Where a testament is, there must also, of necessity, be the death of the testator. For a testament is of force after men are dead; otherwise it is of no strength at all, whilest the testator liveth.-Heb. ix. 16.

SPECIAL NOTICE.-Twenty-five cents each will be paid for December, 1886, numbers of the American Law Register, if clean and perfect. F. C. Johnson, 1128 Walnut street, Phila.

WHAT IS A FIRE?-A curious point of law, bearing upon the responsibility of insurance companies, has just been decided in the Paris Law Courts (5th Chamber of the Civil Tribunal of the Seine), at the suit of the Countess Fitz- James v. The Union Fire Insurance Company, of Paris, by which it is ruled that insurance companies must indemnify all losses sustained by an assured caused by fire, even in cases where no destruction of premises has been caused by conflagration. The Countess Fitz - James insured against fire, in the above company, all her furniture and effects for 558,000 francs, and in her policy, under Art. 7, were mentioned her jewels, among which figured specially a pair of earrings, composed of fine pearls, valued at 18,000 francs. On April 17, 1887, one of these earrings, which had been placed on the mantelpiece, was accidentally knocked down by the countess and fell into the fire, where it was consumed, notwithstanding every effort made to save the jewel. Expert jewellers were called in by both parties to

estimate the intrinsic value of the property destroyed, and 9,000 francs was stated to be the amount, less sixty francs for molten gold rescued from the ashes. The insurance company refused to pay for the burnt pearl on the ground that there was no conflagration, that the fire which consumed the object was an ordinary fire; in other words, that there was no fire, and that the company was not responsible where combustion had only occurred by the ordinary use of a grate for heating purposes. The court, however, rejected this, and ruled that "the word fire, in matters of assurance, applied to every accident, however unimportant such accident may be, so long as it is caused by the action of fire." It was therefore ordered that the Union Company should pay to the Countess Fitz-James the value of the jewel, less that of the gold recovered, viz., 8,940 francs and costs.-Irish Law Times.

BICYCLES.-The Supreme Court of Indiana was recently called upon to review a non suit in an action brought to recover damages for being struck down on a sidewalk by a bicycle rider. The trial Court had held that bicycling was a form of pedestrianating and that the bicyclers had as much right on the sidewalk as any pedestrian. The appeal from the non-suit was argued in the forenoon. When the court adjourned for dinner, Judges Coffey and Berkshire started to walk to their hotel, and as they were passing out of the Capitol grounds a clumsy bicycle rider ran into them, knocking both down and badly bruising the former.

This practical argument had such a convincing effect on the minds of the learned Judges that they immediately overruled their unrendered decision and filed an opinion setting forth that a person who "rudely and recklessly" rides a bicycle against a man standing on a sidewalk is responsible for damages for assault and battery. After quoting an Indiana law forbidding persons from riding or driving on the sidewalks, the court says: "If sidewalks are exclusively for the use of footmen, then bicycles, if they are vehicles, must not be ridden along them, since to affirm that sidewalks are exclu sively for the use of footmen necessarily implies that they can not be traveled by bicycles. It would be a palpable contradiction to affirm that footmen have the exclusive right to use the sidewalks and yet concede that persons not traveling as pedestrians may also rightfully use them. We think, however, that a bicycle must be regarded as a vehicle within the meaning of the law."-N. Y. Law Journal.

WEEKLY NOTES of CASES, of Philadelphia, presents on its cover the anomaly of having a justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as the reporter of one of the local courts of the city.

THE BRAKEMEN and freight con. ductor ***** evidently considered it a dangerous car, which they and their comrades were expected to operate, and in language more forcible than decorous, they took occasion to express their opinion of it.-BRAGG, Commissioner.

(Communicated.)

IT APPEARS to me that the Supreme Court (Liverpool v. The Phanix, 129 United States 397.) do not perceive the inevitable consequence of their determination to recognize as the law which governs commercial contracts a system which they call the general commercial law as distinguished from the law of the place where the contract is made or to be performed. I do not speak of the fact that thereby another and hitherto unheard of element is introduced into the question of the construction of contracts, already sufficiently thorny.

