THE LAW OF OFFICE Boys.—In a recent issue of the Law Notes is a very amusing article on office boys, which we print below in extenso. It is good warm weather reading, and we give it, although it is in a somewhat lighter vein than most legal articles.

The leading case, Limpus v. General Omnibus Company, therein referred to, is reported in 1 H. & C. (Exch.), 526. See, also, the important case of Howe v. Newmark, 12 Allen, 49, to the same effect.

It will be noticed that, in spite of the remarks as to the misdeeds of office boys, in the two cases cited in the article, the offenders were clerks.

Boys, in our opinion, ought, for legal purposes, to be classed under the head of animals feræ naturæ, so that the employer of a boy, if he allows him to escape and do mischief, should be liable without proof of negligence and without proof of scienter. We would put the employer in the same legal position as that gentleman who owned a monkey which got loose and bit an unfortunate plaintiff, and make him prima facie liable. A man should indulge in the luxury of an office boy at his peril, and be responsible for every outbreak by him, not only while he is acting in the course of his employment, but for the whole of the time he is upon his employer's premises. An office boy should be kept under strict surveillance. If this is so lax as to allow the demon-boy an opportunity to evade the eye of authority and give vent to his diabolical propensities for mischief by destroying, or committing depredations upon, the property of another person residing in the same premises, there is no earthly reason why his employer should not be just as responsible for his misdeeds as is the proprietor of an animal with known mischievous proclivities. We do not cherish any spite against office boys-it is their nature to be continually up to mischief.' They cannot help themselves; and for this very reason the responsibility for their misfeasances should lie with him who assumes to control them.

"It is a very common practice for a man to go out-for his lunch, for a drink, or what not—and leave his office boy in charge. Glorious opportunity for the untamable youth! He immediately seeks for an opportunity of giving the rein to his high spirits. In what more feasible and enjoyable manner can he do so than in the destruction of some property or other? Or, at least, if he is not animated with a positive intention to destroy, he proceeds to enjoy himself with such a want of thought and with such recklessness of consequences that his indulgence, however innocent, is pretty sure to result in disaster to somebody's goods and chattels. What fun it is, for instance, to go to his master's lavatory and turn on the water-to fill up the basin and float miniature boats therein! Suppose, while engaged in this amusing occupation, his keen ear detects the returning footsteps of his 'guv'nor.' Without another thought, save that of avoiding being detected, he rushes off to regain his own proper quarters. The tap is left untouched, the stream flows on, and the result is that in a short time the lavatory is flooded, the water leaks through the floor and penetrates the ceiling of the room

beneath, occupied by another gentleman, some of whose valuable papers it reduces to undecipherable pulp. Now, is the employer of that demon-boy to be answerable for his wrongful acts, or is he not? On the wild-beast principle-which, we contend, is the proper one to apply -he would be liable. But if this principle is not adopted, then the ordinary maxim, that a man is not responsible for the torts of his servant, unless they are done in the course of the latter's employment, will rule the case; and the master in the illustration we have given will escape liability, on the ground that it was in no sense within the scope of the office boy's authority to use the lavatory for any purpose-let alone the sailing of miniature boats.

"But let us leave the domain of theorizing and come to actual facts. There have been two cases decided on the point in question, which resemble each other in a most extraordinary close manner as to their facts, but the decisions in which are totally opposed. These cases are Stevens v. Woodward (6 Q. B. D., 313), a case decided some time ago and doubtless well known to our readers, and a very recent case, Ruddeman v. Smith. It may, perhaps, not be without profit to contrast these two cases, and to point out that the recent case has, we are glad to see, extended the responsibility of a master for the misfeasances of his clerk, by enlarging acts done in the course of the employment' to 'acts incidental to the employment.

