Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative JudgmentThis book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational? What place does morality have in the kind of life it makes most sense to lead? How are we to understand claims to objectivity in moral judgments and in judgments of rationality? When we find ourselves in fundamental disagreement with whole communities, how can we understand our disagreement and cope with it? |
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... sentiments of fair reciprocity are central to our moral experience . Late in the book I grapple with Rawls's treatment of compromise and toleration . In this work I disagree both with Brandt and with Rawls at many points , but always ...
... sentiments: the sentiments of guilt and resentment and their variants. Moral wrongs are acts to be avoided on pain of these sentiments. Morality in this narrow sense is a narrow part of life, but still, perhaps, something we need as a ...
... sentiments : the sentiments of guilt and resentment and their variants . Moral wrongs are acts to be avoided on pain of these sentiments . Morality in this narrow sense is a narrow part of life , but still , perhaps , some- thing we ...
... sentiments . Hare thinks they express preferences of a special kind : preferences , all told , that are universal , in that they do not depend on who occupies which position in the situation to which they pertain ( 1981 , 107 ) . 7. Non ...
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Contents
3 | |
23 | |
36 | |
Normative Psychology | 55 |
Normative Logic | 83 |
Natural Representation | 105 |
Moral Emotions | 126 |
First Steps | 153 |
Normative Authority | 171 |
MORAL INQUIRY | 250 |
References | 329 |
Index | 339 |