Geschichte Der Philosophie, Volume 11

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Page 300 - N'est-ce pas là traiter indignement la raison de l'homme et la mettre en parallèle avec l'instinct des animaux, puisqu'on en ôte la principale différence, qui consiste en ce que les effets du raisonnement augmentent sans cesse, au lieu que l'instinct demeure toujours dans un état égal? Les ruches...
Page 308 - Nous connaissons la vérité, non seulement par la raison, mais encore par le cœur; c'est de cette dernière sorte que nous connaissons les premiers principes, et c'est en vain que le raisonnement qui n'ya point de part essaye de les combattre.
Page 308 - Car la connaissance des premiers principes, comme qu'il ya espace, temps, mouvement, nombres, [est] aussi ferme qu'aucune de celles que nos raisonnements nous donnent. Et c'est sur ces connaissances du cœur et de l'instinct qu'il faut que la raison s'appuie, et qu'elle y fonde tout son discours.
Page 471 - To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us ; that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject ; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeneee of something existing without...
Page 489 - The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together ; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name...
Page 479 - The third is separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence ; this is called "abstraction:" and thus all its general ideas are made. This shows man's power and its way of operation to be much the same in the material and intellectual world. For, the materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them.
Page 444 - All knowledge of causes is deductive ; for we know none by simple intuition, but through the mediation of their effects. So that we cannot conclude any thing to be the cause of another, but from its continual accompanying it ; for the causality itself is insensible.
Page 489 - I confess, there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it ; and that is the idea of substance, which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation or reflection.
Page 307 - agit avec lenteur, et avec tant de vues, sur tant de principes lesquels il faut qu'ils soient* toujours présents, qu'à toute heure elle s'assoupit et s'égare, manque d'avoir tous ses principes présents. Le sentiment n'agit pas ainsi : il agit en un instant, et toujours est prêt à agir. Il faut donc mettre notre foi dans le sentiment ', autrement elle sera toujours vacillante.
Page 471 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.

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