But surely the court has put itself into a dilemma, as it seems to me, very painful to the national vanity. They have said, we will recognize the English rule of construction of contracts, but, although the New York rule is the same, we will pay no attention to it, even though the contract was made there. And this because we have once said the rule was different. That is, the first and largest commercial State and community (New York) is not entitled to a voice on the legality of their contracts, and their law is to be disregarded, while such a contract is sanctioned when made in any other nation.

The case was a bill of lading. which exempted the carrier from liability for negligence. The court agreed, that if it was an English contract, the exemption discharged the carrier. But, being a New York contract, it did not. And why? Because, by the commercial law, such an exemption is not permitted. New York and all the States of the Union, acting simultaneously, can

not change a rule of contracts; that is, cannot make a contract legal which was illegal only because inconsistent with public policy. Did any one ever put the illegality on any other ground? And by whom was the public policy ascertained? By the courts. No State or legislature ever gave countenance to the notion that it was immoral to agree not to hold a man liable for a mistake. The courts created the rule out of their own inner consciousness. All civilized communities have been at work changing it; but we are presented with the mortifying spectacle that the American Supreme Court refuses to recognize the modification of this rule by the States, while conceding the power to the English judiciary.

What is this rule? It is that a common carrier may not, with the consent of his employer, stipulate that he shall not be held liable for the acts of his servants-people that he really cannot control, in fact, and that the shipper will look to his insurance instead.

This profoundly sacred right of compelling people to submit to a peculiar and local view of the law of contracts might be justified if there was anything even supposed to be inherently right or wrong in the matter, e. g., the usury question. But there are some considerations that make the application of this judicial legislation rather absurd. Whence did this notion arise, that a carrier must be an insurer? the Roman law recognize any such thing? Even the common law allowed two exceptions, and all now admit another-fire. Is there any moral truth in the maxim, qui

Did

facit per alium, etc., that it is forbidden to exclude it by contract? And is it not conclusive, that Congress has long since cut up the doctrine by the roots-as they certainly did when they limited the liability to the carrier's interest in the vehicle of transportation. Surely, if it was proper to take away all personal liability and substitute another, there can be nothing savoring of legal immorality in releasing that substituted security.

Then what is this substitute for the law of the place of contracting with its sonorous title-what sort of general commercial law is that which is not known to the nation possessing half the commerce of the world? But what are we to say when it is announced that not only does it differ from the English law, but also from the law of Europe generally, and this grand system is reduced to a rule of the common law as declared by this court, which differs from the law of all, or nearly all, the larger commercial countries of the world, -France, Italy, Germany, Holland, p. 443, and England, p. 447. Whatever it is, it is a misnomer to call it general; it should be called the peculiar commercial law of this forum. R. C. MCM.

PROFESSIONAL CARDS in the Register for 1854 included those of Barker Gummere, of Trenton, N. J.; Chief Justice Waite; "War Governor" Curtin, of Pennsylvania; John Scott, Jr., of Huntingdon, Pa.; Thomas E. Franklin, of Lancaster, Pa.; Chief Justice Mercur, of Towanda, Pa.; James R. Ludlow, afterwards Judge of the Philadelphia Common Pleas

PROCEDURE REFORM.-The attention of the Bar and the public has been frequently called, of late, to the need for a reform in the present methods of procedure in the courts of justice. Not only have the delays and expenses of litigation become matters of every day comment, but the lawyers are beginning to feel the inevitable results of the defective system. The criticisms apply with equal force to the equitable as well as common law processes. Much of the complaint is directed against the lawyers themselves, it being apparently the common belief that they are the originators and upholders of the evils in the code of practice, and therefore responsible for all its shortcomings. While the profession will deem the censure unmerited, it behooves its members not only to repudiate the responsibility, but, also in their own interests, to bestir themselves to bring about, if possible, some measures of reform.

