if it operates as a preference by an insolvent. This sounds well, even to one experienced in affairs, for nothing seems more rational, and the rule of this State to the same person seems but a lawyer's quibble. Our rule is this: Preferences of one creditor over another in an assignment are void. But this does not mean that an insolvent may not prefer one creditor to another, but only that he may not do it in a particular way. In fact, if the statute is only read before it is construed it is impossible to give it any other effect. It simply declares that the deed shall operate as a trust for all creditors-in other words, the clauses that operate as a preference are to be disregarded. To treat this as prohibiting a preference by payment, because of insolvency, is of course impossible. But there are two considerations, that are either of them quite sufficient to support the rule of this State, and it may not be useless to call attention to them. 1. Where a perfectly lawful act is prohibited by statute the Legislature may, if they see fit, prohibit it altogether or under circumstances or as respects forms. If there be one thing more important than another in the canon this at least has a high place. That the act was lawful except when it contravened a statute is distinctly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States: 7 Wheaton 577, 11 Id. 89. And every one knows that it has always been one of the features of all bankrupt law, which is purely statutory. But, 2nd, there is the practical consideration, the importance of which cannot be overestimated. This rule has always been the greatest difficulty in respect of the bankrupt law, and if there be difficulty in dealing with a rule which is rigid and defined by written words, in determining when a settlement by a debtor with his creditor can or cannot be made, what must be the difficulty when for this exactness and rigidity there is substituted mere judicial caprice, to be exercised without a single fact or a single rule settled further than the vague generalization, that an insolvent cannot prefer a creditor. Try to carry out this sentiment and see where we land. A debt can never be paid, a claim or dispute or any kind of obligation be settled, without putting the person who receives under a liability, till protected by some statute of limitation, of being compelled to repay the money with interest and costs; and all this without a suspicion of liability on his part to another. There is not in the proposition or rule any element of fraud or notice or intention. It is not required by the rule that either payer or receiver should know or believe or suspect that the transaction is forbidden. Everything rests on two facts to be ascertained by the suit brought to recover back the money: Was the payer insolvent? Was the payment a preference? The old bankrupt laws attempted to grapple with the problem. With what success in the cause of justice the reports tell us. But it should be remembered that these laws were statutory, they defined the cases where the rule could be applied. They were confined to a class, viz: traders. There must have been an act of bankruptcy. Singularly enough, even Courts when they have ventured to enlarge the statutory prohibition against preferences by assignors do not seem to have observed that if any act prior to the assignment, which is the thing specified by the statute, is by construction to be made part of the assignment in the sense that it becomes a prohibited thing the liberty of men to deal with each other is most unreasonably dealt with. is it reasonable to avoid transactions because one party sees fit subsequently to make an assignment and not to do so if he declines. Certainly if we are to have any reason in For the rule, we must agree that it is the inability to pay debts and not the making of an assignment that must be the reason for the rule which undertakes to say when a debtor shall not pay or compound with creditors; and it is evident, if inability to pay in full is to be rule, that nothing can be more hopelessly confusing than this rule. Can anything be more unwise than to prohibit all compromises or compounding by debtors, or to make the validity of a payment depend on the state of the payer's solvency, frequently unknown even to himself? And when it is to be done should it not be done by distinct, statutory regulations? Can anything be more unwise than to leave open to the vague notions of public policy rules which determine when a debtor's capacity to deal with his property R. C. McM. ceases? Philadelphia. THE ANNOTATION of White v. Cotzhausen, in the June American Law Register, seems to have drawn forth the above communication, by the remark, that unfortunately certain Pennsylvania cases (Blakey's App., 7 Pa. 449, and Lea's Appeal, 9 Id. 504), had become the established law in that State, instead of the principles laid down in Miner's Nat'l Bank App., 57 Pa. 193, 199, where inability to go on in business had been held to prevent preferences. The annotation generally sought to present facts, and not arguments or recommendations, and for that reason the underlying principle was "disregarded," that is, merely stated in the language of a Wisconsin Judge. The primary object of all such annotations is to reach the facts: such method of writing does not meet with favor with men who merely write for compensation, as requiring too much labor. It is humble work but valuable, if correct, as it may well be with care. Of course, the writer of the above communication does not mean to reprobate humble work. The difficulty, in all cases, is the same, and nothing but a bankrupt law will remove it. For even statutes like those of Illinois, allow both real estate and chattel mortgages, and all such transfers create very real preferences at times. The exception in such case is founded upon a very flimsy technicality; it is said that such instruments create liens and do not transfer title. Nor is fraud allowed to affect such liens if the time between the execution of the mortgage and the resolve to give up business is appreciable. It may be even one hour. The only remedy seems to be a bankrupt law, which shall give one rule for the whole Union, and a reasonably plain one. THE NEAGLE CASE.-The Chronicle, a few days since, contained an editorial entitled "A Peculiar Grand Jury," in which the recent action of the San Joaquin County Grand Jury in not finding an indictment against David Neagle was freely criticised. What is deemed "peculiar," is, that the Grand Jury of San Joaquin County did not disregard the principle, that the subordinate must yield to the supreme, and pass upon the merits of Neagle's case, by either indicting him, or ignoring the bill; whereas it would have been very “peculiar" had it done so. By acting upon the matter after the case had been regularly removed from its jurisdiction by a higher authority, it would have directly, and, contemptuously, violated an express statute of the United States, which provides: that "pending the proceeding, or appeal in the case mentioned in the three preceding sections, and until final judgment therein, and after final judgment of discharge, any proceedings against the person, so imprisoned, or restrained of his liberty, in any State Court, or by or under authority of any State, for any matter so heard and determined, or in process of being heard and determined, under such writ of habeas corpus, shall be deemed null and void :" Rev. Stat. Section 766. This is one of the cases mentioned in the three "preceding sections" referred to. Any action, therefore, of the Grand Jury upon the merits of the case, would have been in direct violation of this statute, and utterly void. Being void, any indictment found would be no indictment, and it could afford no basis for a future trial, and valid conviction under it. For like reasons, ignoring the bill could afford Neagle neither vindication, nor protection. It would simply be the expression of the private opinion of so many respectable citizens of San Joaquin County. The suggested action, then, whatever the result, would be an utterly useless proceeding. And more than this, an indictment found would necessitate an arrest, in pursuance of the indictment, in violation of the final judgment of the United States Circuit Court, establishing his immunity from arrest and punishment by the State Court, and its order for his discharge from custody, thereby constituting a contempt of court punishable by it under section 724 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which makes the disobedience or resistance "by any party, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command of said Courts a contempt." To have indicted and arrested Neagle for the homicide of Terry after his examination by the Circuit Court, and the rendering of its judgment that he was acting in the line of his duty under the laws of the United States, and the order for his final discharge from custody, would have been a disobedience to, and resistance of a lawful order, rule, decree or command of the Circuit Court, and a direct violation of the provisions of both sections 766 and 725 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Any action, therefore, upon the merits of the case, by the Grand Jury of San Joaquin County, in direct violation of these statutes, especially since its attention was called to one of them, and the section quoted in full in the |