Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative JudgmentThis book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational? What place does morality have in the kind of life it makes most sense to lead? How are we to understand claims to objectivity in moral judgments and in judgments of rationality? When we find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with whole communities, how can we understand our disagreement and cope with it? |
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... simply mean different things by ' rational ' ? Then there is no real dispute . There seems in fact to be a dispute of sub- stance : The two sides differ on whether to pay more in the one case or in the other . It is easy to think that ...
... simply shows a respect in which we might hope to do better . What we should note , though , is that the funny cases — the cases where Brandt's account labels crazy acts rational — have a systematic import . The word ' rational ' , in ...
... simply be angry at will , or grateful at will . Nor can a person refrain from any of these things simply at will . What can be appraised as rational or irrational is not an emotion itself , but taking measures to nurture or repress it ...
... simply at will . There may be things I can do to cultivate an indifference to happiness , but that is not the same as being indifferent at will . In the case of inten- tions , matters are less clear than with preferences , but to ask ...
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Contents
3 | |
23 | |
36 | |
Normative Psychology | 55 |
Normative Logic | 83 |
Natural Representation | 105 |
Moral Emotions | 126 |
First Steps | 153 |
Normative Authority | 171 |
MORAL INQUIRY | 250 |
References | 329 |
Index | 339 |