An Elective system tends also, in other material respects, to secure that free government, of which it is the most essential member. As it calls some of almost every class of men, to share in legislative power, and many of all classes to exercise the highest franchises, it engages the pride, the honour, and the private interest as well as the generosity, of every part of the community, in defence of the Constitution. Every noble sentiment, every reasonable consideration, every petty vanity, and every contemptible folly, are made to contribute towards its security. The performance of some of its functions, becomes part of the ordinary habits of bodies of men numerous enough to spread their feelings over great part of a nation.

Popular representation thus, in various ways, tends to make governments good, and to make good governments secure.These are its primary advantages: But free, that is, just governments, tend to make men more intelligent, more honest, more brave, more generous. Liberty is the parent of genius, the nurse of reason, the inspirer of that valour which makes nations secure and powerful; the incentive to that activity and enterprise to which they owe wealth and splendour; the school of those principles of humanity and justice which bestow an unspeakably greater happiness, than any of the outward advantages of which they are the chief sources, and the sole guardians.

These effects of free government on the character of a people, may, in one sense, be called indirect and secondary; but they are not the less to be considered as among its greatest blessings and it is scarcely necessary to observe, how much they tend to enlarge and secure the liberty from which they spring. But their effect will perhaps be better shown by a more particular view of the influence of popular elections on the character of the different classes of the community.

To begin with the higher classes.-The English Nobility, who are blended with the gentry by imperceptible shades, are the most opulent and powerful order of men in Europe. They are comparatively a small body, who unite great legal privileges with ample possessions, and names both of recent renown and historical glory. They have attained almost all the objects of human pursuit. They are surrounded with every circumstance which might seem likely to fill them with arrogance, to teach them to scorn their inferiors,-and might naturally be supposed to extinguish enterprise, and to lull every power of the understanding to sleep. What has preserved their character ?— what makes them capable of serving or adorning their country as orators and poets, men of letters and men of business, in as great a proportion as in any equal number of the best educat

*

ed classes of their countrymen? Surely only one solution can be given of these phenomena, peculiar to our own country. Where all the ordinary incentives to action are withdrawn, a free constitution excites it, by presenting Political Power as a new object of pursuit. By rendering that power in a great degree dependent on popular favour, it compels the highest to treat their fellow-creatures with decency and courtesy; and disposes the best of them to feel, that inferiors in station may be superiors in worth, as they are equals in right. Hence chiefly arises that useful preference for country life, which distinguishes the English gentry from that of other nations. In despotic countries they flock to the Court, where all their hopes are fixed. But here, as they have much to hope from the people, they must cultivate the esteem, and even court the favour of their own natural dependants. They are quickened in the pursuit of ambition, by the rivalship of that enterprising talent, which is stimulated by more urgent motives. These dispositions and manners have become, in some measure, independent of the causes which ori ginally produced them; and extend to many on whom these causes could have little operation. In a great body, we must allow for every variety of form and degree. It is sufficient that a system of extensive popular representation has, in a course of time, produced this general character, and that the English Democracy is the true preservative of the talents and virtues of the Aristocracy.

The effects of the Elective franchise upon the humbler classes, are, if possible, still more obvious and important. By it the peasant is taught to venerate himself as man;' to employ his thoughts, at least occasionally, upon high matters; to meditate on the same subjects with the wise and the great; to enlarge his feelings beyond the circle of his narrow concerns; to sympathize, however irregularly, with great bodies of his fellow-creatures; and sometimes to do acts which he may regard as contributing directly to the welfare of his country. Much of this good tendency is doubtless counteracted by other circumstances. The outward form is often ridiculous or odious.

*To be quite correct, we must remind the reader, that we speak of the character of the whole body, composed, as it is, of a small number. In a body like the French noblesse, amounting perhaps to a hundred thousand, many of whom were acted upon by the strongest stimulants of necessity; and, in a country of such diffused intelligence as France, it would have been a miracle if many had not risen to eminence in the state, and in letters, as well as in their natural profession of arms.

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The judgments of the multitude are never exact, and their feelings often grossly misapplied: but, after all possible deductions, great benefits must remain. The important object is, that they should think and feel;-that they should contemplate extensive consequences as capable of arising from their own actions, and thus gradually become conscious of the moral dignity of their nature. Among the very lowest classes, where the disorders of election are the most offensive, the moral importance of the Elective franchise is, in some respects, the greatest. As individuals, they feel themselves of no consequence; hence, in part, arises their love of numerous assemblies, the only scenes in which the poor feel their importance. Brought together for elections, their tumultuary disposition, which is little else than a desire to display their short-lived consequence, is gratified at the expense of inconsiderable evils. It is useful that the pride of the highest should be made occasionally to bend before them; that the greatest objects of ambition should be partly at their disposal: It teaches them to feel that they also are men. It is to the exercise of this franchise, by some bodies of our lowest classes, that we are to ascribe that sense of equality-that jealousy of right-that grave independence, and calm pride, which has been observed by foreigners as marking the deportment of Englishmen.

