"To be, or not to be," was the ever-recurring problem; and it is curiously interesting to trace the ambiguities of so subtle a casuist as Cicero in regard to death, and the doctrine of a future state.

We shall find in those admirable lucubrations of his, on the subjects of Religion, of Man, of Conscience, of Old Age, and of Death, as well as throughout his Miscellaneous Thoughts, that his views frequently seem to approach the region of inspiration; and that they are not only far superior to the transcendental doctrines of the modern German school, but may be advantageously contrasted with Locke and the opponents, generally, of the notion of innate ideas. So far was Cicero from maintaining "nihil esse in intellectu quod not fuit prius in sensu❞—that he, again and again, by the most lucid arguments, derived from the purest inferences of "Natural Religion" maintains that there is in every one a responsible conscience; thereby virtually yielding assent to the authoritative words of St. Paul, that, "When the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; Which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." He only then betrays his natural infirmity when, in deference to the authority of Plato, he endeavours to prove the pre-existence of every human soul from its innate ideas. Had he but been acquainted with the Bible, how would all his doubts have been put to flight by the knowledge that, when God made man, He not only breathed into him the breath

of life, but made him pre-eminently after His own likeness -in contradistinction from all other living creatures.

at.

These are matters too interesting to be merely glanced

It is necessary to confront the devout portions of Cicero's writings with others of a different tendency, in order to show that, without the Bible, there can be no reasonable account given of the origin, present circumstances, or future prospects of man.

It must be admitted that his opinions, in common with those of the whole Socratic school, were decidedly in favour of a future state. He plainly tells us, in the first place, that none but a fool can doubt the existence of a God: "Quid potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, cum cœlum suspeximus, cœlestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen præstantissimæ mentis, quo hæc regantur? Quod qui dubitet, hand sane intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit."*

In derision of the Epicureans he asks, whether it is not astonishing that any man could be brought to think that a world, so decorated and beautiful as this which we inhabit, could have been produced by the fortuitous concourse of gravitating atoms? Since, with equal reason, it might be supposed that, if numberless types, comprising the letters of the alphabet, were cast at random on the ground, they would form the Annals of Ennius, and so become legible. Or why, if such a concourse of atoms can make a world, can it not accomplish the much easier task of making a portico, a temple, a house, or a city?

*De Nat. Deor. Lib. ii. Cap. 2.

But now comes the difficulty. "Should you ask me," he says, "to define what God is, I must follow the example of Simonides, who, when asked the same question by Hiero, King of Syracuse, desired one day to consider it; on the following day, he requested two days more; then four; and so on for a considerable time, always doubling his demand. At length, when Hiero demanded to know why he did so, he owned that 'the more he considered the question, the greater he found was its obscurity."" Cicero, nevertheless, is led from the mere consideration of the human intellect, to the inevitable conclusion that there must exist some divine mind of a very superior order; and thus concurs in the opinion of Socrates, as recorded by Xenophon, that from no other source can man have derived his spiritual nature. For, with whatever fanciful ingenuity we may trace the constituent parts of the body to elements such as water, fire, earth, and air; nothing, he argues, of the kind has been attempted respecting the source of our mental faculties. And having decided, from these several premises, that there must exist a perfectly excellent and eternal Being, who is, therefore, entitled to religious worship, he deprecates the follies of superstition which everywhere met his eye, and exclaims with an energy worthy of a purer faith, and in words which I will not impair by attempting to translate them-" Deos et venerari, et colere debemus. Cultus autem deorum est optimus, idemque castissimus, atque sanctissimus, plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper purâ, integrâ, incorruptâ, et mente, et voce veneremur. Non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam majores nostri superstitionem a religione seperaverunt."

He further lays it down as a fundamental principle, that the gods are the supreme lords and governors of all things; that their goodness is equal to their power; that they are discerners of the very hearts of men; and that they therefore very well know who are pious and who wicked. "Can any one," he asks, "deny the weight of opinions such as these on the obligation of oaths, and of public treaties ? What numbers are restrained from crimes by the fear of future punishment! What sanctity must be inherent in any state, where a belief prevails of the interposition of the immortal gods as judges as well as witnesses !"*

He doubts whether men could be held together in society, or justice, the most excellent of all virtues, subsist without piety. In short, there would be no difficulty in filling a volume with quotations from the writings of Cicero to the same effect; they are redolent of the doctrines of a pure faith; and, with reference to the moral world, resemble the bright effulgence of the eastern sky, ere the sun has yet risen above the horizon. In numberless places he defines virtue to be " conformity to right reason;" and pronounces the testimony of a man's conscience to be preferable to all eulogy-" Mihi quidem laudabiliora videntur omnia, quæ sine venditatione, et sine populo teste fiunt; non quo fugiendus sit (omnia enim benefacta in luce se collocari volunt) sed tamen nullum theatrum virtuti conscientiâ majus est."†

"Those actions which are performed unostentatiously and without a witness, appear to me most entitled to

*De Nat. Deor. Lib. ii. 28.

+ Tuscul. ii. 26.

praise; not that we should act as if we were ashamed of our good deeds (for it is natural to us to be pleased with their being brought to light), but that virtue knows no theatre greater than conscience."

Such sentiments might pass as a paraphrase on the very words of our Lord Himself, who both tells us, in performing acts of charity, "not to let the left hand know what the right doeth," and yet qualifies this total absence of the motive of ostentation, by inculcating the duty of "letting our light so shine before men, that they may see our good works, and thereby be led to glorify our Father which is in heaven." He assigns, as his excuse for lending himself to the superstitions of Pagan Rome, that, in his opinion, the lower classes of no community could be kept in order without religion and the terrors which it inspires; but that, in reality, we ought not to be guilty of avarice, injustice, sensuality, and intemperance, even if concealed from gods and men. "Nobis satis (si modo in philosophiâ aliquid profecimus) persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avarè, nihil injustè, nihil libidinosè, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum."* And to make his meaning unmistakeably plain, he relates from Plato, how that Gyges, a shepherd of the king of Lydia, having gone down into a fissure of the earth, occasioned by violent rains, observed, if fables can be credited, a brazen horse with doors in its sides, upon opening which he discovered the dead body of a man of extraordinary size, with a gold ring on one of his fingers; this he drew off, and, putting

*Offic. iii. 9.