"In Stevens v. Woodward, A had offices on one floor, B had offices on the floor beneath. A's clerk, one fine evening after A had departed for the day, went into A's lavatory-a private one, in which he had no business to go-to wash his hands. He turned on the tap; but to his surprise, and perhaps disgust, this operation was not followed by any flow of water. The water had been turned off at the main. The clerk, with a muttered imprecation, most probably flung himself from the lavatory and went home. But in his disappointment he utterly forgot to turn the tap off. Consequently, when the water was allowed to flow again through the mains in the morning it found egress at the open tap, speedily overflowed the basin, spread all over the floor, penetrated it and did damage to B's premises underneath. For this damage B sued A, and it was held that A was not liable.

"Now, in Ruddeman v. Smith, the facts were almost similar, save that the lavatory was one which the defendant's clerks were accustomed to use, and which they were not forbidden to use. In this case the defendant was held to be liable. Let us now see how the two cases are distinguishable.

"The great point of difference is that in Stevens v. Woodward the clerk was forbidden to use the lavatory, and therefore in using it he was doing a wrongful act; whereas, in Ruddeman v. Smith the clerk was at least impliedly authorized to use the lavatory, and therefore was not doing a wrongful act. But does this make any difference in respect to the master's liability? Clearly not; because when a third person is injured by the act of another's servant the question is not, Was what the

servant did to cause the injury forbidden by the master? but, Was the act done while acting within the scope of his employment? This is clearly settled by Limpus v. London General Omnibus Company, the facts in which case, we presume, are too well known to our readers to be recalled here. In fact, the question whether or no the master forbade the particular act which the servant was doing, and which caused the injury, is quite irrelevant. The sole question is-(or, previous to Ruddeman v. Smith, was)-Was the servant acting within the scope of his employment?

"Can, then, the cases be distinguished on the ground that in the one case the clerk was acting within the scope of his employment, and that in the other he was acting outside that scope? We do not think they can; and we are prepared to hold that if Stevens v. Woodward were to come up again for decision the law as there laid down would be deemed to be overruled by the decision in Ruddeman v. Smith. For, take away the factor of the clerk's having no authority to use the lavatory in the older case (which, as we said just now), is irrelevant, the facts are precisely similar to those in the latter case. In both, the cause of the injury was the negligence of a servant in the employment of the defendant. Why, then, was the decision in the first case in favor of the defendant, and against him in the second? The sole reason is that in the second case the Court took a broader view of the 'scope of the employment.'

"In Stevens v. Woodward, GROVE, J., asks, 'What possible part of the clerk's employment could it be for him to go into his master's room to use his master's lavatory, and not only the water, but probably his soap and towels, solely for his-the clerk's-own purposes? What is there in any way incident to his employment as a clerk? I see nothing. *** In doing that which his employment did not in any way authorize him to do he negligently left the stopcock open, and the water escaped and did damage !"

"Now, in Ruddeman v. Smith, the Court held that the defendant was liable; and the Lord Chief Justice said that without precluding himself from saying that the use of the lavatory by the clerk was within the scope of his employment, he decided the case on the ground that it was incidental to his employment. The defendant's counsel expressly argued that there was no duty in a clerk toward his employers to wash his hands; but Lord Coleridge said he was not prepared to agree to that; and HAWKINS, J., said that that must depend upon the circumstances and the nature of the employment.

"It is clear, then, that by widening an act done in the course of one's employment' to an act 'incidental to one's employment,' the liability of a master for his clerk's negligence is much increased. For instance, a clerk who goes to wash his hands is not acting within the scope of his employment, because washing his hands is not one of the direct objects for which he is employed. But it may be an incident' of his employment, for that may be of such a nature that it is necessary

for him to keep his hands clean. It would seem, then, that in some cases a clerk is not going beyond his agency for his master in washing his hands; and masters to whose offices a lavatory is attached should bear the fact in mind, and remember that a negligent use of the lavatory by the clerk may render them liable in damages to any one injured by that negligence. It should further be borne in mind, too, that no amount of forbidding the use of the lavatory to his clerks will diminish that liability. His only safe course is to have no lavatory on his premises at all, or, if he has one, to keep it carefully locked, and retain the key in his possession.