They must not fail to remind the public that it is the representatives of the people on the bench, and in the legislature, who determine how and in what manner and upon what occasions, the courts shall administer justice, and that they, the lawyers, are obliged to submit themselves just as other citizens do, to the laws as they find them.

It is so well known, however, that the influence of the Bar Association, if used in a proper manner, is a powerful factor in shaping legislation, and particularly in matters of practice, that the lawyers cannot fail to merit some measure of censure, if through inattention, or lack of interest, or for

whatever reason, they do not bring to the attention of the bench and legislature, their earnest wish to aid the public towards a radical change.

An examination of the evils complained of, will show not only that the lawyers are not responsible for them, but also that they alone are powerless to better the conditions.

The popular complaints are directed against the delays in the progress of litigation, the intricacy and length of the pleadings, the useless technicalities upon which parties may be tripped up, the uncertainties of verdicts resulting from the prejudices of juries, and, last, but not least, the heavy expenses and costs incurred by litigants.

It is not the present purpose to suggest a universal panacea for all these grievances, but to point out several matters in which a reform might readily be accomplished.

As our system of jurisprudence comes to us from England, the very antiquity of the measures and processes is often the reason why

we continue to use them. The prejudices of lawyers and the courts against a change of any kind is well known, but when the change involves a sacrifice of their dearest precedents, involved as they are in the sanctity of professional veneration, then it is that they are almost immovable. They seem to forget that law is a business as well as a science, and that connected, as it necessarily is, with the every day transactions of the world, it must needs keep pace with the world's advancement. Much of the criticism by the public

is as out of date as the imaginary evils to which it relates; for many improvements on the English practice have been introduced by our courts and Legislature, looking to the orderly and speedy conclusion of lawsuits. For instance, the establishment of short pleadings has dispensed with much of the old-fashioned verbiage, and our statutes of amendments prevent the loss of time from objections to mere technical errors. So also has the Pennsylvania statute compelling an affidavit of defence much shortened the methods of obtaining a judgment. The Pennsylvania Procedure Act of 1887, intended as a further advance towards simplicity, accomplishes its purpose in some respects, but the criticisms it has provoked, the questions that arise under it, and the attempts to repeal it, show how ill-considered a piece of legislation it is and how small a hand the lawyers had in it. How much better it would be for such statutes to be the result of the deliberate consideration of a State Bar Association or of a Commission duly appointed to recommend the necessary changes.

Notwithstanding all the expedients adopted and tried in the past, it is undeniable that suits do hang in the courts an unpardonable time, and which the parties involved cannot understand. It is the lawyers who bear the blame, and who suffer in pocket for all this, for there can be no doubt that matters have come to that pass when many possible litigants settle their difference out of court, rather than spend their money upon an uncertain result, and a certainty of delay.

Now, it may perhaps be argued that the amicable settlement of cases is "consummation devoutly to be wished" for, but, on the other hand, it is well known that such compromises do not always work substantial justice, nor are the results attained of any benefit to those cases where no compromise is possible and which therefore must always be settled by the

courts.

The question may be asked: Is there any speedy and practicable remedy for the evils complained of, which the lawyers or others could bring about? Several statutes on the subject have been drafted for submission to the present Legislature of Pennsylvania. These acts, while prepared by competent authority, have not been submitted to or passed the criticism of the Bar Association. Had it been so, they would doubtless have been presented with that endorsement and covered much more ground, for it is believed they do not touch some of the most crying evils.

It is now possible for a defendant,. on filing a demurrer to the plaintiff's statement, to arrest all proceedings until the next general argument list, heard but once every term. The result is, that it is possible for a defendant to delay proceedings sometimes for three months and without having the slightest defence to the action. Here is a cause of delay over which the lawyer, be he ever so anxious to push the case, has no control whatever. However futile the demurrer, the result is the same, for the court must pass on it. Under the new procedure act,