By thus laying open some of the particular modes in which representation produces its advantages to the whole community, and to its separate classes, we hope that we have contributed somewhat to the right decision of the practical question which now presents itself to our view.-Systems of election may be of very various kinds. The right of suffrage may be limited, or universal; it may be secretly, or openly exercised; the representatives may be directly, or indirectly, chosen by the people; and where a qualification is necessary, it may be uniform, or it may vary in different places. A variety of rights of suffrage is the principle of the English representation. In the reign of Edward the First, as much as in the present moment, the Members for counties were chosen by freeholders; and those for cities and towns by freemen, burgage tenants, householders or frecholders. Now, we prefer this general principle of our representation to any uniform right of suffrage; though we think that, in the present state of things, there are many particulars which, according to that principle, ought to be amended. Our reasons for this preference are shortly these-Every uniform system which seriously differs from universal suffrage, must be founded on such a qualification, as to take away the Elective franchise from those portions of the inferior classes who now en

joy it. Even the condition of paying direct taxes, would disfranchise many. The only reasonable ground, on which an uniform qualification of property could be founded, would be its tendency to secure the independence of the voter; but it is evident that such a principle, if pursued to its proper conse quences, would disfranchise great multitudes of the present electors. After what we have already said, on the general subject of representation, it is needless for us to add, that we should consider such a disfranchisement as a most pernicious mutilation. of the representative system. It has already been seen, how much, in our opinion, the proper composition of the House of Commons, the justice of the government and the morality of the people, depend upon the elections which would be thus sacrificed.

This tendency of an uniform qualification, is visible in the new French system. The qualification for the electers, is the annual payment of direct taxes to the amount of about 12. When the wealth of the two countries is compared, it will be apparent that, in this country, such a system would be thought a mere aristocracy. In France, the result is a body of 100,000 electors: + and in the situation and temper of the French nation, such a scheme of representation may be eligible. But we mention it only as an example, that every uniform qualification, which is not altogether illusory, must incline towards independent property, as being the only ground on which it can rest. The reform of Cromwell had the same aristocratical character, though in a far less degree. It nearly excluded what is called the popuJace; and, for that reason, is commended by the most sagacious * of our Tory writers. An uniform qualification, in short, must be so high as to exclude true popular election, or so low, as to be liable to most of the objections which we shall presently offer against Universal Suffrage. It seems difficult to conceive how it could be so adjusted, as not either to impair the spirit of liberty, or to expose the quiet of society to continual hazard.

Our next objection to unifomity, is, that it exposes the difference between the proprietors and the indigent, in a way offensive and degrading to the feelings of the latter. The difference itself is indeed real, and cannot be removed; but in our present system, it is disguised under a great variety of usages: It is far from uniformly regulating the franchise, and, even where it does, this invidious distinction is not held out in its naked form.

†The population of France is now estimated at twenty-nine mil lions and a half.

* Clarendon, Hume, &c.

-No broad line of demarcation is drawn between the electors and the non-electors, disposing them to mutual animosity, and either degrading the latter class, or provoking them to dangerous excesses. It is something, also, that the system of various rights does not constantly thrust forward that qualification cf property, which, in its undisguised state, may be thought to teach the people too exclusive a regard for wealth.

This variety, by giving a very great weight to property in some elections, enables us safely to allow an almost unbounded scope to popular feeling in others. While some have fallen under the influence of a few great proprietors, others border on universal suffrage. All the intermediate varieties, and all their possible combinations, find their place. Let the reader seriously reflect how all the sorts of men, who are necessary component parts of a good House of Commons, could on any other scheme find their way to it. We have already sufficiently animadverted on the mischief of excluding popular leaders. Would there be no mischief, in excluding those important classes of men, whose character unfits them for success in a canvass, or whose fortune may be unequal to the expense of a contest? A representative assembly, elected by a low uniform qualification, would fluctuate between country gentlemen and demagogues. Elected on a high qualification, it would probably exhibit an unequal contest between landholders and courtiers. All other interests would, on either system, be unprotected. No other class would contribute its contingent of skill and knowledge, to aid the deliberations of the Legislature.

The founders of new commonwealths must, we confess, act upon some uniform principle. A builder can seldom imitate, with success, all the fantastic but picturesque and comfortable irregularities, of an old mansion, which through a course of ages has been repaired, enlarged, and altered, according to the plea sure of various owners. This is one of the many disadvantages attendant on the lawgivers of infant states. Something, perhaps, by great skill and caution, they might do; but their wisdom is most shown, after guarding the great principles of Liberty, by leaving time to do the rest.

Though we are satisfied, by the above and by many other considerations, that we ought not to exchange our diversified elections for any general qualification, we certainly consider Universal Suffrage as beyond calculation more mischievous than any other uniform right. The reasons which make it important to liberty, that the elective franchise should be exercised by large bodies of the lower classes, do not in the least degree require that it should be conferred on them all. It is necessary to their security from