"Of course the case of Ruddeman v. Smith does not go as far as, in our preliminary remarks, we would like to see the law carried. The office boy is not likely to confine his unsurveyed efforts to acts incident to his employment; such efforts are, as a rule, very extraneous to that employment. For these acts, then, his master will still remain irresponsible, and the sufferer will have to put up with his injuries in silence, or else take the law into his own hands and box the offending office boy's ears on the first convenient occasion he can meet with him.”N. Y. Law Journal.

THE PAROLE, or conditional release of prisoners confined in the New Jersey State prison, is now provided for by the following Act:

"1. Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, That the principal keeper and the board of inspectors of the New Jersey State prison shall have power to establish rules and regulations under which any prisoner who is now, or hereafter may be, imprisoned under a sentence other than for murder in the first or second degree, manslaughter, sodomy, rape, arson, burglary, or robbery, who may have served with commutation time allowed one-half of his or her sentence for the crime for which he or she was convicted, and who has not previously been convicted of a felony and served a term in a penal institution, may be allowed to go upon parole outside of the buildings and inclosures, but to remain, while on parole, in the legal custody of the principal keeper and board, and subject at any time to be taken back within the inclosure of said institution; and full power to enforce such rules and regulations and to retake and to reimprison any convict so upon parole, is hereby conferred upon said principal keeper and board of inspectors, whose written order, certified by its secretary, shall be a sufficient warrant for all officers named therein, to authorize such officers to return to actual custody any conditionally released or paroled prisoner; and it is hereby made the duty of all officers to execute said order the same as ordinary criminal process; provided, that any prisoner violating the conditions of their parole or conditional release (by whatever name), as affixed by the principal keeper and board of inspectors, when, by a formal order, entered in the principal keeper and board of inspectors' proceedings, he or she is declared a delinquent, shall thereafter be treated as an escaped prisoner owing service to the State,

and shall be liable when arrested, to serve out the unexpired period of the maximum possible imprisonment, and the time from the date of their declared delinquency to the date of their arrest shall not be counted as any part or portion of time served; and any prisoner at large, upon parole or conditional release, committing a fresh crime, and, upon conviction thereof, being sentenced anew to the State prison or penitentiary, shall be subject to serve the second sentence after the first sentence is served or annulled, to commence from date of termination of his liabilities upon the first or former sentence; provided further, that it shall be unlawful to parole any prisoner who may at this time be, or hereafter be, sentenced to the New Jersey State prison or penitentiary, unless he or she has been a citizen of the State of New Jersey for three years last prior to their conviction.

"2. And be it enacted, That all Acts and parts of Acts, whether general or special, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be and the same are hereby repealed.

"3. And be it enacted, That this Act shall be a public Act, and shall take effect immediately. Approved May 13, 1889."

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR Programme.-The following are the heads of the programme decided upon by the International Labor Congress at its recent meeting at Paris:

1. Eight hours a day for the maximum day's work fixed by international law.

2. At least one day's holiday in each week, and no work on fête days. 3. Abolition of night work, as far as is practicable, for men and women, and entirely for children.

4. The total suppression of children's labor below the age of 14. and protection of children (regulation of child labor) up to the age of 18. 5. Complete general, technical and professional education.

6. Overtime to be paid for at double rates, and limited to four hours in each twenty-four.

7. Civil and criminal responsibility of employers for accidents.

8. An adequate number of qualified inspectors, to be nominated by the workers themselves, and paid by the State or the commune, with full powers to enter workshops or factories or religious establishments at any time, and to examine the apprentices at their own homes.

9. Workshops organized by the workers, with subventions from the municipalities or the State.

10. Prison and workhouse labor to be conducted under the same conditions as free labor, and to be employed as far as possible on great public works.

11. That no foreign laborers be allowed to accept employment, or employers be allowed to employ such labor, at rates of wages below the trade union rates fixed for their trade.

12. That a minimum wage be fixed in every country in accordance with a reasonable standard of living.

13. The abrogation of all laws against the international organization of labor.

14. Equal pay and opportunities for women and men for equal work.