Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Volume 2, Part 2E. Frantzen, 1842 - Philosophy, Modern |
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absolute actions adeo animae Ansicht ars inveniendi atque ausser autem Begriff beiden Berkeley bestimmt Bewegung Bewusstseyn blosse c'est chose corps daher Daseyn Definition deswegen dicitur Dieu Dinge eben eigentlich endlich enim ens a se Entelechie Erkenntniss ersten etiam exist existentia Existenz existiren Gegenstand Geist Gott Harmonie hinsichtlich Ibid idea ideas Ideen indem Jahre Körper Kosmologie Lehre Leib Leibnitz Leibnitz's lich mais materia materia prima Mathematik Menschen Metaphysik mind Möglichkeit Monaden Monas Moral muss Natur natürliche Theologie Naturrecht nihil nobis Nothwendigkeit notion object omnes Ontologie perception peut Physik point possible potest Princip principium qu'il qu'on quae quam quid quod raison ratio Realität rerum sagt Satz schen scientia Seele sense seyn sive sowol Spinoza Spinozismus Substanz sunt System teleologische Thätigkeit Theil Theismus Théod things tout unsere Unterschied Vernunft vero verschiedenen viel vinculum substantiale Vorstellung Wahrheiten Welt Werke Wesen wirklich Wolff Wolff's Wolff'schen zuerst Zweck
Popular passages
Page lxxiv - ... or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.
Page lxxv - But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas?
Page lxxiii - IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination— either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
Page lxix - Now if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
Page lxxxiv - For, as we have shewn the doctrine of matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion.
Page lxxvi - ... secondary qualities, have certainly no existence without the mind. But, by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate anything from the reality of Matter or external objects; seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who nevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into primary and secondary.
Page lxxiii - The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things: and those excited in the imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas or images of things, which they copy and represent.
Page lxxvii - But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances; which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance.
Page lxx - To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which...
Page lxxxiv - I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all.